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P R E F A C E 
The enormous output of work which has "been done on 
Iqbal i n recent years, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Pakistan, i s enough 
to deter any prospective research student. One would "be 
i n c l i n e d to think a f t e r seeing the Iqbal-bibliography that 
^ a l l possible avenues of research are v i r t u a l l y closed, 
i- that a l l that i s needed or had to be done, has been done. 
But, i n f a c t , t h i s i s not the case. Although every major 
bookshop i n Pakistan has a section on 'I q b a l i y a t ' , yet the 
t r u t h i s , that by f a r the greater bulk of the work done on 
Iqbal touches only a very l i m i t e d part of his a r t and 
thought. Apart from the work of some devoted Iqbal-scholars, 
including some European and American writ e r s (notably Pro-
fessor Bausani, Professor Schimmel, Dr. Jan Marek, and 
Professor Whittemore), most writings on Iqbal are merely 
r e p e t i t i v e and devoid of any deep insi g h t or c r i t i c a l appre-
hension. This applies equally to the work of Iqbal's 
admirers and his detractors. When the subjective element 
has been s i f t e d from the objective comment, one i s l e f t 
w i t h disappointingly l i b t l e to guide a student who wishes 
to understand the complex world of Iqbal's thought. 
As a philosopher, Iqbal has won wider acceptance out-
side Pakistan than i n Pakistan. Iqbal's p o s i t i o n as a 
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poet and as a p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e rests secure, but I q b l l 
the philosopher i s s t i l l a long way from being generally 
recognised. The average l i t e r a t e man i n Pakistan knows 
vaguely that Iqbal i s a philosopher and probably also 
knows something about some of his concepts (such as the 
concept of 'Khudl') but i f one were t o question him f u r -
ther, one would discover that to him the philosophising 
of Iqbal i s no d i f f e r e n t from the philosophising of most 
other poets. Most poets tend to philosophise, he would 
say, and so does Iqbal. Perhaps he philosophises a l i t t l e 
more than the others - that i s why he i s known as a poet-
philosopher. 
Nor i s t h i s the view only of the layman. While I 
was i n Pakistan c o l l e c t i n g material f o r t h i s study, I had 
an opportunity of meeting several post-graduate students 
reading Iqbal's philosophy f o r one of t h e i r M.A. papers. 
To my profound amazement, I learnt that most of them did 
not consider Iqbal a philosopher at a l l . Their opinion, 
I discovered, was based on one common idea - that there 
i s no system i n Iqbal's t h i n k i n g . Some of them a t t r i b u t e d 
t h i s lack of system to the f a c t that Iqbal had not w r i t t e n 
any 'text-book' of philosophy. I t i s rather surprising 
that Iqbal's Lectures - which, i n c i d e n t a l l y , are read by 
few other than students of philosophy - are not considered 
by many to be a philosophical work. I t i s undeniable that 
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the Lectures are hard to understand. The arguments very 
often do not follow a l o g i c a l order and are not l a i d out 
systematically. There are frequent re p e t i t i o n s and 
digressions. Nonetheless, the Lectures are a major con-
t r i b u t i o n to world philosophy. But even i f i t i s conceded 
that they do not constitute a 'textbook 1 of philosophy, or 
disregarded a l l t o g e t h e r , Iqbal - on the strength of his 
poetry alone - would s t i l l q u a l i f y f o r the t i t l e of a 
philosopher. There are, a f t e r a l l , as many d i f f e r e n t 
v a r i e t i e s of philosophers as there are of poets. A l l 
poets do not w r i t e i n rhymed verse; a l l philosophers do 
not wri t e 'textbooks. 1 
But the general idea - that there i s no system i n 
Iqbal's thinking - must be considered c a r e f u l l y . I n my 
opinion, i t i s the chief obstacle i n the way of Iqbal's 
recognition as a philosopher. This idea i s based on the 
assumption that every philosopher has a philosophic system. 
I accept the v a l i d i t y of t h i s assumption. Random philoso-
phising, however b r i l l i a n t , does not make a philosopher. 
There must be discernible i n the t h i n k i n g of a philosopher, 
at least the outlines of a structure formed by his most 
important ideas and concepts. The question 'Is Iqbal a 
philosopher?' can, then, be resolved i n t o the question 
'does Iqbal have a philosophic system?' I n my opinion, 
the answer i s - not just that Iqbal has such a system but 
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that i t i s remarkably consistent i n some ways - as t h i s 
study hopes to show. 
I t i s not possible to say precisely why so many readers 
of Iqbal - including students of philosophy - should f a i l 
t o see any method i n his t h i n k i n g . I t i s possible to 
suggest several answers. To my mind the two most impor-
tant causes or reasons f o r the widely-prevalent opinion 
that Iqbal has no philosophic system, are a) his prominence 
as a poet and as a p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e ; b) the fundamental 
opposition between poetry and philosophy. 
To a considerable extent Iqbal's prominence as a poet 
and as a p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e obscures his importance as a 
philosopher. Compared wi t h a poet, a philosopher's appeal 
i s n a t u r a l l y f a r more l i m i t e d . Many more people read Keats 
than read Kant. Furthermore when one has grown up believing 
Iqbal t o be f i r s t and foremost, a poet - as most Pakistanis, 
at least of the present generation, have done, i t i s not 
always easy to see him as a philosopher. Coleridge, f o r 
instance, was also a metaphysician, but to most people he 
i s simply a poet. 
Not only does Iqbal the poet, but also Iqbal the s p i r i -
t u a l founder of Pakistan, stands i n the l i g h t of Iqbal the 
philosopher. S t r i c t l y speaking, Iqbal was never a p o l i t i c i a n 
though he p a r t i c i p a t e d i n p o l i t i c s . As he himself admitted, 
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his i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c s was only secondary. But t h i a 
confession which i s of fundamental importance from the 
viewpoint of students of his philosophy, i s "brushed aside 
i n the enthusiasm of a young nation to make him a p o l i -
t i c a l hero. Iqbal was, of course, one of the pioneers 
of the independence movement. I n f a c t , i t would hardly 
he an exaggeration to say that i f there had "been no Iqbal 
there might well have been no Pakistan. The influence 
he wielded was tremendous. His personal reputation - not 
only as a poet, but also as a man of unswerving convictions 
and inc o r r u p t i b l e honesty - had a great deal to do with the 
r a l l y i n g of Muslims under the banner upheld by the QS'id-e-
A'gam Muhammad ' A l l Jinnah. Nevertheless i t i s wrong, i n 
my opinion, to give Iqbal, the p o l i t i c a l leader, precedence 
over I q b a l , the philosopher. The p o l i t i c a l circumstances 
of h is time had, of course, a considerable influence on h i s 
philosophy. But Iqbal was, ess e n t i a l l y a philosopher and 
not a p o l i t i c i a n . A p o l i t i c i a n ' s actions and utterances 
are determined, t o a large extent, by motives of p o l i t i c a l 
expediency. His philosophy, i n other words, i s derived 
from his p o l i t i c s . But i n Iqbal's case, his p o l i t i c a l 
views are derived from his philosophy. I t seems t o me 
that i f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s not c l e a r l y made, i t i s not 
possible t o arrive at a f a i r estimate of Iqbal as a p h i l o -
sopher ( p a r t i c u l a r l y as a p o l i t i c a l philosopher). 
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Something also needs to be said about the opposition 
between poetry and philosophy. A number of people have 
d i f f i c u l t y i n accepting as philosophy what i s w r i t t e n i n 
the form of poetry. By i t s very nature, poetry working 
through symbols avoids statement and prefers suggestion, 
whereas philosophy dealing with l o g i c a l categories and 
concepts, demands preciseness i n thought and expression. 
Therefore, i n a sense, a poet-philosopher i s a paradox. 
But t h i s paradox finds i t s basis i n human nature i t s e l f . 
There i s , i n human beings, a s t r a i n i n g both towards, and 
away from, d e f i n i t i o n of thought and f e e l i n g . This 
psychological phenomenon has found d i f f e r e n t expressions 
and outl e t s at d i f f e r e n t times i n the h i s t o r y of l i t e r a t u r e 
and philosophy. Sometimes i t has led to poetry becoming 
philosophical, as i n the case of the metaphysical poets; 
sometimes to philosophy becoming p o e t i c a l , as i n the case 
of Nietzsche; sometimes to a complete b i f u r c a t i o n between 
poetry and philosophy (the quarrel between the poet and 
the philosopher being an ancient one); sometimes to a 
jo i n i n g of poetry and philosophy, as i n the case of mystic-
metaphysicians such as 'Attar and RUml, and also as i n the 
case of Iqbal. 
Iqbal's philosophical system i s not something 'given.' 
I t has to be constructed from a number of philosophical 
i d e a s which appear i n his prose and p o e t i c a l writingSo 
I n one sense, Iqbal's thought consists not of one but of 
several systems, since he has dealt with and made c o n t r i -
butions t o many d i f f e r e n t branches of philosophy, i . e . 
epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of r e l i g i o n , 
aesthetics and p o l i t i c a l philosophy. However, the 
thread of some central ideas and concepts runs through 
these various systems and l i n k s them i n t o a larger whole. 
In t h i s study an attempt has been made both to ana-
lyse and to synthesise Iqbal's main philosophical ideas. 
The f i r s t chapter gives the important biographical d e t a i l s 
of Iqbal's l i f e and i s intended to f a m i l i a r i s e us wi t h 
Iqbal the man. The second chapter covers the f i e l d of 
epistemology. The t h i r d , f o u r t h and f i f t h chapters are 
devoted t o Iqbal's metaphysics. The s i x t h and seventh 
chapters contain ideas which have metaphysical and e t h i c a l 
import, but are, perhaps, best described as forming the 
bulwark of I q b l l ' s r e l i g i o u s thought. The eighth chapter 
deals with Iqbal's aesthetics, and the n i n t h chapter with 
Iqbal's p o l i t i c a l philosophy. 
Some important work has been done on segments of 
Iqbal's thought, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the sphere of metaphysics 
but so f a r no attempt has been made to study Iqbal's p h i l o 
sophy i n t o t o . I t i s hoped that t h i s study w i l l succeed 
i n f i l l i n g , to some small degree, t h i s wide gap i n the 
f i e l d of Iqbal studies. 
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CHAPTER I 
iQBATi - BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH AND INTRODUCT ION 
IQBBL'S ANCESTRY , K + 
s 
Jt 
(Payam-e-Mashriq, p.21k) 
Muhammad Iq b a l ' s ancestors h a i l e d from Kashmir. 
2 ' 
According t o I q b a l they came from Cakku1 Pargan Sdun i n 
T a h s l l Kotgan. Long "before 1857 ? they had l e f t Kashmir 
and s e t t l e d i n S i a l k o t , near the r i v e r Cenab, an i n d u s t r i a l 
town l y i n g on the trade-route "between Western Panjab and the 
Province of Jammd and Kashmir. 
I q b a l ' s .ancestors, were Brahmans of- 'Sapril^-sub-caste* — 
A Brahman belonged t o the highest caste of Hindis and was 
known f o r the s u b t l e t y o f h i s i n t e l l e c t and h i s f i n e 
a e s t h e t i c s e n s i b i l i t y . I q b a l was proud o f h i s Brahman ancestry. 
1 . My body comes from the paradise of Kashmir, 
My heart from the sanctuary of H i j a z and my song from Shiraz, 
2. Wahld-ud-dln. F. S. Rozgar-e-Faalr. Karachi, V o l . 1 , ( 5 t h 
e d i t i o n I965) p. 238. 
3. I b i d , p. 239-
2h 
1 ( B a q i y a t - e - I q b f l , p.225) 
p _ (Zabur-e-'Ajam, P«17) 
Regarding h i s ancestors' sub-caste 'Sapru,' I q b a l 
himself throws l i g h t on the etymology of the word: "With 
the advent of Muslims i n Kashmir, the Brahmans of Kashmir 
were, by v i r t u e of t h e i r conservatism or f o r some other 
reasons, not favourably i n c l i n e d towards the Muslim sciences 
and t h e i r language. The f i r s t group among them t h a t 
devoted i t s e l f t o a study of the Persian language e t c . , and 
a f t e r a t t a i n i n g p r o f i c i e n c y t h e r e i n won f o r i t s e l f the 
confidence and t r u s t of Muslim r u l e r s earned the t i t l e of 
'Sapru'. 'Sapru' i s o r d i n a r i l y understood t o mean a 
person, who i s the f i r s t t o take a step towards l e a r n i n g . . . 
My father, held t h a t the e p i t h e t was used by- the-Brahmans of 
Kashmir t o express t h e i r d isapproval and contempt f o r those 
of t h e i r kinsmen who had instead of t h e i r ancient l i t e r a -
t u r e a p p l i e d themselves to the p u r s u i t of I s l a m i c 
1. Mir and Mirza have staked t h e i r heart and f a i t h on p o l i t i c s , 
I t i s j u s t t h i s son of a Brahman who knows the secrets 
( o f r e a l i t y ) . 
2. Look at me f o r m Hindustan you w i l l not see another 
Son of Brahman f a m i l i a r w i t h the secrets of Rum and Tabriz. 
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s t u d i e s . Gradually the name acquired a permanent a s s o c i a t i o n 
and came t o "be regarded as a sub-caste. The l a t e Dlwan Tek 
Cand, once a Commissioner i n the Panjab, was a great student 
of Philosophy. I n a meeting at Ambala he t o l d me t h a t the 
word 'Saprtt' was derived from 'Shahpur' an ancient I r a n i a n 
King, and t h a t the Saprxls were of I r a n i a n o r i g i n , who had 
migrated t o Kashmir "before the advent of Islam i n I r a n . 
They however, came t o "be regarded as Brahmans "because of 
t h e i r s u perior i n t e l l e c t and wisdom." 
One of Iq b a l ' s ancestors was known as "Lo l H a j l " 
(Lover of H I D I ) who performed many pilgrimages t o Mecca 
on f o o t . He "became a d i s c i p l e of Baba NasIr-ud-DIn who 
was an outstanding s a i n t . One of the descendants o f 
*Lol Haj^' was a mystic Muhammad Akbar whose p i e t y was 
3 
h e l d i n esteem. I n the t h i r d l i n e of h i s succession was 
Shaikh Jamal Din. E i t h e r he, or h i s f o u r sons namely, 
'Abdul Rahman, Muhammad Ramzan, Muhammad R a f l q , and Muhammad 
'Abdullah, migrated t o S i a l k o t , at the end o f the eighteenth 
or the beginning of the n i n e t e e n t h century, Shaikh Ntlr 
Muhammad, who was the f a t h e r of I q b a l was the eleventh son 
1. I g b a l ' s l e t t e r t o MunshI Muhammad Din Fauq, E d i t o r of "The 
Kashmiri," Lahore, dated 16.1.1934, as r e f e r r e d t o by 
Qur a i s h I , M.A. "Aspects of I q b a l ' 6 Biography" I q b a l , 
Lahore, J u l y 1958, V o l . V I I , No.l, pp 65-66. 
2. Wahld-ud-dln, F.S. Rozgar-e-Faqlr, V o l . I I , (1st E d i t i o n 
1964) p. 114. 
3. Q u r a i s h I , M.A. "Aspects of Iq b a l ' s Biography," p. 69. 
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of Shaikh Muhammad RafTq. 
Nur Muhammad had a small but successful c l o t h i n g 
business i n S i a l k o t . He had fou r daughters and two sons. 
I q b a l was the younger of the two sons. Shaikh Nur 
Muhammad had not received a r e g u l a r education but he was 
by no means i l l i t e r a t e or mentally u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d . ^ He 
was a deeply r e l i g i o u s man, a man who l i v e d h i s r e l i g i o n , 
and added t o hi s p i e t y was a deep s t r a i n of mysticism. 
I q b a l learned a good deal from his f a t h e r . To h i s l a s t 
day he was t o remember how one day h i s f a t h e r had said t o 
him t h a t w h i l e reading the Qor'an i t was necessary f o r him 
t o b e l i e v e t h a t the Book was meant s p e c i a l l y f o r him and 
— 2 
t h a t A l l a h Himself conversed w i t h him. Perhaps i t was the 
memory of h i s f a t h e r ' s e x h o r t a t i o n which i n s p i r e d the l i n e s 
3 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 112)_ _ - -
1. Wahtld-ud-din, P.S. Rozgar-e-Faqir, V o l . 1, p .2^0.-
2. Nadvi, A.S. Iqbal-e-Kamil A'zarngarh, 19U8, p. U. 
3» Unless the Book ( t h e Qor'an) i s revealed t o your conscience, 
The knots cannot be u n t i e d by RazT or the author of the 
Kashshaf (Abu'l-Qasim Mahmud Zamakhsharl). 
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I q b a l has also r e f e r r e d t o his f o r e f a t h e r s ' p r e d i -
l e c t i o n f o r mysticism. To h i s son JavTd he wrote: 
4 ,A, 
1 
(Zarb-e-Kallm, p. 86) 
A reference t o i t was made also by Akbar Allahabad! who 
wrote on the death of Iqb a l ' s mother:-
2 s S' ' 
No account, however b r i e f , of Iq b a l ' s f a m i l y background 
would be complete without a mention of h i s mother Imam B l b i , 
who belonged t o a Kashmiri f a m i l y i n Sambaryal, D i s t r i c t 
S i a l k o t . ^ She was a wise and pious lady known f o r her 
kindness and s p i r i t of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . To her memory I q b a l 
has dedicated one of the most b e a u t i f u l and moving elegies 
i n the language. His glowing t r i b u t e t o her 
l^ButtThe house of which you are the l i g h t , 
Has a t a s t e f o r mysticism. 
2. The q u a l i t i e s which were born i n I q b a l , 
Which endeared his name t o the n a t i o n , 
Bear witness t o the f a c t t h a t h i s parents were pious, 
Godly and c h a r i t a b l e and understood the secrets ( o f r e a l i t y ) 
(Quoted by Qur a i s h l , M.A. "Aspects of I q b a l ' s Biography"# 
p» 70)., . 
3. WahTd-ud-DTn, P.S. Rozgar-e-Faqlr, V o l . I I , pp 133-146. 
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V ^ A °^ ^  ->' ^ i ^ 
1 
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 250) 
has made immortal the image of a lady who passed her days 
i n q u i e t anonymity amongst her dear ones. 
Iqbal's devotion t o h i s e l d e r b r o t h e r Shaikh 'Ajija 
Muhammad (1859-1940) deserves t o be mentioned. Shaikh 
- 4Ata Muhammad looked upon I q b a l almost as a son and helped 
him i n every way. Many i n c i d e n t s are known which p o i n t 
t o the great love the two brothers had f o r each other. 
For h i s b r o t h e r the poet prayed:-
2 
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 97) 
1« Because of your guidance my d e s t i n y became luminous as a s t a r 
The house of my forefathers'became a storehouse of honour. 
I n the Book of L i f e your l i f e was a golden page, 
I t was a lesson i n the ways of r e l i g i o n and the w o r l d . 
2. That second Yusuf t o me, the l i g h t of Love's assembly, 
Whose brotherhood i s the comfort of my l i f e , 
whose a f f e c t i o n o b l i t e r a t e d the d i f f e r e n c e s of you and I , 
And reared me i n an atmosphere of l o v e , 
May he be happy as a rose i n the garden of t h i s w o r l d , 
For he, l i f e of my l i f e , i s dearer t o me than l i f e . 
S 
One t h i n g stands c l e a r even a f t e r a cursory glance 
at I q b a l ' s background. He was proud of h i s h e r i t a g e -
proud of i t because, i n a sense, i t had made him what he 
was - a man not very w e l l - o f f "by w o r l d l y standards but 
w e l l aware of h i s s p i r i t u a l wealth and h i s love f o r God. 
Perhaps i t i s pos s i b l e t o see i n the quiet p r i d e which 
I q b a l took i n h i s lineage andlegacy, the r e f l e c t i o n o f a 
greater p r i d e - the supreme p r i d e which he took i n being 
a man which made him audacious enough t o f l i n g a challenge 
before the Almighty: 
1 ( b a l - e - J i b r i l , p.21) 
I n the vast annals of h i s t o r y , i t i s hard t o f i n d a person 
who took more joy and p r i d e i n being a man than the humble 
t a i l o r ' s son who was born i n a small Panjab town and whose 
b i r t h was not even r e g i s t e r e d . 
DATE -OF BIRTH 
I q b a l was born i n S i a l k o t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y w h i l e there 
i s complete agreement about the place of h i s b i r t h , there 
i s considerable disagreement about the date on which 
1 . P r i c e l e s s treasure i s the agony and burning of d e s i r e , 
I would not exchange my manhood f o r the g l o r y of Godhead. 
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he was born. Most o f t e n the date i s given as 1873, 
2 m 
or more s p e c i f i c a l l y as 22 February, 1873• ^he main 
reason f o r regarding t h i s year and date as I q b a l ' s date 
of " b i r t h i s t h a t i n the municipal records there i s an 
ent r y r e l a t i n g t o the b i r t h of a son born t o Shaikh Mir 
Muhammad. One research scholar has been able t o c o l l e c t 
the evidence of members of I q b a l ' s f a m i l y and a f f i r m s 
t h a t the record i s a u t h e n t i c but t h a t the son r e f e r r e d 
t h e r e i n t o i s not I q b a l but an elder b r o t h e r who d i e d i n 
inf a n c y . I q b a l ' s own b i r t h was not recorded but such 
an occurrence was by no means uncommon at t h a t t i m e . 
Some w r i t e r s have given I q b a l ' s year of b i r t h as 
1876.^ - When I q b a l submitted h i s Ph.D. t h e s i s a t Munich 
U n i v e r s i t y i n 1908, he attached a b i o g r a p h i c a l note t o 
i t . I n t h i s note he wrote t h a t h i s date of b i r t h was 
the 3rd of Z i ' l - q a ' d 129U A.H. (A.D. 1876). I876 was, 
t h e r e f o r e , accepted as the c o r r e c t year of h i s b i r t h . 
5 
Professor Jan Marek has shown, however, t h a t the c o r r e c t 
conversion of 3rd Z i ' l - q a ' d 129k t o a date i n the 
1 . As f o r instance i n Schimmel, A.M. "Muhammad I q b a l (1873-
1938)" Die Welt des Islams. Leiden, 195U, No. I l l , 
p. LU5; S a l i k , A.M. Z i k r - e - I q b a l , Lahore, 1955, p. 10. 
2 . As f o r instance i n Beg, A. A. The Poet o f the East 
Lahore, 1961, p. U. 
3 . Wahid-ud-din, F. S. Rozgar-e-Faqlr. V o l . 1, pp 229-237. 
k- As f o r instance Smith, W. C. Modern Islam i n I n d i a , 
London, 19^6, p. 101. 
5. Marek, J. "The Date of Muhammad Iqb a l ' s B i r t h " Archiv 
O r i e n t a l n i , Prague, 1958, pp 617-620. 
C h r i s t i a n era would be t o November 9, A.D. 1877. FaqTr 
S a i y i d Wahid-ud-dln 1 also supports the idea of November 
9 as being the date of I q b a l ' s b i r t h . He has a r r i v e d 
at t h i s conclusion by means of h i s personal contact w i t h 
members of I q b a l ' s f a m i l y . (For instance, he mentions 
t h a t i t was common b e l i e f i n I q b a l ' s f a m i l y t h a t he was 
born on a F r i d a y . Now from the years 1298 A.H. t o 1296 
A.H. only the 3rd of Z i ' l - q a ' d of the year 129U f a l l s on 
a F r i d a y . ) 2 I t has also been point e d out- 5 t h a t i f 
November 9, 1877 i s accepted as I q b a l ' s date of b i r t h 
i t would accord b e t t e r w i t h the d i f f e r e n t phases of h i s 
academic l i f e a t school, college and U n i v e r s i t y than i f 
i t i s assumed t o have been as e a r l y as 1873* Since the 
conversion of the Muslim era i n t o the C h r i s t i a n era i s a 
v ery complicated process i n v o l v i n g complex mathematical 
c a l c u l a t i o n s , I q b a l made an approximate r a t h e r than an 
accurate conversion. 1 4' A f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n of the 
i l l u m i n a t i n g studies.^ devoted t o the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h i s — 
p o i n t , i t i s now g e n e r a l l y being accepted t h a t November 
1. Wahid-ud-din, F.S. Rozgar-e-Faqlr. V o l . I , pp 229-237. 
2. i b i d , p. 232. 
3. Schimmel, A.M. G a b r i e l s ' Wing, Leiden, 1963, p. 35. 
i j . . Vahid, S.A. "Date of Iqbal's B i r t h " I q b a l Review, 
Karachi, October I96U, p. 21-32. 
5. I n p a r t i c u l a r the w r i t i n g s of Wahid-ud-dTn, F. S. 
Marek, J. and Vahid, S.A. 
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9~ • 1877 i s the date of I q b a l ' s b i r t h . 
EDUCATION 
Like c h i l d r e n from most l a t e - n i n e t e e n t h century-
lower middle class Muslim f a m i l i e s I q b a l s t a r t e d h i s 
education i n a 'maktab* i n S i a l k o t . He was a good 
and conscientious student and won many d i s t i n c t i o n s 
throughout h i s academic career. He won scholarships 
f o r h i s performance i n class V Examination, the Middle 
Examination (which he passed i n 1891) and the M a t r i c u -
l a t i o n Examination (which he passed i n 1893). Apart 
from h i s f a m i l y , perhaps the strongest i n f l u e n c e i n 
Iq b a l ' s e a r l y academic l i f e was t h a t of Maulana Mir 
Hasan who was a f r i e n d of h i s f a t h e r and a renowned 
• 
scholar of Arabic and Persian. Maulana Mir Hasan was 
born on 8 A p r i l , ISkh at Flrozwala, D i s t r i c t Gujranwala, 
and died on 25, September, 1929,1 nine years before the 
death of h i s i l l u s t r i o u s p u p i l . Maulana Mir Hasan 
taught I q b a l at the Scotch-Mission School, S i a l k o t , which-
l a t e r became an Intermediate College. I q b a l passed the 
F.A. Examination i n 1895 w i t h d i s t i n c t i o n and once again 
won a scholarship. 
1. 'Jbid, A. A. Talmlhat-e-Iqbal, Lahore, 1959, P. 1+9 
2. Singh, I . The Ardent P i l g r i m , London, 1951, P. 9. 
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Maulana Mir Hasan encouraged I q b a l i n every way and 
besides g i v i n g him a serious i n t r o d u c t i o n t o Persian 
l i t e r a t u r e , he was also responsible f o r i n c u l c a t i n g i n 
I q b a l a deep sense of dedication t o I s l a m i c c u l t u r e and 
1 _ 
l i t e r a t u r e . The love and g r a t i t u d e t h a t I q b a l cherished 
f o r h i s teacher d i d not diminish w i t h time. I n 1905, on 
his way t o England, when he v i s i t e d the shrine of Ni^arn-
ud-din A u l i y a at D e l h i , he r e c i t e d h i s w e l l known poem 
' I l t i j a ' - e - M u s a f i r > c ~ i n which he r e f e r r e d thus t o h i s o l d 
teacher:-
iS 
1 «= — 
(Bang-e-Dara, pp 96-97) _ 
I n 1°22, when Iqbal's name was recommended f o r k n i g h t -
hood, he i n s i s t e d t h a t his o l d teacher be given the t i t l e 
1. Beg, A. A. The Poet of the East, p.7. 
2. That l i g h t of the revered house of ' A l l , 
Whose abode w i l l always be as sacred as the Ka'ba to me. 
And whose being caused the embryo of desire t o grow w i t h i n mej 
Developing i n me by means of h i s humanity and benevolence, 
a b e t t e r i n s i g h t i n t o r e a l i t y . 
Pray t h a t the Lord of sky and of the e a r t h 
Blesses me by g r a n t i n g i t t o me t o be h i s p i l g r i m once more. 
3k 
of Shams-ul-'Ulama. When asked i f h i s teacher had produced 
a work of note, I q b a l i s reported t o have said t h a t he 
was himself the l i v i n g book of h i s t u t o r . 1 Since the 
Scotch Mission College at S i a l k o t had no degree classes 
i n 1895 I q b a l moved t o Government College, Lahore. He 
was once more very f o r t u n a t e i n the choice of h i s teacher, 
and came under the i n f l u e n c e of Mr. ( l a t e r S i r ) Thomas 
W. Arnold, who a f t e r ten years a t 'Aligarh had j o i n e d the 
Government College, Lahore, i n I898 as Professor of 
Philosophy. He i n i t i a t e d I q b a l t o the methods of 
c r i t i c a l reasoning and the s c i e n t i f i c approach of the 
West t o the problems of l i f e . When S i r Thomas Arnold 
resigned on 26 February, I9OI4., and r e t u r n e d t o England, 
I q b a l was deeply aggrieved. I n a poem dedicated t o 
Arnold he wrote:- ^ 
C J J JA-JL , J J>T U-L*> <^ >~>1 
2(Bang-e-Dara, pj. 7J)' 
1. Wahid-ud-dln, F.S. Rozgar-e-FaqgTr, V o l . I , p. kk» 
2. The t i n y p a r t i c l e of my heart was soon t o expand t o hold 
the sun, 
The broken m i r r o r was soon t o become a r e f l e c t o r of the 
w o r l d . 
The t r e e of Desire was soon t o become green, 
Ah1, who knows what I was soon t o become. 
The cloud of grace withdrew from the garden and went away, 
For a short w h i l e i t dropped r a i n on the buds of Desire 
and then moved on. 
S i r Thomas Arnold exercised profound i n f l u e n c e on 
the young student of Philosophy, and also on the young 
poet. I t was he who (along w i t h Sir'Abdul Q a d i r ) 1 
persuaded I q b a l not t o abandon hi s p o e t i c career at a 
p o i n t i n I q b a l ' s l i f e when ( l i k e M i l t o n and Keats before 
him) he could not decide whether he wished t o lead a l i f e 
of s p e c u l a t i o n or a l i f e o f actiono That he should have 
achieved both and have b u i l t up a philosophy of dynamism 
and a c t i o n i s perhaps h i s g r e a t e s t achievement. I q b a l 
owed much t o the l o v i n g personal i n f l u e n c e of h i s two 
teachers Maulana Mir Hasan and S i r Thomas Arnold, the 
f i r s t r e v e a l i n g t o him the wealth and beauty of his own 
h e r i t a g e , the second i n s p i r i n g him w i t h a desire t o 
understand the West. 
To r e t u r n t o Iqbal's academic d i s t i n c t i o n s : he 
graduated i n 1897, winning a scholarship and two gold 
medals f o r excellence i n E n g l i s h and Arabic. I n the 
M.A. degj*ee which I q b a l took i n Philosophy _in 1899,-he 
won the "Nanak Bakhsh Medal" f o r standing f i r s t i n the 
examination. I q b a l m a t r i c u l a t e d i n Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y 
as Advanced Student of T r i n i t y College on 21 October, 1905. 
He proceeded t o the degree of Bachelor of A r t s on 13 June, 
1907 having submitted a d i s s e r t a t i o n f o r t h a t degree which 
1. Qadir, A. Preface t o Bang-e-Dara, p. i x . 
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was approved by the s p e c i a l Board f o r Moral Science on 
7 May, 1907*1 While at Cambridge, I q b a l studied under 
p 
McTaggart and James Ward. 
I q b a l was a l s o admitted t o The Honourable Society 
of L i n c o l n ' s Inn on 20 October, 1905, and he was c a l l e d 
t o the Bar i n the T r i n i t y Term 1908. Before being c a l l e d 
t o the Bar he had t o keep terms and pass the Bar Examination.-^ 
I q b a l submitted a t h e s i s on The Development of 
Metaphysics i n Persia** at Munich U n i v e r s i t y i n Germany t o 
Professor P. Hommel on k November, 1907, ( t h e residence 
requirement of two years being waived i n h i s case) f o r the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.-* 
IQBgL'S CAREER AS AN EDUCATIONIST. 
On 13 May, 1899, I q b a l j o i n e d the O r i e n t a l College as 
McLeod Reader i n A r a b i c . At t h a t time S i r Thomas Arnold 
was the a c t i n g P r i n c i p a l of the College. I q b a l was on 
leave without pay from J u l y 1902, t o 3 October, 1902, and 
from 2 March, 1903 -to 2_June, 1903. During-his stay at-
1. I n f o r m a t i o n received by l e t t e r reference E.15/392 from 
U n i v e r s i t y R e g i s t r y , The Old Schools, Cambridge,University 
dated 13 September, 1966. 
2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 37« 
3. I n f o r m a t i o n received by l e t t e r reference FCC/JM from the 
Under-Treasurer, The Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn 
dated 7 June, 1966. 
i+. F i r s t published by Messrs. Luzac & Co. , London i n 1905, 
r e p r i n t e d by Bazm-i-Iqbal, Lahore, i n 195U. 
5. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, pp 30-39* 
O r i e n t a l College I q b a l wrote an a r t i c l e on "The D o c t r i n e 
of Absolute Unity as Expounded by'Abdul KarTm a l - J i l a n l . " 
He al s o summarised and t r a n s l a t e d i n t o Urdu,Stubbs' 
'Early Plantagenets' and Walker's ' P o l i t i c a l Economy.'1 
During t h i s p e r i o d he wrote h i s f i r s t book, also on 
p 
p o l i t i c a l economy. I n the Preface he st a t e d t h a t S i r 
Thomas Arnold had encouraged him to w r i t e the book which, 
i n c i d e n t a l l y was the f i r s t book on Economics i n Urdu. He 
also expressed h i s g r a t i t u d e t o S h i b l i who had r e v i s e d 
the terminology and language i n some p a r t s of the book. 
I q b a l was appointed an a d d i t i o n a l Professor of 
En g l i s h from 1 January, 1901 at the Government College, 
Lahore. I n J u l y 1901 he r e v e r t e d t o O r i e n t a l College. 
I n May, 1903, I q b a l l e f t O r i e n t a l College and on 3 June, 
1903 he became an A s s i s t a n t Professor of English and 
Philosophy at the Government College, Lahore. W h i l s t 
at the O r i e n t a l College, I q b a l taught B.O.L. and I n t e r -
mediate classes. To jthe B. O.L. students he taught. 
H i s t o r y and Economics, and t o the Intermediate students 
Psychology and Logic. At Government College, Lahore, 
I q b a l taught Philosophy and English. 
I n 1905, I q b a l was granted leave e x t r a o r d i n a r y f o r 
three years t o study i n England and he proceeded abroad. 
1. Z u l f i q a r , G. H. " I q b a l i n the O r i e n t a l College" I q b a l , 
A p r i l 1962, V o l . 10, No. U, pp 1+8-52. 
2. Published i n 1903, Reprinted by the I q b a l Academy, 
Karachi", I96I. 
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While i n England I q b a l taught Arabic f o r s i x months at 
U n i v e r s i t y College, London. 
I q b a l r e t u r n e d to Lahore on 27 J u l y , 1908, and 
a f t e r a short time he resigned from the Government 
College, Lahore, having decided to concentrate on his 
l e g a l p r a c t i c e which he s t a r t e d i n October, 1908. As 
I q b a l was g e t t i n g s e t t l e d i n his new profession Mr. Wyatt 
Jones, Professor of Philosophy i n the Government College, 
Lahore, died and Mr. Robson, P r i n c i p a l of the College 
approached I q b a l t o take up the work as a p a r t - t i m e 
P r o f e s s o r . 1 As I q b a l was u n w i l l i n g t o give up h i s l e g a l 
work,the Government of the Panjab requested the Chief 
Court a u t h o r i t i e s t o take up I q b a l ' s cases only i n the 
afternoon. This arrangement went on t i l l the 1st 
January, 1911 when Mr. L. P. Saunders of Decca College, 
Poona, was appointed as a permanent Professor of Philosophy 
i n the Government College. I q b a l was o f f e r e d a post i n 
the College i n the Indian Education Service - j r t t h a t 
time a rare honour f o r any I n d i a n . I q b a l refused the 
2 
o f f e r . He knew he had t o choose between a l e g a l and 
an educational career. He decided on the former. On 
the day he resigned ' A l l Bakhsh, h i s o l d and f a i t h f u l 
s ervant, asked I q b a l why he had l e f t h i s teaching j o b . 
1. Vahid, S. A. " I q b a l As a Teacher", I q b a l and Education, 
Karachi, n.d., p. 92. 
2. PaizT, A. I q b a l j p. 51. 
I q b a l answered t h a t he had a message t o d e l i v e r t o h i s 
people and he could do i t b e t t e r i f he adopted an 
•1 
independent p r o f e s s i o n l i k e law. 
I t was about t h i s time t h a t I q b a l was o f f e r e d a 
p a r t i n the M.A.O. College, ' A l l g a r h ( l a t e r on Muslim 
U n i v e r s i t y , ' A l l g a r h ) I q b a l refused t h i s a l s o . I n 
1918 Dr. Haig, Professor of Philosophy i n I s l a m i a College, 
died and at the request of the Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam, 
I q b a l taught philosophy t o the M.A. classes f o r about two 
3 
months. 
Although I q b a l d i d not adopt teaching as a p r o f e s s i o n , 
yet he never l o s t i n t e r e s t i n educational programmes and 
problems. For many years he was the Dean of F a c u l t y of 
O r i e n t a l Studies and Chairman of the Department of 
Philosophy.^ He was also i n close a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the 
5 
I s l a m i a College, Lahore. During the sessions of the 
Round Table Conference i n London, he worked on the various 
committees connected w i t h the educational reforms.^ 
I n 1933, he was i n v i t e d , along w i t h some other 
e d u c a t i o n i s t s , by the Afghanistan Government t o v i s i t the 
1 . Hayat-e-Iqbal, p. 62. 
2. F a i z I , A. I q b a l , p. 37» 
3. Vahid, S.A. " I q b a l as a Teacher", p.92. 
k» Vahid, S.A. I n t r o d u c t i o n t o I q b a l , p. 10. 
5. i b i d . 
6. Vahid, S. A. I q b a l : His A r t and Thought, p. 17. 
ho 
country and give suggestions r e g a r d i n g educational 
reforms i n Afghanistan i n general and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
of Kabul U n i v e r s i t y i n p a r t i c u l a r . 1 I q b a l took great 
i n t e r e s t i n the J a m i a - M i l l i a of D e l h i and was always 
2 
prepared to help i t s promoters i n any way he could. 
He has l e f t "a permanent impression on three important 
U n i v e r s i t i e s of the East: Kabul, the Panjab, and the 
Jarr&a M i l l i a . " " 5 
I q b a l was a f i n e teacher. One of h i s p u p i l s t o 
whom he taught the poe t r y of Shelley, states t h a t I q b a l ' s 
s e n s i t i v e a p p r e c i a t i o n of Shelley was q u i t e u n f o r g e t t a b l e . 
He would e x p l a i n Shelley's poetry o f t e n w i t h the help of 
Urdu verses ( h i s own and others') and hi s l e c t u r e s were 
so engrossing t h a t students were s o r r y when a l e c t u r e 
ended.^ I q b a l was also a very k i n d and sympathetic 
5 
teacher, who r e a l i z e d t h a t a teacher educates not only 
by v i r t u e of the knowledge he imparts but also by means 
of his personal example and i n f l u e n c e . A teacher must 
not only e n l i g h t e n but also i n s p i r e : -
1. Vahid, S. A. I q b a l : His A r t and Thought, p. 17 
2« I b i d , pp 17-18. 
3. i b i d , p. 18. 
k» Rahman, M. A. Quoted i n 'Arshl S. K. "A Forgotten Leaf 
from I q b a l ' s L i f e " I q b a l Review, January 1962, pp 70-71. 
5. Vahid, S. A. " I q b a l as a Teacher" p. 93. 
hi 
1 ' 
(Bal-e-JibrTl, p. 21) 
Iqbal's c o n t r i b u t i o n as an e d u c a t i o n i s t , then, 
cannot be minimized, although he was not d i r e c t l y -
connected w i t h education f o r the major p o r t i o n of h i s 
p r o f e s s i o n a l l i f e . This i s so, because as an eminent 
e d u c a t i o n i s t p o i n t s out, "Education, i n i t s f u l l and 
co r r e c t s i g n i f i c a t i o n , must be v i s u a l i s e d as the sum 
t o t a l of a l l the c u l t u r a l forces which play on the l i f e 
of the i n d i v i d u a l and the community. I f t h i s i s c l e a r l y 
understood, i t f o l l o w s t h a t the emergence of an out-
standing c r e a t i v e t h i n k e r , who has a d i s t i n c t i v e message 
t o give or new values t o present before the w o r l d , i s a 
phenomenon of the greatest i n t e r e s t f o r the e d u c a t i o n i s t , 
and the more his ideas catch the imag i n a t i o n , the under-
standing and the enthusiasm of his contemporaries, the 
2 
gr e a t e r must be h i s i n f l u e n c e as an educative f o r c e . " 
What i s Iqbal's philosophy of Education? He sums 
i t up himself m a l e t t e r , "Modern I n d i a ought t o focus 
on the discovery of man as a p e r s o n a l i t y - as an 
independent 'whole* i n an all-embracing synthesis of l i f e . 
1. Was i t the g i f t of the (teacher's) eye or the wonder of the 
School, 
That taught Isma'Tl the ways of being a d u t i f u l son? 
2. S a i y i d a m , K. G. I q b a l ' s Educational Philosophy, i3Kot£B6o. 
5-6 
k2 
But does our education today tend t o awaken i n us such 
a sense of inner wholeness? My answer i s no. Our 
education does not recognize man as a problem, i t 
impresses on us the v i s i b l e f a c t of m u l t i p l i c i t y w i t h o u t 
g i v i n g us an i n s i g h t i n t o the inner u n i t y of l i f e , and 
thus tends to make us more and more u n i v e r s a l i n our 
p h y s i c a l environment. The soul of man i s l e f t untouched 
and the r e s u l t i s a s u p e r f i c i a l knowledge w i t h a mere 
i l l u s i o n of c u l t u r e and freedom. Amidst t h i s predo-
minantly i n t e l l e c t u a l c u l t u r e which must accentuate 
separate centres w i t h i n the 'whole* the duty of higher 
minds i n I n d i a i s t o r e v e a l the inner synthesis of l i f e . " 1 
IQBAX AS A LAWYER 
I q b a l s t a r t e d h i s p r a c t i c e of law i n 1908. Although 
he was a conscientious lawyer,2 i t does not seem evident 
t h a t he regarded his profession as a vocation.-^ I n a 
l e t t e r t o a f r i e n d , he gives us one reason why he adopted 
-law as a p r o f e s s i o n . "As ydu know l e t e r a t u r e i s not and 
never has been a profession i n I n d i a . Music and p a i n t i n g 
are professions of a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , l i t e r a t u r e i s not. 
I know t h i s from personal experience. I have w r i t t e n 
something i n the way of l i t e r a t u r e but I have t o earn my 
d a i l y l i v i n g a t the Bar."^4-
1. L e t t e r dated 5 December, 1925, published i n The I n d i a n 
Review,Madras, January, 1926, Volume XXVII, No. 1, p. 2. 
2. Vahid, S. A. I q b a l ; His A r t and Thought p. 18 
3. Beg, A. A. The Poet of the East, p. 2k. 
k. I q b a l ' s l e t t e r t o S i r W i l l i a m Rothenstem, quoted i n Since 
F i f t y (Men and Memories'). London, 1931-1939, V o l . I l l , P.I4.7. 
U3 
Law i s demanding p r o f e s s i o n and req u i r e s undivided 
a t t e n t i o n which I q b a l was not able to give t o i t 1 due 
t o h i s l i t e r a r y and s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . Also, 
he was temperamentally an unambitious man and was not 
i n t e r e s t e d i n earning more than he re q u i r e d f o r his 
needs. However, the f a c t of h i s not being e n t i r e l y 
successful at the Bar d i d cause I q b a l considerable h e a r t -
burning as i s apparent from h i s l e t t e r t o S i r W i l l i a m 
Rothenstein, "my r i v a l s and other i n t e r e s t e d persons 
have always c a r r i e d on a propaganda against me on account 
of my l i t e r a r y p u r s u i t s and t r i e d a l l s o r t s of means t o 
pr e j u d i c e the men i n a u t h o r i t y against me i n order t o 
r u i n my career as a p r o f e s s i o n a l man. I n t h i s they 
have succeeded so f a r . Please excuse t h i s personal 
reference. I should have never mentioned i t t o a less 
sympathetic mind."^ 
I q b a l whose own l i f e was l i v e d i n accordance w i t h 
h i s e x h o r t a t i o n t o his son 
^ ( B a l - e - J i b r n , p. 198) 
s u f f e r e d not so much on account of f i n a n c i a l i n s e c u r i t y 
1. Vahid, S. A. I n t r o d u c t i o n to I q b a l , p. 11. 
2. Vahid, S. A. I q b a l : His A r t and Thought, p. 18. 
3* Quoted i n Since F i f t y , p. hi-
h» My way l i e s not i n being r i c h but i n being poor; 
Your Selfhood do not s e l l , i n poverty win renown. 
<S-iS 
/ 
as he d i d due t o the lack of understanding of people 
who mattered t o him. 
I q b a l l o s t his voice i n 193k and could not p r a c t i s e 
law a f t e r t h a t . 
IQBAL AND POLITICS 
I q b a l was i n t e r e s t e d i n the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n and 
problems of h i s country as no s e n s i t i v e and i n t e l l i g e n t 
young I n d i a n could f a i l t o be, but i t was only when he 
came t o r e a l i s e most of the Muslim p o l i t i c a l leaders 
lacked p o l i t i c a l sagacity and i n s i g h t t h a t he began t o 
take an a c t i v e i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c s . 1 
I q b a l was a member of the Committee of the Muslim 
League formed i n London i n 1908 by the Rt. Hon. Amir 
' A l l . On his r e t u r n from England,Iqbal took i n t e r e s t 
i n the working of the Muslim League but d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e 
a c t i v e l y i n p o l i t i c s from 1910-1923. During t h i s period 
he was t r y i n g t o create p o l i t i c a l consciousness and b r i n g 
about an awakening—of h i s people.** 
I n 192k I q b a l j o i n e d the N a t i o n a l L i b e r a l League of 
Lahore but not f i n d i n g i t very e f f e c t i v e resigned from 
i t l a t e r on.^ I n 1926, he was e l e c t e d as a member of the 
1. Vahid, S. A. Studies i n I q b a l . Lahore, 1967, P« 266. 
2. Was.^ T, S. R. Lord Minto and the Indian N a t i o n a l i s t 
Movement 1905 t o 1910, Oxford, 196k, p. 227. 
3* Vahid, S. A. Studies i n I q b a l , p. 267. 
k« i b i d . 
5. i b i d . p. 269. 
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Pan jab L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, and as the v a r i o u s speeches 
and statements made during h i s membership of the C o u n c i l 
i n d i c a t e , he took i n t e r e s t i n , and made important c o n t r i -
butions to, the d e l i b e r a t i o n s of the L e g i s l a t i v e body. 
I n 1928, I q b a l became S e c r e t a r y of that branch of 
the Muslim League which functioned under the P r e s i d e n t s h i p 
of S i r Muhammad ShafT.' Along with other members of the 
3 
League, he appeared before the Simon Commission which 
had been appointed by the B r i t i s h Government to report 
on the i n t r o d u c t i o n of f u r t h e r p o l i t i c a l reforms i n the 
Sub-Continent. The Commission was c o n s i d e r a b l y i n f l u e n c e d 
by the evidence given by the delegates of the League.^ 
While p a r t i c i p a t i n g e a g e r l y i n Panjab p o l i t i c s , I q b a l 
was a l s o i n t e r e s t e d i n A l l - I n d i a p o l i t i c s . I n 1929 he 
attended the Muslim Conference held i n D e l h i under the 
Chairmanship of the A"ga Khan. "He made some important 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the d e l i b e r a t i o n s of the Conference."^ 
I n 1930 he was s e l e c t e d to preside a t the annual" S e s s i o n 
Q 
of the Muslim League held a t Allahabad. I n h i s h i s t o r i c 
1. S a l i k , A. M. Z i k r - e - I q b a l , Lahore, 1955, P» 134. 
2. Khan, M. A. I q b a l Ka S i y a s T Karnama, K a r a c h i , 1952, p. 122. 
3 . Vahid, S. A. Studies i n I q b a l , p. 274. 
4 . Khan, M. A. I q b a l Ka S i y a s I Karnama, p. 121. 
5 . Vahid, S. A. Studies m I q b a l , p. 279. 
6. i b i d . 
7. i b i d . 
8. Vahid, S. A. I q b a l : His Art and Thought, p. 19 . 
k6 
P r e s i d e n t i a l Address, I q b a l s a i d , " I would l i k e to see 
the Panjab, North-West F r o n t i e r Province, Sind and 
B a l o c h i s t a n amalgamated i n t o a s i n g l e s t a t e . S e l f -
government w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Empire or without the 
B r i t i s h Empire, the formation of a c o n s o l i d a t e d North-
west I n d i a n Muslim S t a t e appears to me to be the f i n a l 
1 
d e s t i n y of the Muslims, a t l e a s t of North-West I n d i a . " 
I n h i s "remarkable speech"^ I q b a l l a i d down the exact 
h i s t o r i c a l composition of what i s now West Pakistan."^ 
As an eminent h i s t o r i a n remarks, "much was to be done 
before t h a t conception could make i t s way i n t o the 
hearts and the souls of Muslim masses, but the idea was 
born. 
I n 1931 I q b a l attended the Second Round Table 
Conference i n London and served as a member of the 
5 
M i n o r i t i e s Committee. He returned to Lahore on 30 
December, 1931 > "most disappointed at the a t t i t u d e of 
Mr. Gandhi and other Hindu l e a d e r s at_the Conference, 
and convinced more than ever, that the only s o l u t i o n 
of the p o l i t i c a l t r o u b l e s of the sub-continent was a 
d i v i s i o n of the country." 
1. Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l , pp 170-171. 
2. W i l l i a m s , L. P. R. " I q b a l Day Speech" d e l i v e r e d a t a 
meeting held at Overseas House, London, on 22 A p r i l , 1959. 
3. i b i d . 
k* i b i d . 
5- Vahid, S. A. Studies i n I q b a l , p. 282. 
6. i b i d , p. 283. 
kl 
On 21 March, 1932 I q b a l presided at the A l l - I n d i a 
Muslim Conference held at Lahore. I n h i s momentous 
address I q b a l s t r e s s e d the intimate l i n k between i n d i v i d u a l 
and c o l l e c t i v e l i f e . "He who d e s i r e s to change an 
unfavourable environment must undergo a complete t r a n s -
formation of his inner being. God changeth not the 
conditions of a people u n t i l they themselves take the 
i n i t i a t i v e to change t h e i r condition by c o n s t a n t l y 
i l l u m i n a t i n g the zone of t h e i r d a i l y a c t i v i t y i n the 
l i g h t of a d e f i n i t e i d e a l . Our i d e a l i s w e l l defined. 
I t i s to win i n the coming c o n s t i t u t i o n a p o s i t i o n f o r 
I s l a m which may b r i n g her o p p o r t u n i t i e s to f u l f i l her 
d e s t i n y i n t h i s country. 
I n 1932 I q b a l was i n v i t e d to attend the T h i r d Round 
2 
Table Conference. While the Conference was i n p r o g r e s s , 
I q b a l grew so d i s s a t i s f i e d with i t s proceedings that he 
resigned and returned to I n d i a . ^ 
In-1 9 3 6 , on Mr.~Jinnah's suggestion, I q b a l under-
took to work f o r the Panjab Parliamentary Board,^ which 
was to conduct e l e c t i o n s under the 1935 C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
Muslim p o l i t i c s were m chaos at that time and Mr. Jinnah, 
was f a c i n g a v e r y hard time. "But i n the midst of a l l 
1. Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l . pp 213-21^. 
2. Valiid, S. A. Studies m I q b a l . p. 2814.. 
3- Husain, A. F a z l - i - H u s a i n , A P o l i t i c a l Biography, London, 
19U6, p. 319 . 
k> Vahid, S. A. Studies i n I q b a l . p. 288. 
t h i s darkness there shone a f l i c k e r i n g l i g h t i n Lahore 
and t h i s was I q b a l who stood s t e a d f a s t by Jinnah i n 
those t r y i n g days and helped him to c h a r t e r the course 
of Indo-Muslim p o l i t i c s . " 1 When I q b a l died, Mr. Jinnah^ 
sent t h i s message to h i s son: "To me he was a f r i e n d , 
guide and philosopher and during the darkest moments 
through which the Muslim League had to go he stood l i k e 
a rock, and never f l i n c h e d one s i n g l e moment." On 21+ 
March 19U0, when the P a k i s t a n R e s o l u t i o n was passed by 
the Muslim League at Lahore, Mr. Jinnah s a i d : " I q b a l i s 
no more amongst us, but had he been a l i v e he would have 
been happy to know t h a t we d i d e x a c t l y what he wanted 
us to do." 
No one today disputes t h a t I q b a l "played a ve r y 
v i t a l p a r t i n the founding of P a k i s t a n . " ^ However, a 
f u l l a p p r e c i a t i o n of I q b a l ' s p o l i t i c a l wisdom and f a r -
sightedness i s y e t to come. I q b a l was perhaps not a 
p o l i t i c i a n i n the sense in which Mr. Jinnah- or Mr. Nehru 
were, but he could see f u r t h e r than almost any other of 
h i s contemporaries could. Recounting h i s meetings with 
I q b a l , L. F. Rushbrook Williams observes, "Looking back 
on that time, i t seems to me that many of us who were 
1. A H i s t o r y of_the Freedom Movement, P a k i s t a n H i s t o r i c a l 
S o c i e t y , K a r a c h i , V o l . I l l , p a r t I I , p. 315. 
2 . Quoted i n Vahid, S. A. I q b a l : His A r t and Thought, p. 19 . 
3« B o l i t h o , H. Jinnah, Creator of P a k i s t a n . London, 195k, p. 129. * 
k» Arberry, A. J . O r i e n t a l E s s a y s , London, 1960, p. 2LU-. 
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working, as we hoped, f o r the f e d e r a t i o n of a united 
I n d i a , tended to undervalue the s k i l l and s a g a c i t y of 
S i r Muhammad I q b a l and indeed I would not al t o g e t h e r 
exempt from that category Qa»id-e-A*&am h i m s e l f because 
I remember being present a t var i o u s meetings i n which 
S i r Muhammad I q b a l i n s i s t e d that a p r e - r e q u i s i t e of the 
f u l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Muslim population of I n d i a i n 
any p r o j e c t e d f e d e r a t i o n must be t h e i r continued pro-
t e c t i o n by a communal e l e c t o r a t e . At that time 
Qa'id-e-A'zam was not convinced and I myself who was 
working as a delegate and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the In d i a n 
s t a t e s ' s i d e of I n d i a , thought that much of S i r Muhammad 
I q b a l was saying, however, val u a b l e i t might have been 
i n the past, was perhaps outdated m the 1930s and yet 
how r i g h t he was and how wrong we were, because no 
sooner were the beginnings of the f i r s t stage of fede-
r a t i o n i n operation i n 1937 than a l l the f e a r s that he 
had o u t l i n e d with_such g r a v i t y and-with such prophetic 
f o r e s i g h t were, from the standpoint of the Indian Muslim 
community only too f u l l y r e a l i s e d . " - ^ 
I t was pa r t of I q b a l ' s greatness that he not only 
formulated the conception of a Muslim s t a t e i n I n d i a , 
and o u t l i n e d i t s p h y s i c a l boundaries, but a l s o l a i d 
down the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which such a s t a t e must have, 
1. W i l l i a m s , L. F. R. " I q b a l Day Speech." 
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i f i t were t o provide an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the development 
of the i n d i v i d u a l and the community, tKe part and twe u * o i e . 
These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s were:- 2 
( i ) I t should be founded on monotheism which I q b a l 
regarded as an e s s e n t i a l element i n the 
conception of the brotherhood of man. ivlonotheism 
acted as a u n i f y i n g f o r c e , and broke down the 
d i v i s i o n of mankind i n t o b e l l i g e r e n t groups. 
As I q b a l s a i d : 
/ 
3(Rumuz-e-BekhudT, p. 182) 
( i i ) I t should have i n s p i r e d and devoted leadership 
or prophethood. I q b a l w r i t e s : 
'• Vis. j i u ^ > r 
1. W i l l i a m s , L. F. R. " I q b a l Day Speech." 
2. Enumerated i n Williams,. L. F. R. " I q b a l Day Speech" and 
Vahid, S. A. I q b a l : His A r t and Thought, pp 1+8-53-
3» This one breath, winding i n a hundred breasts, 
I s but one secret of the Unity. 
( t r a n s l a t i o n by A r b e r r y , A. J. The Mysteries of Selflessness 
London. 1953- P 69.) 
1(Rurauz-e-Bekhudr, pp 116-117) 
( l i i ) I t should have an e t h i c a l code embodying the 
i d e a l s and a s p i r a t i o n s of t h a t s o c i e t y * For 
the Muslims, such a code i s the Qofc'an: 
2(Rumuz-e-Bekhudr, p. 11+0) 
( i v ) I t should have a cognizable c e n t r e i n space; 
a t e r r i t o r i a l focus of the a c t i v i t i e s and 
l o y a l t i e s which such a s t a t e would engender. 
For the Muslims the s p i r i t u a l c e n t r e i s Mecca. 
( v ) I t should have an i d e a l o b j e c t i v e . 
1. On Prophethood i s based our e x i s t e n c e on t h i s e a r t h , 
From prophethood are derived our r e l i g i o n , our code. 
The Prophet moulded hundreds of thousands of us i n t o one, 
So t h a t various, p a r t s were i n s e p a r a b l y welded-into each other. 
From prophethood we a t t a i n e d u n i t y of tune, 
I t imparted to us the u n i t y of b r e a t h and the u n i t y of 
o b j e c t i v e . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Vahid, S. A. I q b a l ; His A r t and Thought. 
P. 5 0 ) . 
2. The f i n a l message to a l l humankind 
Was borne by him e l e c t of God to be 
A mercy unto every l i v i n g t h i n g . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J . The Mysteries of 
S e l f l e s s n e s s , p. 3 8 ) . 
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( v i ) I t should aim at conquest over the f o r c e s of 
nature. I t should u t i l i z e the mechanical 
and s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o v e r i e s of the West without 
subordinating i t s e l f to Western values and 
c u l t u r e . 
( v i i ) I t should develop a combined s o c i a l p e r s o n a l i t y 
which w i l l act as an extension and as a 
r e a l i z a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of i t s f r e e 
c i t i z e n s . 
( v i i i ) I t should give f u l l scope f o r the development 
of womanhood i n a l l i t s p o t e n t i a l and a c t u a l 
a s p e c t s . 
IQBAV S LITERARY CAREER 
I q b a l was a precocious youth and a t a very e a r l y age 
began to w r i t e poetry which promised much to the perceptive 
eye. He took to w r i t i n g v e r s e s e r i o u s l y probably w h i l s t 
he was a t the Scotch Mission College, S i a l k o t . He attended 
the. s m a l l - s c a l e poetry symposiums held i n the town and'was 
sometimes asked to r e c i t e h i s own poetry.^ When he was an 
o 
Intermediate student, he sent h i s poems f o r c o r r e c t i o n to 
Dagi . 
1. Beg, A. A. The Poet of the E a s t , p. 7. 
2 . Vahid, S. A. I n t r o d u c t i o n to I q b a l , p. 2 . 
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~ Dag D e h a l v i (1831-1905) was one of the renowned 
exponents of Urdu poetry who had accepted the t u t o r s h i p 
of the Niaam of Hyderabad a f t e r the f a l l of D e l h i . 
S h o r t l y afterwards Dag t o l d I q b a l t h a t h i s poems needed 
no c o r r e c t i o n . Such a statement from so eminent a poet 
must have been a source of great encouragement to the 
young I q b a l . I q b a l always remembered the debt he owed 
^-(Rozgar-e-PaqTr, V o l . I I , p. 278) 
Dag too l i v e d long enough to see I q b a l ' s name become a 
b r i g h t new s t a r on the l i t e r a r y horizon of I n d i a . S i r 
'Abdul Qadir recounts how i n a meeting with Dag i n 
Hyderabad, Dag had expressed h i s pride at once having 
had the p r i v i l e g e of c o r r e c t i n g I q b a l ' s poetry. 
-Dag's poetry had considerable" i n f l u e n c e on the young 
I q b a l , and Dag's l i v e l y spontaneity became a noteworthy 
f e a t u r e of I q b a l ' s e a r l y 'gazals'. Soon however, the 
mmd of the younger poet widened i t s horizons m i t s 
s e a r c h f o r new pastures and found modes of expression 
other than the gazal' whose form tended to impose r e s -
t r i c t i o n s of s u b j e c t and scope.3 
1. I q b a l , i t i s the miraculous touch of the venerable Dag 
Which has made one l i k e you both eloquent and a poet. 
2. Qadir, A. Preface to Bang-e-Dara, p. 7. 
3 . JunagarhT, Q.A. M.A. IqbaliyiatKa T a n q i d l J a ' i z a , K a r a c h i , 
to Dag:-
/ y 
1955, P. 7U. 
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I n 1895» I q b a l came to Lahore the c e n t r e of the 
development of Urdu which was r e p l a c i n g P e r s i a n as the 
language of the i n t e l l e c t u a l e l i t e . I n Lahore i t was 
customary f o r persons who had a t a s t e f o r l i t e r a t u r e 
to meet at a few well-known p l a c e s . I n I896 I q b a l 
was introduced to the higher l i t e r a r y c i r c l e of Lahore, 
which had i t s c e n t r e a t Bazar-e-Hakiman, i n s i d e B h a t i 
Gate. Bazar-e-Hakiman was the venue of the meetings of 
the 'Urdu Bazm-e-Musha"'ara>which had been founded by 
Hakim Shuja'-ud-Din Muhammad f o r the purpose of 
encouraging the growth of Urdu poetry. Weekly meetings 
were held at the re s i d e n c e of Hakim A m l n - u d - D T n . I q b a l 
f r e q u e n t l y took part i n the 'musha'arss'' held t h e r e . I t 
was on one of these occasions that he r e c i t e d h i s famous 
c o u p l e t : -
>A~ O* ^ i i / o U : lis 
2 ( R o z g a r - e - P a q I r , V o l . I I , p. 73) 
Mirza Arshad Gorganl of D e l h i , an Urdu poet of s t a t u r e , 
was much impressed and f o r e t o l d a great future f o r I q b a l . ^ 
1. I have t h i s on the a u t h o r i t y of my grandfather Hakim Ahmad 
Shuja', the son of HakTm Shuja'-ud-Din Muhammad''and the 
cousin of_Hakim Amin-ud-Dih. A l s o corroborated by Vahid, 
S.A., I q b a l ; His Art and Thought, p. U» 
2. Taking them to be p e a r l s , the Glorious One 
Gathered what were the f a l l e n t e a r s of shame. 
3 . Vahid, S.A. I q b a l : His Art and Thought, p. 
I q b a l used to r e c i t e h i s poems at Bazar-e-HakTman 
before he r e c i t e d them m p u b l i c , ^ Amongst the poems 
read there were "Nala-e-Yatlm," " H i l a l - e - T d " and 
"Ta§wTr-e-Dard" which were soon to rank among the 
f a v o u r i t e poems of the nation. 
An organization to which I q b a l was devoted a l l h i s 
l i f e was the Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam ( S o c i e t y f o r the 
Defence of I s l a m ) . The annual s e s s i o n s of the Anjuman 
f u l f i l l e d an emotional need of the I n d i a n Muslims and 
became n a t i o n a l f e s t i v a l s . Muslims attended these 
s e s s i o n s devotedly i n order to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the e f f o r t s 
of t h e i r l e a d e r s and to a f f i r m the u n i t y of t h e i r purpose. 
I q b a l made an a l m o s t - s e n s a t i o n a l debut i n 1900, when 
he read h i s poem " N a l a - e - Y a t T m , ( T h e Orphan's Lament) 
at the f i f t e e n t h annual meeting of the Anjuman. The poem 
begins with a lamentation, "an essay i n that p l a i n t i v e 
ii 
and p a t h e t i c mode which often r e c u r s i n h i s e a r l y v e r s e . " 
The lament i s followed by an e n t r e a t y addressed to the 
Prophet of I s l a m . The poem ends w i t h the Prophet's 
e x h o r t a t i o n that the orphans be t r e a t e d with compassion -
f o r he too had been an orphan: 
1. Shuja*, H.A. Khun Baha, Lahore, 19*4-3f P» 199. 
2. Malik, H. Moslem Nationalism i n I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , 
Washington, D.C. 1963, p. 218. 
3. Mehr, G. R. and DelawarT, S.A. ( E d i t o r s ) Sarod-e-Rafta, 
Lahore, 1951, PP 9-18. 
k' Singh, I . The Ardent P i l g r i m , London, 1951, V» 21. 
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iJ'Sarod-e-Rafta, p. 18) 
Every age has found i t s spokesmen and i n t e r p r e t e r s 
m i t s c r e a t i v e a r t i s t s . I q b a l even at the beginning 
of h i s long and f r u i t f u l p oetic c a r e e r possessed a genius 
f o r being able to f e e l the pulse of the n a t i o n and c a p t i -
v a t e the mood of the >»oor. 'Nala-e-Yatim' indeed not a 
remarkable poem had a remarkable response because i t 
s t r u c k a chord of emotional cognizance of deep-rooted 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs of those who came to l i s t e n to i t . 
The orphan's lament was a l s o the lament of the Indi a n 
Muslims who f e l t d e s o l a t e and abandoned m an atmosphere 
of p o l i t i c a l bondage and s p i r i t u a l poverty. I q b a l 
continued to read h i s poems at the meetings of the Anjuman 
and i t was at a meeting i n A p r i l 1911 that I q b a l read h i s 
famous 'Shikwa' - a poem which commands such a unique 
pla c e i n Urdu l i t e r a t u r e that I q b a l ' s fame could r e s t 
secure on i t alone. A few months l a t e r , I q b a l read h i s 
4Jawab-e-Shikwa*. I n 1912, I q b a l ' s 'Shanfa aur S h a ' i r ' 
was published which gives quite a c l e a r idea of the 
message which the poet was to d e l i v e r . 
1. To you i s e n t r u s t e d the safeguarding of the d i g n i t y 
of my orphan s t a t e . 
The p u b l i c a t i o n of Asrar-e-Khudf i n 1915 was a 
great event. His a t t a c k on Hafig brought on a storm 
which took a long time to subside. I q b a l had under-
taken to shake m i l l i o n s out of slumber and s l o t h and 
i t was no easy t a s k to accomplish. However, with the 
p u b l i c a t i o n of Asrar-e-Khudl, I q b a l ' s commitment of 
the philosophy of the Ego (wi t h a l l that i t s p r a c t i c a l 
a p p l i c a t i o n e n t a i l e d ) was complete. Rumuz- e -3 e kjiud r 
which d e a l t with the development of the communal ego, 
was published i n 1918. I n 1923 appeared Payam-e-Mashriq, 
I q b a l ' s answer to Goethe's West O s t l i c h e r Divan. I n 1924 
Bang-e-Dara was published. I t was the f i r s t c o l l e c t i o n 
of I q b a l ' s Urdu poetry and contained most poems such as 
' Tar ana-e-Hindi"', 'Tarana-e-Milli"', 'Shikwa', *Jawab-e-
Shikwa', 'Shamii aur S h a ' i r ' , which had already become 
a part of the l i t e r a r y h i s t o r y of Urdu poetry. I n 
ad d i t i o n to these poems, Bang-e-Dara, a l s o contained 
'Khizr-e-Rah',- published in- 1921 and 'Julu' - e ^ I s l a m ' , 
published i n 1922. These poems are amongst I q b a l ' s 
f i n e s t Urdu poetry. 
Zabur-e-'Ajam was published i n 1927, and was 
followed by I q b a l ' s magnum opus, Javid Nama, modelled 
on Dante's D i v i n e Comedy i n 1932. I n 1935, B a l - e - J i b r i f l , 
and i n 1936 Zarb-e-Kalim, two volumes of Urdu poetry 
appeared. I n 1934 I q b a l had published a P e r s i a n poem 
Musafir, on account of h i s v i s i t to Afghanistan and i n 
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1936 appeared another P e r s i a n poem Pas l O i Bayad Kard 
A i Aqwam-i-Sharqg . Armagjin-e-Hi ;jaz, c o n t a i n i n g both 
P e r s i a n and Urdu ve r s e appeared posthumously i n 1938. 
I q b a l ' s f r i e n d S i r 'Abdul Qadir has enumerated the 
p r i n c i p a l themes d e a l t with by I q b a l i n h i s Urdu works.^ 
These themes are to be found running through a l l p o e t i c a l 
works by I q b a l and may be summed up thus:-
(aj The importance of the / i n d i v i d u a l ' and the 
need to develop the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of the 'Ego'. 
(b) The exalted s t a t i o n of man i n the h e i r a r c h y of 
the universe and the unli m i t e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of h i s f u r t h e r r i s e to p e r f e c t i o n . 
( c ) The n e c e s s i t y of s p i r i t u a l guidance to c o n t r o l 
man's m a t e r i a l progress, which i f l e f t uncont-
r o l l e d , could s p e l l d i s a s t e r . 
(d) A warning to the nations of the West of the 
calamitous consequences which w i l l accrue i f 
they continue to advance, on p u r e l y m a t e r i a l i s t i c 
l i n e s , n e g l e c t f u l of the s p i r i t u a l sphere of 
human l i f e . 
( e ) A warning to the nations of the E a s t i n general 
and to Muslims m p a r t i c u l a r , t o remember t h e i r 
s p i r i t u a l h e r i t a g e and eminence. 
1. Qadir, A. "Muslim C u l t u r e and R e l i g i o u s Thought" i n 
O'Malley L. S. S. ( E d i t o r ) Modern I n d i a and the West, 
Oxford, 19kl, PP 530-531. ~ 
Besides h i s p o e t i c a l works, I q b a l wrote three works 
m E n g l i s h * . ' I l m - u l - I q t j s a d , (the f i r s t book on P o l i t i c a l 
Economy i n Urdu) appeared i n 1903; I q b a l ' s d o c t o r a l 
t h e s i s on The Development of Metaphysics i n P e r s i a was 
published i n London i n 1908; and h i s l e c t u r e s on The 
Reco n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m were f i r s t 
p u blished i n 1930. I q b a l a l s o wrote numerous a r t i c l e s 
i n Urdu and E n g l i s h i n v a r i o u s j o u r n a l s and newspapers. 
A number of c o l l e c t i o n s of h i s a r t i c l e s , l e t t e r s , speeches 
and statements have been published. 
SOME DETAILS OF IQBAL'S L I F E . 
MARRIAGES: I q b a l was married three times. His f i r s t 
marriage took place i n 1 8 9 5 , 1 when he was b a r e l y eighteen 
yea r s o l d . His f i r s t w i fe was from G u j r a t and came from 
a wealthy f a m i l y . She bore I q b a l a son (Aftab I q b a l ) 
and a daughter (Maryam who died i n i n f a n c y ) . ^ T h i s 
marriage was not a success.** I q b a l ' s f i r s t wife died 
i n March 19_l+7«^ His second wife was from Lahore^ -and- - -
bore him two c h i l d r e n ( J a v i d I q b a l and MunTra). She died 
i n May 1935*"'' I q b a l ' s t h i r d w i f e was from Ludhiana. She 
died i n 1 9 2 U . 8 
1. S a l i k , A. M. Z i k r - e - I q b a l , p. 11+ 
2. i b i d . 
3 . i b i d . 
1+. i b i d . 
5. Wahfd-ud-din, F. S. Rozg_ar-e-FaqIr, V o l . I , p. 202 . 
6. S a l i k , A. M. Z i k r - e - I q b a l , p. 67* 
7 . Wafrld-ud-dTn, F. S. Rozgar-e-Faqlr, V o l . I , p. 202. 
8. i b i d . 
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TRAVELS: I q b a l v i s i t e d Europe t h r i c e - the f i r s t time as 
a student, when he spent three years (from 1905-1908) and 
then twice l a t e r on i n l i f e to attend the Round Table 
Conferences held i n London. I n 1933 he met M u s s o l i n i i n 
Rome. Mussolini whom I q b a l d e s c r i b e d as "Luther without 
h i s B i b l e " 1 asked I q b a l what he thought of the I t a l i a n s 
and I q b a l answered him "They are quick-witted, they are 
handsome, they are a r t i s t i c and they have many years of 
p 
c i v i l i z a t i o n behind them, but they have no blood." 
I q b a l a l s o met Henri Bergson i n P a r i s and when I q b a l 
t o l d him of the Prophet's T r a d i t i o n 'Do not v i l i f y Time 
f o r Time i s God', Bergson appeared amazed at the profun-
d i t y of such an o b s e r v a t i o n . I n 1933, I q b a l a l s o v i s i t e d 
Spain** and went to Jerusalem to attend the I s l a m i c 
Conference held t h e r e . ^ 
Amongst other v i s i t s undertaken are I q b a l ' s v i s i t to 
Madras, Mysore, Hyderabad, Sermgapatam and ' A l l g a r h i n 
1928 on a_lec.ture tour. In- 1935^he~ pai d a~ long" v i s i t 
to h i s f r i e n d S i r Ross Masfeod a t Bhopal . 7 I n 1933 I q b a l 
v i s i t e d Afghanistan along with Maulana Sulaiman Nadvl and 
S i r Ross Mas*ood. 
1. I q b a l quoted.by'Sir Malcolm D a r l i n g " I q b a l Day Speech" 
d e l i v e r e d at the I q b a l Day meeting held a t Overseas House, 
London, on 22 A p r i l , 1959. 
2. i b i d . 
3» Vahid, S. A. I q b a l : His A r t and Thought. 
k» Wahid-ud-din, P. S. Rozgar-e-Faqir, V o l . I , p. 2i+5. 
5« Vatiid, S. A. I q b a l : His Art and Thought, p. 17. 
6. i b i d . 
7 . Wahid-ud-din, P. S. Rozgar-e-Faqir, V o l . I , p. 21+5. 
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KNIGHTHOOD: I q b a l was knighted on 1 January, 1923* The 
a c t u a l ceremony of kni g h t i n g him was carried* out by the 
Vi c e r o y of I n d i a , on b e h a l f of King George V, at a l a t e r 
date i n 1923*1 
ILLNESS AND DEATH; i n 192U I q b a l developed kidney trouble 
but was cured of i t by 'Abdul Wahab A n s a r l known as Hakim 
NabTna, the b l i n d p h y s i c i a n . 2 I q b a l l o s t h i s v o i c e i n 
193U-^ I n 1937 he developed c a t a r a c t m h i s eyes.'"*' 
I q b a l ' s i l l n e s s took a s e r i o u s turn on 25 March 1938 and 
5 
he died i n the e a r l y hours of 21 A p r i l , 1938 i n the arms 
of h i s f a i t h f u l s ervant ' A l l Bakhsh. Half an hour 
before h i s death he r e c i t e d the f o l l o w i n g v e r s e s : -
i * / - " " 
^(Armagan-e-Hijaz, p. 11+) 
I T Information r e c e i v e d i n a l e t t e r dated 16.8.66 from the 
Secretary^ C e n t r a l Chancery of the Orders of Knighthood, 
S t . James's Pa l a c e , London. 
2. N i a z i , s. N. "'Allama I q b a l K i A k h i r l * A l a l a t " Urdu, 
( I q b a l number) Awrangabad. October 1938, p. 1019. 
3. i b i d . 
k» Vahid, S. A. I q b a l : His A r t and Thought, p. 22. 
5. i b i d , p. 23. 
6. The departed melody may r e c u r or not. 
The zephyr may blow again from H i j a z or not. 
The days of t h i s F a q l r have come to an end, 
Another s e e r may come or not. _ 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Vahid, S. A. I q b a l : His A r t and Thought, 
P. 231). 
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LAST VISITOR: I q b a l ' s l a s t v i s i t o r was h i s German f r i e n d , 
Baron von Veltheinr 1- w i t h whom I q b a l d i s c u s s e d many problems, 
ranging from poetry and philosophy to p o l i t i c s , which had 
i n t e r e s t e d him during h i s l i f e t i m e . 
BURIAL; I q b a l was given almost a sovereign's b u r i a l . He 
was b u r i e d near the gate of the Badshahr Mosque i n Lahore, 
w i t h 10,000 people or more i n attendance. 
I t i s not p o s s i b l e to give an adequate idea of the 
r i c h n e s s or achievements of I q b a l ' s l i f e merely by 
mentioning the important events which took place i n i t . 
I q b a l has yet to f i n d a biographer who w i l l do f u l l j u s t i c e 
to the man who was not j u s t a poet or philosopher or a 
p o l i t i c i a n but one whose v e r s a t i l e genius could not be 
circ u m s c r i b e d i n words, who wanted " t o melt the world i n 
2 
the f i r e of h i s heart," and c r e a t e a whole new world. I n 
many ways I q b a l was a remarkably simple man, but anyone who 
has t r i e d to form a c l e a r p i c t u r e of the man behind a l l 
the legends.which he c r e a t e d , knows th a t coming to" know 
I q b a l i s l i k e e x p loring a new country - there i s so much 
to see, so much to know, so much to understand. But as 
1. Vahid, S. A. I q b a l : His Art and Thought, p. 11+. 
2. Schimmel, A. M. "The JavTdname i n the L i g h t of the 
Comparative H i s t o r y of R e l i g i o n s " P a k i s t a n Q u a r t e r l y , 
Karachr, Winter 1956, V o l . V I , No.l+, P- 39» 
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I q b a l ' s f r i e n d and f i r s t t r a n s l a t o r wrote: " I t i s 
worthwhile to become acquainted with I q b a l ' s r i c h and 
f o r c e f u l p e r s o n a l i t y . Granted that the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
are g r e a t , so i s the reward."l 
1. Nicholson, R. A. " I q b a l ' s Message of the E a s t " , I s l a m i c a , 
L i p s i a e , 1921+/25, Volume I , p. 115« ~ 
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CHAPTER I I 
IQBAX'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
POSSIBILITY AMD IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE 
According to Kant, the p e r c e p t u a l manifold must f u l f i l 
c e r t a i n formal c o n d i t i o n s i n order to c o n s t i t u t e knowledge. 
For him, the noumenon or the 1 t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f ' i s only a 
l i m i t i n g or r e g u l a t i v e idea. I f there i s some a c t u a l i t y -
corresponding to the ide a , i t transcends ' a c t u a l ' experience, 
and consequently i t s e x i s t e n c e cannot be r a t i o n a l l y 
demonstrated. The subject-matter of metaphysics f a l l s outside 
the boundaries of experience and cannot by sys t e m a t i s e d by 
space and time, and t h e r e f o r e , according to Kant, metaphysics 
i s impossible. I n Kanti a n terms, r e l i g i o n i s e q u a l l y impossible, 
but according to I q b a l , i t i s p o s s i b l e to a t t a i n knowledge of 
ultimate^ R e a l i t y , and the r e f o r e Jboth metaphysics a n d - r e l i g i o n - — 
are p o s s i b l e . I n I q b a l ' s words, "Kant's v e r d i c t can be 
accepted only i f we s t a r t with the assumption t h a t a l l 
experience other than the normal l e v e l of experience i s 
impossible. ""^  
According to I q b a l , " i t i s the l o t of man to share i n the 
deeper a s p i r a t i o n s of the un i v e r s e around him and to shape h i s 
1. The Re c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Is l a m , p. 182. 
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own d e s t i n y as w e l l as t h a t of the universe."" 1" I n order 
t h a t man may achieve the f u l l e s t p o s s i b l e development of h i s 
s e l f and h i s environment, i t i s e s s e n t i a l f o r him to possess 
knowledge. His " l i f e and the onward march of h i s s p i r i t 
depend on the establishment of connections w i t h the r e a l i t y 
t h a t confronts him. I t i s knowledge t h a t e s t a b l i s h e s these 
2 
connections." 
Man s u f f e r s g r e a t l y because h i s knowledge i s l i m i t e d 
but i t i s o f t e n the consciousness of the incompleteness 
of h i s knowledge which provokes g r e a t e r endeavour and 
l e a d s to an i n t e l l e c t u a l r e n a i s s a n c e : 
3 
(Bang-e-Dara, p. JT) 
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE: I q b a l , f o l l o w i n g the Qor'an, maintains 
t h a t there a r e two sources of knowledge - the inner c o n s c i o u s -
ness of man ('anfus 1) and the outer world of nature ('afaq,') 
1. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 12. 
2. I b i d . 
3. My very weakness may be the source £>f power. 
The mirror of my wonder may be the en]gy of Jamshed's 
(worl d - r e v e a l i n g ) cup. 
U. par B. A. " I n t e l l e c t and I n t u i t i o n i n Bergson and S u f i s " 
I q b a l January 1956. Volume I V No. 3. p. 82. 
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I q b a l a l s o mentions the study of HISTORY as a source of 
knowledge. "Hi s t o r y or, i n the language of the QBr'an, 
'the days of God,' i s the t h i r d source of human knowledge 
... I t i s one of the most e s s e n t i a l teachings of the 
Qor'an that n a t i o n s a r e c o l l e c t i v e l y . judged, and s u f f e r 
f o r t h e i r misdeeds here and now. I n order to e s t a b l i s h 
t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n the Qor'an c o n s t a n t l y c i t e s h i s t o r i c a l 
i n s t a n c e s , and urges upon the reader to r e f l e c t on the p a s t 
and p r e s e n t experience of m a n k i n d . I q b a l h i m s e l f i s a 
great "believer i n the study of h i s t o r y as a source of 
knowledge and i n s p i r a t i o n . I n a poem he says: 
T h i s t h i r d source of knowledge may he subsumed under the 
second source of knowledge i . e . knowledge of the e x t e r n a l 
world. ^  
I q b a l cannot be e a s i l y or e x c l u s i v e l y c l a s s i f i e d as 
an ' e m p i r i c i s t ' , ' r a t i o n a l i s t ' or ' i n t u i t i o n i s t ' s i n c e he 
1. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 138. 
2. Our h e a r t s a r e not f r e e of the memory of p a s t ages, 
T h i s n a t i o n w i l l not f o rget i t s r u l e r s . 
Though over fo r t h i s n a t i o n are the days of the g l o r y 
of i t s .might, 
Yet the days of the g l o r y of i t s beauty are y e t to come. 
3. par B. A. " I n t e l l e c t and I n t u i t i o n i n Bergson and 
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 15?) 
'J. JO 
S u f i s " p. 82. 
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combines sense-perception, reason and i n t u i t i o n i n h i s 
theory of knowledge."1' He defines knowledge as "sense-
p e r c e p t i o n e l a b o r a t e d by understanding" ('understanding 1 
here does not stand e x c l u s i v e l y f o r 'reason' but f o r a l l 
non-perceptual modes of knowledge). There are two ways of 
e s t a b l i s h i n g connections with the r e a l i t y t h a t confronts u s. 
The d i r e c t way i s by means of observation and sense-perception, 
the other way i s through d i r e c t a s s o c i a t i o n with that 
r e a l i t y as i t r e v e a l s i t s e l f within."^ 
MODES OF KNOWLEDGE 
(1) SENSE PERCEPTION 
Importance of E m p i r i c a l Study: 
I q b a l r e p e a t e d l y p o i n t s out the e m p i r i c a l a t t i t u d e of 
the Qor'an which l a y s great emphasis on the observable a s p e c t s 
of r e a l i t y so t h a t by r e f l e c t i v e o b s ervation of nature man 
may a t t a i n "consciousness of t h a t of which nature i s regarded 
as a symbol."*4' According to I q b a l , Nature stands i n the same 
r e l a t i o n to the Ultimate Ego as c h a r a c t e r does to the human 
5 
s e l f . He holds t h a t "the s c i e n t i f i c o b s e r v a t i o n of nature 
1. Khatoon, J . The P l a c e of God. Man and Universe i n the 
P h i l o s o p h i c System of I q b a l , K a r a c h i , 1963 P. 3. 
2. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 12. 
3. I b i d , p. 15. 
U. I b i d , pp 13-1U. 
5. Gibb, H. A. R. Modern Trends i n I s l a m , p. 79. 
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keeps us i n c l o s e c o n t a c t with the behaviour of R e a l i t y , 
and thus sharpens our inner p e r c e p t i o n f o r a deeper v i s i o n 
of i t ... The s c i e n t i f i c observer of Nature i s a k i n d of 
mystic seeker i n the a c t of prayer."^ 
I n Asrar-e-Khudi I q b a l c r i t i c i s e s P l a t o (and by 
i m p l i c a t i o n a l l the t h i n k e r s who were i n f l u e n c e d by P l a t o 
i n t h i s r e s p e c t ) f o r reducing the world of phenomena to a 
myth: 
2 
(Asrar-e-KhudT, pp 3i+"35) 
1. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 91. 
2. He was so f a s c i n a t e d by the i n v i s i b l e 
That he made hand, eye, and ear of no account. 
He d i s b e l i e v e d i n the m a t e r i a l u n i v e r s e 
And became the c r e a t o r of i n v i s i b l e I d e a s . 
Sweet i s the world of phenomena to the l i n i n g s p i r i t , 
Dear i s the world of Id e a s to the dead !&pifit 0 
t r a n s l a t i o n by Nicholson, R. A. The S e c r e t s of the S e l f . 
PP 57-58) 
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I n Zabur-e-'A.jam I q b a l laments over such modes o f 
t h i n k i n g which have reduced t h e l i v i n g w o r l d t o a mirage: 
1 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 38) 
To one who denies t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e w o r l d o f t h e senses, 
I q b a l says: 
2 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 108) 
I q b a l p o i n t s out t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e c l a s s i c a l 
s p i r i t , w i t h i t s contempt f o r s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n , and t h e 
i n s p i r a t i o n and c o n s t a n t l y c a l l s upon the rea d e r t o observe 
1. A l a s , t h e w e s t e r n mind h a t h s o i l e d 
The s p r i n g s o f knowledge u n d e f i l e d -
S t o i c a l i k e and P l a t o n i s t 
Have shrouded a l l t h e w o r l d m m i s t . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by A r b e r r 1 ' , A. J. P e r s i a n Psalms, p. 21. ) 
2. Thou has t closed t h i n e e^es, and s a i d , 
"The w o r l d ' s a dream, no l e s s : " 
Open t h i n e eves; t h i s dream-abed 
I s a LI o f wa k e f u l n e s s . 
( T r a n s i t i o n by A r b e r r y , A. J. P e r s i a n Psalms, p. 67) 
J 
CL»^j \ 1—> 
1 
QoV'an "which sees m t h e humble bee a r e c i p i e n t of D i v i n e 
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p e r p e t u a l change of the winds, the a l t e r n a t i o n of day and 
ni g h t , the clouds, 1 the s t a r r y heavens, and the p l a n e t s 
swimming through i n f i n i t e space."' 1 . The c u l t u r e s of the 
a n c i e n t world f a i l e d , says I q b a l , "because t h e i r approach 
to R e a l i t y was e n t i r e l y i n t r o s p e c t i v e and they moved 
from w i t h i n outwards. T h i s gave them theory without power, 
2 
and on mere theory, no durable c i v i l i z a t i o n can be based. 
Nature and Ultimate R e a l i t y . 
I q b a l regards e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e as an in d i s p e n s a b l e 
stage i n the e v o l u t i o n of man. He says t h a t the Uni v e r s e , 
by o f f e r i n g o b s t r u c t i o n to man, sharpens h i s f a c u l t i e s 
"and prepares us f o r an i n s e r t i o n i n t o what l i e s below the 
su r f a c e of phenomena." The Prophet of I s l a m regarded 
Nature as one of the * s i g n s ' of God and p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t 
unhealthy mysticism which forgot that r e a l i t y l i v e s i n i t s 
own appearances.* 4" I q b a l does not b e l i e v e i n ma^s 
withdrawal from the world of matter which, de s p i t e i t s 
temporal f l u x , i s o r g a n i c a l l y r e l a t e d to u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y . 
When the S p i r i t of the E a r t h welcomes Adam, i t asks him to 
1. The Re c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. k» 
2. I b i d , p. 15. 
3. Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l . p. 11L. 
k. I b i d . 
5. Khatoon, J . " I q b a l ' s Theory of Knowledge" I q b a l Review 
A p r i l 1960. 
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observe the n a t u r a l phenomena around him f o r R e a l i t y i s "both 
concealed and r e v e a l e d i n them: 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 178) 
Nature and S e l f . 
_ 2 
According to I q b a l , knowledge s t a r t s w i t h the concrete. 
Nature confronts the s e l f as the "other" e x i s t i n g per se, 
3 
which the s e l f knows but does not make. The S e l f develops 
when there i s i n t e r a c t i o n between the ego and the non-ego. 
"The l i f e of the ego i s a k i n d of t e n s i o n caused by the ego 
invading the environment and environment invading the ego. 
The ego does not stand outside t h i s area of mutual i n v a s i o n . 
I t i s present- i n i t as d i r e c t i v e energy and i s formed and 
d i s c i p l i n e d by i t s own experience: 
1. Open your eyes and see the e a r t h and the sky! f e e l the a i r , 
See the sun r i s i n g from the E a s t ! 
See the open r e v e l a t i o n concealed i n v e i l s ! 
8. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 131. 
3. par, B. A. I q b a l ' s Gulshan-i R a z - i J a d l d and Ba'mdagl 
Hamgh. p. 27) 
U. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 12. 
/ . ' ^  s • -"W i J J / 
1 
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1 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 212) 
I q b a l wants to emphasise the f a c t that the s e l f i s not 
p a s s i v e i n the a c t of knowledge. The human mind i s not a 
'tabula r a s a ' on which e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s simply l e a v e an 
impression. He s t a t e s t h a t "the r e a l i s a t i o n of the t o t a l 
s e l f comes not by merely p e r m i t t i n g the wide world to 
throw i t s v a r i e d impressions on our mind, and then watching 
2 _ 
what becomes of us." I q b a l r e f e r s to E i n s t e i n who had 
taught t h a t the knower i s i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to the o b j e c t 
known, and t h a t the a c t of knowledge i s a c o n s t i t u t i v e 
3 _ 
element i n the o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . I q b a l , then, does not 
deny the o b j e c t i v i t y of nature, but merely the p a s s i v i t y of 
the knower. 
1. I t f i r s t f l o o d s things w i t h an i r r a d i a t i n g l i g h t , 
And then b r i n g s them w i t h i n i t s laws' superior might. 
I t i s awareness which has brought i t c l o s e r to the World 
And through the world has i t s own mystery u n f u r l e d . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Husain, H. The New Rose-G-arden of 
P. 5) 
2. Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l . p. 115. 
3. I b i d , p. 111. 
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( 2 ) RKASON: The c o n n o t a t i o n o f 'reason' and i t s i m p o r t a n c e . 
I t i s o f t e n s a i d t h a t I q b a l was opposed t o r e a s o n , t h a t 
he v/as a n t i - r a t i o n a l i s t o r a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l . Much c o n f u s i o n 
has o c c u r r e d because n e i t h e r I q b a l nor most o f h i s c r i t i c s 
s t a t e e x a c t l y what i s meant by 'reason'. I n i t s widest sense, 
t h e word 'reason' stands f o r a l l t h a t d i f f e r e n t i a t e s man from 
t h e lower animals and expresses i t s e l f m t h e p r a c t i c a l sphere 
and i n a c t i v i t i e s which a r e n o n - c o g n i t i v e or n o t p u r e l y 
cognitive."*" O b v i o u s l y , I q b a l i s n o t , and no one suggest t h a t 
he i s , opposed t o 'reason' i n i t s w3 dest c o n n o t a t 3 on. 
When i t i s s a i d t h a t I q b a l i s a n t 3 - r a t i o n a l i s t , t h e word 
'reason' i s used t o s t a n d f o r t he ' d i s c u r s i v e ' or ' r a t i o c i n -
a t i v e ' f a c u l t i e s as opposed t o t h e ' i n t u i t i v e ' f a c u l t i e s . 
Used i n t h i s sense, 'reason' i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r b o t h t h e o -
r e t i c a l ( d e d u c t i v e ) and e m p i r i c a l ( i n d u c t i v e ) s c i e n c e s . The 
q u e s t i o n t o be asked i s whether I q b a l i s , m f a c t , opposed t o 
".reason 1 i n t h i s na-r-rower sense o f — t h e word". The "evidence " 
i s t h a t I q b a l , f a r fr o m denying t h e v a l u e or v a l i d i t y o f 
reason, always commended i t . He c i t e s e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y t h e 
^ o r ' a n i c v e r s e s ( 2 : 2 8 - 3 1 ) which s t a t e t h a t Man's s u p e r i o r i t y 
over a n g e l s l a y i n h i s power t o 'name' t h i n g s i . e . t o form 
1. S t o c k s , J. L. "Reason and I n t u i t i o n " Reason and 
I n t u i t i o n and o t h e r essays, London, 1939. P« 2. 
Ik 
concepts."'" Concepts a r e not a b s t r a c t l o g i c a l e n t i t i e s . 
They are based on, and i n d i s s o l u b l y l i n k e d w i t h , f a c t s of 
2 
se n s a t i o n . I t i s the knowledge of things and t h e i r 
inherent nature t h a t e x a l t e d man over c e l e s t i a l c r e a t u r e s , 
and i t i s only through an unceasing s t r u g g l e to a t t a i n the 
knowledge of things t h a t man can maintain h i s s u p e r i o r i t y 
3 
with j u s t i c e i n the world. 
I t i s with the weapon of conceptual knowledge that man 
i s able to gain mastery over the elements and f o r c e s of 
Nature. Without reason, s c i e n c e would be impossible, and 
without s c i e n c e v e r y l i t t l e progress would be made i n the 
m a t e r i a l sphere. I q b a l b e l i e v e d s t r o n g l y i n the power and 
u t i l i t y of s c i e n c e , and i t i s he who speaks through Ahmad 
Shah AbdalT i n J a v i d Nama and c a l l s f o r "nimble i n t e l l e c t s . " 
'1 ^ U ^ r ' ^ l l ^ 
1. The Re c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 13. 
2. Khatoon, J . " I q b a l ' s Theory of Knowledge" p. 9U. 
3. BilgramT, H. H. " I q b a l ' s Theory of Knowledge and i t s 
S i g n i f i c a n c e i n h i s poetry". The I s l a m i c L i t e r a t u r e 
Lahore, May 1951. P. 11. 
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(JavTd Nama, p. 209) 
Nature and f u n c t i o n of 'thought*: 
I n h i s theory of knowledge, Bergson draws a sharp 
d i s t i n c t i o n "between the c h a r a c t e r of our conceptual 
knowledge of the e x t e r n a l world and consciousness as 
known from w i t h i n . The i n t e l l e c t i n i t s s c i e n t i f i c 
study of the e x t e r n a l world proceeds by a n a l y s i s and 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . For a n a l y s i s , the world must be 
considered as composed of i s o l a t a b l e o b j e c t s e x t e r n a l l y 
r e l a t e d to each other; f o r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n these must be 
regarded as repeatable i n s t a n c e s of s i m i l a r k i n d s . So the 
world i s i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms o f — l i m i t e d kinds of d i s c r e t e 
u n i t s , undergoing repeatable rearrangements i n space. 
1. The power of the West comes not from l u t e and rebeck, 
not from the dancing of u n v e i l e d g i r l s , 
not from the magic of tulip-cheeked enchantresses, 
not from naked l e g s and bobbed h a i r ; 
i t s s o l i d i t y s p r i n g s not from i r r e l i g i o n , 
i t s g l o r y d e r i v e s not from the L a t i n s c r i p t . 
The power of the West comes from s c i e n c e and technology, 
and w i t h that selfsame flame i t s lamp i s b r i g h t : 
For s c i e n c e and technology, elegant young s p r i g , 
b r a i n s are necessary, not European c l o t h e s , 
I f you have a nimble i n t e l l e c t , t h a t i s s u f f i c i e n t , 
I f you have a p e r c e p t i v e mind, that i s s u f f i c i e n t . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry A. J . J a v i d Nama, p. 129) 
76 
Hence the i n t e l l e c t t h i n k s n a t u r a l l y of s t a t i c o b j e c t s i n 
s p a t i a l , j u x t a p o s i t i o n ; i t does not grasp fundamental 
changes through time, but imagines change as a s u c c e s s i o n 
of instantaneous spaces. The i n t e l l e c t t h e r e f o r e , Bergson 
sa y s , " s p a t i a l i z e s . " " * " 
I q b a l does not agree w i t h Bergson as regards the nature 
and f u n c t i o n of thought. For him though outwardly thought 
s p a t i a l i z e s and makes use of only mechanical c a t e g o r i e s 
"to break up R e a l i t y i n t o s t a t i c fragments, i t s r e a l 
f u n c t i o n i s to s y n t h e s i z e the elements of experience by 
employing c a t e g o r i e s s u i t a b l e to the v a r i o u s l e v e l s which 
2 
experience p r e s e n t s . I t i s as much organic as l i f e . " 
3 
Thought has a deeper movement which goes beyond mechanism. 
The sphere of 'thought': 
I q b a l c r i t i c i s e s Kant and GazzalT f o r c i r c u m s c r i b i n g 
the sphere of reason and concluding t h a t reason co u l d not 
y i e l d knowledge of u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y . I q b a l says t h a t the 
idea that thought i s e s s e n t i a l l y f i n i t e and cannot Rapture 
the I n f i n i t e , i s based on a mistaken notion of the movement 
of thought i n knowledge. " I t i s the inadequacy of the 
l o g i c a l understanding which f i n d s a m u l t i p l i c i t y of mutually 
1. Urmson, J . 0. ( E d i t o r ) . The Concise Encyclopaedia of 
Western Philosophy and P h i l o s o p h e r s London 1960. pp 61-62 
2. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 52. 
p. x i i i . 
3. RajUi, P. T. "The I d e a l i s m of S i r Mohammed I q b a l " . 
The V i s v a b h a r a t i Q u a r t e r l y S h a n t i n i k e t a n . August-
October 19k0. New S e r i e s . Volume VI P a r t I I , p. 10L. 
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r e p e l l e n t i n d i v i d u a l i t i e s w i t h no prospect of t h e i r u l t i m a t e 
r e d u c t i o n t o a u n i t y t h a t makes us s c e p t i c a l about the 
conclusiveness of t h o u g h t " . 1 The l o g i c a l understanding is 
unable t o see t h i s m u l t i p l i c i t y as a coherent universe 
since i t proceeds "by g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s "based on resemblances, 
and these g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s are f i c t i t i o u s u n i t i e s which do not 
a f f e c t the r e a l i t y of r e a l t h i n g s . Thought, however, has a 
deeper movement i n which i t can reach an immanent. Infirfibe-' . 
I n i t s e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e , thought i s not s t a t i c but dynamic, 
u n f o l d i n g i t s i n t e r v a l i n f i n i t u d e i n time l i k e the seed which, 
from the f i r s t , c a r r i e s w i t h i n i t s e l f the organic u n i t y of 
the t r e e as a present f a c t . Thought reveals i t s e l f i n s e r i a l 
time as a succession o f f i n i t e concepts appearing t o reach a 
u n i t y which i s already present i n them. I n f a c t , says I q b a l , 
" i t i s ... the presence of the I n f i n i t e i n the movement o f 
knowledge t h a t makes f i n i t e t h i n k i n g p o s s i b l e . " I n I q b a l ' s 
o p i n i o n , what Kant and SazzalT f a i l e d t o see was t h a t thought, 
i n the very act o f knowledge, passes beyond i t s _ own f i n i t u d e . ^ 
I n i t s progressive movement thought surmounts i t s f i n i t u d e , 
the i m p l i c i t presence w i t h i n i t of the I n f i n i t e , keeping a l i v e 
w i t h i n i t the flame o f a s p i r a t i o n and s u s t a i n i n g i t i n i t s 
endless p u r s u i t . Thought, then, i s not i n c o n c l u s i v e , because 
1. The Reconstruction of Re l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 6. 
2. I b i d . 
3. I b i d , pp 6-7. 
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i t i s "on i t s own way a gr e e t i n g of the f i n i t e w i t h the 
i n f i n i t e . 
I o b a l ' s use of 'reason* m a double sense: 
I t may be seen t h a t l o b a l uses the word 'reason' or 
'thought' m two senses. Th i s , m one sense, i s the crux 
of the problem f o r i t i s here t h a t the confusions begin. 
More o f t e n than not ( t > p r t i c u l a r l y i n h i s p o e t r y ) Jqbal uses 
the word "thought" t o stand f o r the " l o g i c a l understanding" 
which has a s e c t i o n a l nature, but sometimes he also r e f e r s 
to "the deeper movement of thought" which i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h 
i n t u i t i o n . When I q b a l c r i t i c i s e s "reason" or "thought" i t i s 
always i t s former and not i t s l a t t e r aspect. 
Attack on mechanistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i f e : 
We have seen t h a t I q b a l and Bergson are m disagreement 
regarding the nature and f u n c t i o n of i n t e l l e c t , but I q b a l 
f o l l o w s Bergson i n a t t a c k i n g the mechanistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
l i f e . He t h i n k s t h a t the a p p l i c a t i o n of mechanical concepts 
employed by n a t u r a l sciences f o r t h e _ o r g a n i z a t i o n of-knowledge -
i s r e l a t i v e to the l e v e l of experience t o which such concepts 
are applied, The concept of 'cause', f o r instance, does not 
apply to the purposive a c t i o n of human be i n r s of whom f r e e - w i l l 
o 
i s predicated. Mechanical concepts, u s e f u l as they are f o r 
purposes of s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y , are inadequate f o r a 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 7. 
2. rbid. pp h~j>-hL\. 
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comprehensive a n a l y s i s of l i f e . I q b a l quotes the well-known 
" b i o l o g i s t J. S. Haldane who p o i n t s out t h a t mechanical 
c a u s a l i t y cannot, f o r instance, e x p l a i n self-maintenance and 
rep r o d u c t i o n . I t has been assumed by mechanists t h a t b o d i l y 
organisftug are so constructed as t o maintain, r e p a i r and 
reproduce themselves. When an event i s s t a t e d i n mechanical 
terms i t i s s t a t e d as a necessary r e s u l t o f c e r t a i n simple 
p r o p e r t i e s o f separate p a r t s which i n t e r a c t i n the event. 
For a mechanical explanation the r e a c t i n g p a r t s must f i r s t be 
given. The idea of a mechanism which i s c o n s t a n t l y maintaining 
or reproducing i t s own s t r u c t u r e i s s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y , f o r 
such a mechanism would be a mechanism wi t h o u t p a r t s and 
t h e r e f o r e not a mechanism. I t i s , £tee' t h e r e f o r e , not p o s s i b l e 
to apply s t a t i c concepts t o v i t a l processes. I n I q b a l ' s 
o p i n i o n , i t i s a mistake t o apply concepts which are r e l e v a n t 
to one l e v e l o f experience t o another, q u i t e d i f f e r e n t , l e v e l . 
L ike Bergson he opposes mechanism because i t forces i n t o the 
s t r a i t j a c k e t o f p h y s i c a l concepts the dynamic processes-of-
2 _ l i f e . I n the language of p o e t r y , I q b a l expresses i t thus: 
^ ^ . 
£ ^ •> 
Z-P<£-J> i>y~>&j 
(Zarb-e-KalTm, p. 78) 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp U3— 
2. M a g i l l , P. N. ( E d i t o r ) Masterpieces of World PHlosophv 
( i n summary form) London, 1963. p. 769. 
3. L i f e and knowledge are two d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , 
L i f e i s heart-burning while knowledge i s the working of 
the mind. 
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LqfeAl'_ s.. I. attitude t o 'reason': 
Much has "been w r i t t e n about I q b a l ' s c r i t i c i s m of '•reason". 
One w r i t e r states t h a t , l i k e Bergson, whenever I q b a l describes 
thought he condemns i t as a mere i n t e l l e c t u a l mechanism 
devised only to c o n t r o l the world of space and matter."1" 
As we have seen, I q b a l d i s t i n g u i s h e s between two types of 
reason: 
. > • J . • y 
2 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 31) 
I q b a l does not condemn "reason" even when i t s . connotation 
i s r e s t r i c t e d t o d i s c u r s i v e reason since he has repeatedly 
po i n t e d out i t s power and u t i l i t y . 'Vhat he does, m f a c t , 
i s t o p o i n t out the l i m i t a t i o n s of d i s c u r s i v e reason. 
I q b a l , l i k e Bergson, d i d react against the predominant 
t r e n d m modern t h i n k i n g " t o regard the I n t e l l e c t as 
p r o v i d i n g a wholly adequate instrument f o r the guidance- of 
l i f e ' s a c t i v i t i e s . " " ^ Like Kierkegaard I q b a l refuses t o hand 
the monopo]y of r e v e a l i n g realit-'- t o Rationalism.^' He does not 
regard 
1, Rahman, F. "Modern Muslim Thought" p. 22. 
2, There i s a knowledge which gives l i g h t , and a knowledge 
which proceeds by l o g i c , 
Discursi\ re knowledge i s abundance of c u r i o s i t y . 
3, S a i v i d a i n , K, G. i q b a l ' s Educational Philosophy, p. 132. 
' t , 'Erfan, N. "What i s common between the E x i s t e n t e n t i a l i s t s 
and I q b a l . " The Pakistan Ph] ] oso-phical J o u r n a l , Lahore , 
January 1963. Volume "VI "No. 3. p 32. 
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science as the measure of a l l t h i n g s . "Science seeks t o 
e s t a b l i s h u n i f o r m i t i e s of experience, i . e . , the laws of 
mechanical r e p e t i t i o n . L i f e w i t h i t s intense f e e l i n g of 
spontaneity c o n s t i t u t e s a centre of i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and 
thus f a l l s outside the domain of necessity. Hence science 
cannot comprehend l i f e . " 1 
I q b a l c r i t i c i s e s the p u r e l y i n t e l l e c t u a l method of 
approaching r e a l i t y because i t does not take account of 
f e e l i n g s , purposes and values. I n h i s o p i n i o n , the 
predicament of the modern man i s t h a t h i s l i f e i s wholly 
overshadowed by the r e s u l t s o f h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y 
and he has ceased to l i v e s o u l f u l l y i . e . from w i t h i n hairing 
2 
been cut o f f from the springs of l i f e . To the "philosophy -
addicted" modern man I q b a l says: 
(Zarb-e-KalTm, p. 10) 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 50. 
2. I b i d , pp 186-187 
3. The s h e l l of Hegel's thought i s w i t h o u t a p e a r l , 
This magic i s a l l an i l l u s i o n . 
I n t e l l e c t does not l e a d t o the v i s i o n , 
Philosophy i s detachment from l i f e . 
3 
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The most obvious l i m i t a t i o n o f d i s c u r s i v e reason i s 
t h a t i t cannot capture the organic wholeness of l i f e , and 
can give only " s t a t i c snapshots" of r e a l i t y . At b e s t , 
d i s c u r s i v e reason can beget science, "the piecemeal 
apprehension of some l i m i t e d p o r t i o n of aspect or R e a l i t y : 
i t cannot encompass R e a l i t y i t s e l f . " " 1 " The f a c t t h a t 
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s fragmentary does not take away from 
i t s value provided science does not a s s e r t dogmatically 
p 
the s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y of i t s f a c t s and methods and i d e a l s . 
Perhaps the g r e a t e s t b e n e f i t of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge 
3 
i s the confidence i t gives t o man. But t h i s confidence 
can e a s i l y become exaggerated i n t o a sense of power which 
seeks dominion r a t h e r than t r u t h . With Tagore, I q b a l 
b e l i e v e s t h a t man's moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l development must 
proceed side by side. He would have endorsed Tagore's words 
t h a t "man w i t h h i s mental amd m a t e r i a l power f a r outgrowing 
h i s moral s t r e n g t h i s l i k e an exaggerated g i r a f f e whose head 
has_ suddenly shot-up miles away—from-the-rest of—himj making -
normal communications d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h . " ^ 
1. Ahmad, S. M. The Pilgrimage of E t e r n i t y , Lahore. 
1961. p x i i i . 
2. HamTd, K. A. "Remarks on the Development of I q b a l ' s 
Poetic Thought" Poems from I q b a l ( t r a n s l a t e d by 
Kiernan, V. G.) Bombay, 19k7» P. 131. 
3. Khayal, T. M. " I q b a l ' s Conception of Satan and h i s place 
i n I d e a l Society." I q b a l J u l y 1953. Volume I I No. 1. p. 3. 
k. Tagore quoted i n Khan, N. A. "Tagore and I q b a l " 3-ndo-
I r a n i c a September 1961. Volume XIV No. 3. p. 52 
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Like the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , I q b a l sounds a warning t h a t 
an i d o l a t r o u s a t t i t u d e towards reason and science leads i n 
the d i r e c t i o n of d e h u m a n i s a t i o n . L e n i n p r o t e s t s "before God: 
y 
2 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 1U7) 
Reason can enable man t o mould h i s p h y s i c a l and s o c i a l 
environment but cannot l i b e r a t e him from the prison-house 
of h i s own confusions and doubts: 
(5arb-e-KalTmrp7 '67) i*L\/u*" ^ > 
1. 'Erfan, N. "What i s Common between E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s and 
I q b a l " p. 32. 
2. Death t o the h e a r t , machines stand sovereign, 
Machines t h a t crush a l l sense of human kindness. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Kiernan, V. G. Poems from I q b a l , p. U3) 
3. Love f l e d , Mind stung him l i k e a snake: he could not forc e 
i t , t o v i s i o n ' s w i l l : 
He sought the o r b i t of the st a r s yet could not t r a v e l h i s 
thoughts world. 
Entangled i n the l a b y r i n t h ^ of l e a r n i n g , 
Lost count of good and i l l ; 
Enchained the sunbeams, yet hi s hand no dawn 
On l i f e ' s dark n i r h t u n f u r l e d . _ 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Khan, N. A. "Tagore and I q b a l " pp 52-53) 
8k 
There, are questions which the I n t e l l e c t cannot answer: 
cJU 
1 
(Armagan-e-Hi j a z , p. ?\\)\) 
The i n t e l l e c t i s " f r e e d " "by modern education "but i t i s 
unable t o cope w i t h i t s "freedom". 
(Zarb-e-KalTm, p. 81) 
Another l i m i t a t i o n of "thought" i s i t s operation being 
" e s s e n t i a l l y symbolic i n character, v e i l s the t r u e nature 
of l i f e , and can only p i c t u r e i t as a u n i v e r s a l c u r r e n t 
f l o w i n g through a l l t h i n g s . The r e s u l t o f an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
3 
view of l i f e t h e r e f o r e , i s n e c e s s a r i l y p a n t h e i s t i c . " I n 
other words, since thought works out i t s end through symbols, 
which are i n essence, general, i t s r e s u l t i s d e i h d i -
v i d u a l i z a t i o n . ^ " 
1. The dust of the wayside has been granted the love of Beauty, 
The I n t e l l e c t cannot t e l l what i s the reason. 
2. Education l i b e r a t e s the I n t e l l e c t , 
But leaves the thoughts incoherent and d i s o r d e r l y . 
3. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 61. 
k. Malik, G. R. "The Nature of the Ego" I q b a l Review 
October 196k* p. U5. 
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(3) INTUITION. D e f i n i t i o n o f ' i n t u i t i o n ' ; 
I n I q b a l ' s philosophy great emphasis has "been l a i d on 
' i n t u i t i o n ' as a mode of knowledge. The word ' i n t u i t i o n ' 
i s d e r i v e d from a verb which means 'looking a t ' , and i t s 
extended use seems t o have o r i g i n a t e d as a metaphor from s i g h t . 
" I t would stand, presumably, f o r a mental i n s p e c t i o n i n which 
a d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n i s made t o the mind, comparable to the 
d i r e c t r e v e l a t i o n which accompanies the exposure of a 
2 
p h y s i c a l o b j e c t t o the eye." The word i s used i n the works 
of Descartes and Locke t o mean the apprehension o f 
- i n d u b i t a b l e , s e l f - e v i d e n t t r u t h s . Descartes explains how 
i n t u i t i o n i s "not the f l u c t u a t i n g testimony of the senses, 
nor the misleading judgment t h a t proceeds from the bl u n d e r i n g 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f imagination, b ut the pure i n t e l l e c t u a l 
cognising of which an unclouded and a t t e n t i v e mind i s capable, 
a cognising so ready and so d i s t i n c t t h a t we are wholly f r e e d 
from doubt about t h a t which we thus i n t e l l e c t u a l l y apprehend.""^ 
Locke describes — i n t u i t i v e -knowledge as "the clearest" and most 
c e r t a i n t h a t human f r a i l t y i s capable o f . This p a r t o f 
knowledge i s i r r e s i s t i b l e , and, l i k e b r i g h t sunshine, forces 
i t s e l f immediately t o be perceived, as soon as ever the mind 
turns i t s view t h a t way, and leaves no room f o r h e s i t a t i o n , 
doubt, or examination, but the mind i s p e r f e c t l y f i l l e d w i t h 
1. Stocks, J. L. "fieason and I n t u i t i o n " p. 3. 
2. I b i d . 
3. Descartes quoted i n Aaron, R. I . " I n t i l i t t i v e Knowledge" 
Mind London October 19U2 Volume L I . No 20k. pp 297-298. 
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the c l e a r l i g h t of i t . " Hence the t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
meaning of ' i n t u i t i o n ' i s knowing w i t h absolute c e r t a i n t y , 
or knowing i n such a way t h a t there i s no room f o r doubt. 
P o s s i b i l i t y of i n t u i t i v e knowledge; 
Kant i n showing the l i m i t a t i o n s of pure reason had also 
demonstrated the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of ' i n t u i t i v e ' experience 
wi t h o u t which metaphysics and r e l i g i o n are not p o s s i b l e . But 
p a r a d o x i c a l l y enoughMn pr o v i n g the r e l a t i v i t y o f the f i n i t e 
o bjects of experience t o the i n t e l l i g e n c e , he also showed 
"though without himself being f u l l y conscious of i t , and 
almost, we might say, against h i s w i l l , t h a t we cannot admit 
the v a l i d i t y of the e m p i r i c a l consciousness without 
a d m i t t i n g the v a l i d i t y of the consciousness o f t h a t which, 
2 
i n the narrower sense of the word, i s beyond experience." 
I t can be seen c l e a r l y from h i s Ikectures t h a t I q b a l i s very 
anxious to show the p o s s i b i l i t y and v a l i d i t y of the i n t u i t i v e 
consciousness. I f i n t u i t i v e experience i s possible then i t 
f o l l o w s t h a t b o t h metaphysics_and r e l i g i o n a re-possible. 
Kant had r e j e c t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of metaphysics because 
i t d e a l t w i t h t h a t which could not be systematised by the 
categories of space and time and t h e r e f o r e , i n h i s o p i n i o n , 
could not c o n s t i t u t e knowledge. But supposing, says I q b a l , 
t h a t there i s more than one k i n d o f space and one k i n d of 
1. St. John, J. A. ( E d i t o r ) . The Philosophic works of 
John Locke, London, 182+3. p. 386. 
2. Caind, E. The Problem of Philosophy a t the Present 
Time" Essays on L i t e r a t u r e , Glasgow. 1909. p. 195 
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t i m e , then i t i s q u i t e possible " t h a t there are other l e v e l s 
o f human experience capable of being systematized by other 
orders of space and time - l e v e l s i n which concept and 
an a l y s i s do not p l a y the same r o l e as they do i n the case 
of our normal experience." 1 I q b a l agrees w i t h Kant i n 
regarding space and time as s u b j e c t i v e b ut he does not look 
upon them as unvarying modes i n t o which a l l our knowledge 
i s moulded. Rather, they admit of new meaning i n r e l a t i o n 
t o v a r ious grades of experience and t h e i r import v a r i e s as 
2 
psychic powers increase or decrease. 
I q b a l has devoted a considerable p o r t i o n o f h i s Lectures 
to discussing the question of the nature of Space and Time. 
I t was necessary f o r him t o do so i n order t o demonstrate 
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f l e v e l s of experience which were f r e e from 
the "normal" spatio-temporal determinations. The importance 
he attached t o t h i s question can be gathered from h i s words, 
" I n the h i s t o r y of Muslim C u l t u r e , we f i n d t h a t b o t h i n the 
realm-of pure - i n t e l l e c t - and r e l i g i o u s psychologyV~by which' 
term I mean higher ^ufism, the i d e a l repealed i s the possession 
and enjoyment of the I n f i n i t e . I n a c u l t u r e w i t h such an 
a t t i t u d e the problem of Space and Time becomes a question of 
l i f e and death."^ I n the course of h i s discussions I q b a l has 
reviewed the various conceptions of Space and Time h e l d by 
1. The Reconstruction o f R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 183. 
2. Enver, I . H. Mete-physics of I q b a l , pp 12-18. 
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p.132. 
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t h i n k e r s from the ancient t o the present times. I q b a l s 
conception of Space and Time which forms a very i n t e r e s t i n g 
p a r t o f h i s thought has "been discussed i n d e t a i l i n a l a t e r 
chapter. Over here, i t would s u f f i c e t o say t h a t I q b a l 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s between kinds of Space and Time, and p o i n t s 
out there are l e v e l s of experience which r e f e r not t o 
these forms of experience i n t h e i r o r d i n a r y connotation, 
but t o "the i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n of the s u p e r - s p a t i a l 'here' 
and super-eternal 'now' i n the u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y . " 1 Such 
an i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n suggests "the modern n o t i o n of space-time 
which Professor Alexander, i n h i s l e c t u r e s on Space, Time 
2 
and D e i t y regards as the matrix of a l l t h i n g s . " 
I q b a l b e l i e v e s , then, i n p o t e n t i a l types of consciousness 
which l i e closeto our normal consciousness and y i e l d l i f e 
and knowledge."^ Such knowledge i s gained through i n t u i t i o n . 
I q b a l describes the main fe a t u r e s of i n t u i t i v e experience 
when he enumerates the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of mysticism which 
deals j w i t h the u l t i m a t e by way of i n t u i t i v e apprehension.^" 
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f I n t u i t i v e (Mystic) Experience: 
(a) The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i n t u i t i o n which has t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
been most emphasised i s i t s i n d u b i t a b i l i t y . " I n t u i t i o n i s m i s 
the theory which a s s e r t s , i n the face of a l l s c e p t i c a l 
1. The Reconstruction o f R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 137. 
2. I b i d . 
3. I b i d , p. 185. 
U. U n d e r h i l l , E. "Can the new Idealism dispense w i t h 
Mysticism?" R e l a t i v i t y . Logic and Mysticism, p. 151. 
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c r i t i c i s m , t h a t a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n knowledge occurs i n 
human experience." 1 I q b a l states t h a t according t o the 
Qor'an, the heart or 'qalb' (the seat of i n t u i t i o n ) i s 
"something which 'sees' and i t s r e p o r t s , i f p r o p e r l y 
2 
i n t e r p r e t e d , are never f a l s e . " 
(B) I t i s immediate experience o f R e a l i t y . A notable 
w r i t e r on mysticism w r i t e s , "we can cla i m f o r those whom 
we c a l l mystics - and, i n a lesser degree, f o r innumerable 
a r t i s t s andccnfcemplative souls - t h a t experience a t i t s f u l l e s t 
and deepest does include the immediate apprehension of an 
unchanging R e a l i t y , and t h a t t h i s apprehension, i n one form 
or another, i s the sheet-anchor o f the r e l i g i o u s consciousness'.' 
I n t u i t i v e experience i s d i r e c t l i k e p e r c e p t i o n but 
sensation i s not i n v o l v e d i n i t . As P l a t o s a i d , i n t u i t i o n s 
come " i n a f l a s h " . ^ I q b a l the poet says: 
J£ \>JC^s ^J\Jo^ 
5 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p 29) 
1. Aaron, J. J. " I n t u i t i v e Knowledge" p. 317. 
2. The Reconstruction of Rel i g i o u s Thought i n Isl a m , p. 16. 
3. U n d e r h i l l , E. "Can the new Idealism disperse w i t h 
Mysticism" pp 11+9-150. 
h. Aaron, R. I . " I n t u i t i v e Knowledge" p. 317. 
5. I n one leap Love t r a v e r s e d the l e n g t h , 
I had thought t h a t the e a r t h and sky were boundless. 
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or, as fee says i n the I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Zabur-*e-iA.iam • 
l 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 2) 
For I q b a l the immediacy of mystic experience l i e s i n t h a t 
i n i t God i s known as other objects are known. "God i s not 
a mathematical e n t i t y or a system o f concept mutually 
r e l a t e d t o one another and having no reference t o experience." 
As I b n 'Arab! p o i n t e d out, God i s a percept not a concept."^ 
(c) I n t u i t i v e experience possesses an unanalysable 
wholeness. I n i t R e a l i t y i s given as one i n d i v i s i b l e u n i t y . 
I q b a l compares i n t u i t i v e consciousness w i t h d i s c u r s i v e 
consciousness. "When I experience the t a b l e before me, 
innumerable data o f experience merge i n t o the s i n g l e 
experience o f the t a b l e . Out of t h i s wealth o f data I s e l e c t 
those t h a t f a l l i n t o a c e r t a i n order of space and time and 
r^und them d f f ~ i n reference t o the t a b l e . I n the mystic 
s t a t e , however v i v i d , such a n a l y s i s i s not possible."^" A 
w r i t e r observes t h a t , here, I q b a l i s denying, by i n f e r e n c e , 
t h a t immediacy t o normal experiences which he associated 
w i t h them e a r l i e r . 3 But a closer a n a l y s i s shows t h a t 
T~. Very f a r and wide i s the v a l l e y of Love, 
But there are times when the journey o f a hundred years 
I s completed i n the d u r a t i o n of a s i g h . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Singh, I . The Ardent P i l g r i m , p. 168. 
2. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 18. 
3. I b i d , p. 183. U. I b i d , p. 18. „ _ n m V i. , 5. Rahman, P. " I q b a l and Mysticism" l a b a l as a Thinker 
Lahore. 1966. p. 220; 
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I q b a l i s not denying the immediacy of sense-perception 
hut r a t h e r t r y i n g t o show the r e l a t i v e importance o f 
an a l y s i s i n the two types of consciousness. The r a t i o n a l 
consciousness s p e c i a l i s e s i n a n a l y s i s and synthesis h u t 
i n the mystic consciousness a l l the diverse s t i m u l i runs 
i n t o one another forming a s i n g l e unanalysable u n i t y i n 
which the or d i n a r y d i s t i n c t n e s s of subject and o b j e c t 
does not e x i s t . ^ The d i s t i n c t i o n between the d i s c u r s i v e 
and i n t u i t i v e consciousness as regards the apprehension o f 
p a r t and whole has also been brought out by H. H. P r i c e . 
" I n d i s c u r s i v e consciousness, there i s a passage o f the mind 
from one item to another r e l a t e d item, f o r instance, from 
a subject t o a concept under which we c l a s s i f y i t , or from 
premises t o conclusion ... And when we have d i s c u r s i v e 
consciousness of a whole or complex of any s o r t (as i n counting) 
although the whole may be vaguely present t o the mind from 
the f i r s t , y e t d e f i n i t e consciousness of the whole comes 
a f t e r consciousness of the p a r t s . I n i n t u i t i v e consciousness, 
on the other hand, consciousness of the whole comes before 
d e f i n i t e consciousness o f the p a r t s . And there i s no passage 
of the mind; whatever we i n t u i t i s present a l l a t once. We 
might say t h a t i n t u i t i v e consciousness i s ' t o t a l i s t i c ' , not 
2 
'progressive' or ' a d d i t i v e " ! 
1. The Reconstruction o f Re l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp 18-191 
2. P r i c e , H. H. Perception. London, 1932, pp 151-152. 
y2 
(&) I n t u i t i v e experience i s o b j e c t i v e . I q b a l t h i n k s i t i s 
erroneous t o t h i n k t h a t the mystic s t a t e i s "a mere 
ret i r e m e n t i n t o the mists of pure subjectivity'.'^" The mystic, 
f o r Instance, experiences God or the u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y as 
both immanent and transcendent. He i s i n d i r e c t communion 
w i t h the 'Other 1 and momentarily loses consciousness o f 
2 
himself as a d i s t i n c t and p r i v a t e p e r s o n a l i t y . But he 
emerges from h i s experience possessing "a Supreme Richness -
unspeakable Concreteness - overwhelming Aliveness, having 
been a witness t o t h a t Being which gives Becoming a l l i t s 
w o r t h . " 3 
I q b a l compares the o b j e c t i v i t y of i n t u i t i v e experience 
w i t h the o b j e c t i v i t y of s o c i a l experience. We know other 
minds only be inference and y e t "the knowledge t h a t the 
i n d i v i d u a l before us i s a conscious being floods our mind 
"k 
as an immediate experience. ^ One t e s t o f the o b j e c t i v i t y o f 
our s o c i a l experience i s t h a t other persons respond t o us. 
I q b a l bases the o b j e c t i v i t y o f r e l i g i o u s experience on the 
^testimony of the Qor'ah t h a t God responds t o our c a l l : "And 
your Lord s a i t h , c a l l Me and I respond t o your c a l l " (k0:62) 
"And when My servants ask thee concerning Me, then I am nigh 
u&to them and answer the c r y of him t h a t c r i e t h unto Me."(2:182^ 
1. Khatoon, J. The Place o f God, Man and Universe i n I q b a l ' s 
Philosophic System p. 12. 
2. I b i d . 
3. F. von. Hugel quoted by U n d e r h i l l , E. "Can the new 
Ideal i s m disperse w i t h Mysticism?" p. 152. 
k. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universfe i n the 
System of I q b a l . p. 13. _ 
5. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp. 19-20. 
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I q b a l a d v a n c e s a n o t h e r argument to s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e 
c l a i m t h a t r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e - w h i c h i s b a s e d on i n t u i t i o n -
i s o b j e c t i v e . "The v e r y f a c t t h a t r e l i g i o u s l i f e i s d i v i d e d 
i n t o p e r i o d s i n d i c a t e s t h a t l i k e t h e s t u d e n t o f t h e s c i e n t i f i c 
method, the p r a c t i c a l s t u d e n t o f r e l i g i o u s p s y c h o l o g y l e a r n s t o 
s i f t e x p e r i e n c e c r i t i c a l l y i n o r d e r to e l i m i n a t e a l l s u b j e c t i v e 
e l e m e n t s , p s y c h o l o g i c a l , or p h y s i o l o g i c a l , i n t h e c o n t e n t of 
h i s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h a v i e w f i n a l l y t o r e a c h what i s a b s o l u t e l y 
o b j e c t i v e . " 1 
To meet the c h a r g e t h a t i n t u i t i v e e x p e r i e n c e i s p u r e l y 
s u b j e c t i v e , I q b a l p o i n t s out a number of t i m e s t h a t m t u i t j o n 
i s not s f a c u l t y of knowledge q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t from 
r e a s o n or p e r c e p t i o n , b u t r a t h e r a s a q u a l i t y which i s i m p l i c i t 
2 
m c o g n i t i o n a t e v e r y l e v e l ! Thus w h i l e i n t u i t i o n i s f e e l i n g , 
t h i s does not mean t h a t i t i s p u r e l y s u b j e c t i v e s i n c e f e e l i n g 
i t s e l f has c o g n i t i v e c o n t e n t a s B r a d l e y and vVhitehead have 
shown." I n I q b a l ' s o p i n i o n , t h i s may be s e e n i f we r e f l e c t 
on t h e c h a r a c t e r o f our knowledge of our S e l f . Man r i s e s 
from the i n t u i t i o n of t h e f i n i t e s e l f to t he a w a r e n e s s of 
l i f e a s a c e n t r a l i s i n g epo and t h e u l t i m a t e e x p e r i e n c e of 
God a s a u n i v e r s a l , u n i f y m e , t e l i r * power.' 1 
1. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp. 197. 
2. Whittemore. R. " I q b a l ' s P a n e n t h e i s m " I q b a l R eview 
A p r i l 1966. n. 70 TP 
3. I b i d . 
k* I b i d . 
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(e) I n t u i t i v e experience i s incommuni'cable. One o f the most 
o f t - r e p e a t e d o b j e c t i o n s t o i n t u i t i v e experience i s t h a t being 
incommunicable, i t s r e a l i t y cannot r e a l l y be e s t a b l i s h e d . To 
t h i s Evelyn U n d e r h i l l would r e p l y : " I f e x p r e s s i b i l i t y be 
indeed the c r i t e r i o n o f the r e a l , as some philosophers have 
dared t o suggest - and t h i s leads us to the strange spectacle 
of a Real World l a b o r i o u s l y keeping pace w i t h the expanding 
vocabulary of man - not only our m y s t i c a l but our highest 
a e s t h e t i c and passional experiences, must be d i s c r e d i t e d ; 
f o r i t i s notorio u s t h a t i n a l l these supreme ways of 
human knowing and f e e l i n g , only a p a r t of t h a t which i s 
apprehended can be expressed; and t h a t the more completed 
and s o u l - s a t i s f y i n g the experience the more i t s r e a l i z a t i o n 
approximates t o the mystic's s i l e n c e where a l l l o v e r s lose 
themselves. "•L 
According t o I q b a l , the incommunicability of mystic 
of mystic experience i s due to the f a c t t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
a matter of i n a r t i c u l a t e f e e l i n g , untouched by_ d i s c u r s i v e 
2 
i n t e l l e c t . But i n t u i t i v e experience has a c o g n i t i v e content 
which can be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o idea. Peeling i s outward -
pushing as idea i s outward-reporting* The mystic r e p o r t s 
not d i r e c t ^ but through symbols and "the wonder s u r e l y i s 
1. U n d e r h i l l , E. "Can the new Ideal i s m dispense w i t h 
Mysticism" p. 153. 
2. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 21. 
3. I b i d . 
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n o t t h a t t h e s e r e p o r t s t e l l so l i t t l e ; h u t - when we 
c o n s i d e r our human s i t u a t i o n and r e s o u r c e s - t h a t t h e y t e l l 
so much. The r e p o r t s a r e a l w a y s o b l i q u e , h u t so a r e the 
r e p o r t s of a l l a r t i s t s ; o f whom i t i s p r o b a b l y t r u e t o s a y 
t h a t t h e g r e a t e r t h e a e s t h e t i c v a l u e s which t h e y seek to 
>>1 
communicate, the more o b l i o u e i s t h e method i n v o l v e d . 
( f ) R e cording t o I q b a l , i n t u i t i v e experience r e v e a l s 
R e a l i t y a s an e t e r n a l 'nov;' and r e v e a l s t h e u n r e a l i t y o f 
2 
the s e r i a l c h a r a c t e r o f time and s p a c e . " A l l i n t e n s e 
r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e - more t h a n t h i s , a l l e x p e r i e n c e m 
whi c h t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f e e l i n g i s i n v o l v e d - a p p e a r s t o be 
accompanied by a marked siowing-down of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a 
r e t r e a t to some deeper l e v e l s o f a p p r e h e n s i o n where r e a l i t y 
i s e x p e r i e n c e d not m e r e l y a s s u c c e s s i o n b ut a s e x i s t e n c e : 
a genuine e s c a p e from t h e t r r a n n y of " c l o c k - t i m e " , though 
not a t r a n s c e n d e n c e o f d u r a t i o n . " ^ 
But a c c o r d i n g to I q b a l t h i s s t a t e , does not a b i d e , 
a l t h o u g h i t g i v e s a s e n s e o f overwhelming a u t h o r i t y t o t h o s e 
who have e x p e r i e n c e d i t . B o t h t h e m y s t i c and the p r o p h e t 
r e t u r n t o l e v e l s of o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e , b ut f o r I q b a l t h e 
r e t u r n of t h e pro p h e t i s of g r e a t e r meaning t h a n t h a t o f the 
m y s t i c . 
1. U n d e r b i l l , E . "Can the new I d e a l i s m d i s p e n s e w i t h 
m y s t i c i s m " pp 153~15U. 
2. Khafcoon,-T. The P l a c e o f God. Han and U n i v e r s e m the 
P h i l o s o p h i c System of I q b a l , p. 13. 
3. U n d e r h i l l , k,. "Can the new I d e a l i s m d i s p e n s e w i t h 
Mys b i c i s m ? " 
U. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought m I s l a m , pp 22-23. 
96 
( j ) Mystic experience springs from the 'he a r t 1 "but i t i s 
not q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from 'normal' experience. According 
t o I q b a l , the seat of i n t u i t i o n i s the 'heart' "which i n the 
"beautiful words of RumT, feeds on the rays of the sun and 
"brings us i n t o contact w i t h aspects o f R e a l i t y other than 
those open t o sense-perception."^ Professor Nicholson t e l l s 
t h a t i n mystic thought, "the qalb, . though connected i n some 
mysterious way w i t h the p h y s i c a l h e a r t , i s not a t h i n g of 
f l e s h and "blood. Unlike the Eng l i s h 'heart' i t s nature i s 
r a t h e r i n t e l l e c t u a l than emotional, b u t whereas the 
i n t e l l e c t cannot gain r e a l knowledge o f God, the qalb i s 
capable of knowing the essences of a l l t h i n g s , and when 
i l l u m i n a t e d by f a i t h and knowledge r e f l e c t s the whole content 
of the d i v i n e mind, hence the Prophet s a i d , 'My Earth and My 
Heaven c o n t a i n Me n o t , but the heart o f My f a i t h f u l servant 
p 
contains Me." 
I q b a l does not regard i n t u i t i v e experience as 'mysterious'. 
I t i s "a mode of deal i n g w i t h R e a l i t y i n which sensation, i n 
the p h y s i o l o g i c a l sense of the word does not play any p a r t . 
Yet the v i s t a of experience thus opened t o us i s as r e a l and 
concrete as any other experience.""^ I q b a l d i f f e r s from 
W i l l i a m James who regards r e l i g i o u s experience as being 
completely unconnected w i t h normal experience. According t o 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp 15-16. 
2. Nicholson, R. A. The Mystics of Islam. London 1912+. p. 68. 
3. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 16. 
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W i l l i a m James, r e l i g i o u s experience cannot be deduced by-
analogy from other s o r t s o f experience. I t r e f e r s t o a 
wider s p i r i t u a l environment which the o r d i n a r y , p r u d e n t i a l 
s e l f cannot enter."'" I q b a l , on the other hand, extends the 
sphere o f normal experience t o cover mystic experience, since 
whatever be the mode of knowledge, i t i s the same R e a l i t y 
2 
which operates on us. 
(h) I n t u i t i v e experience reveals l i f e as a c e n t r a l i s i n g eho. 
I t makes us aware o f "the simple f a c t of experience t h a t l i f e 
i s not a formless f l u i d , b u t an o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e o f u n i t y , 
a s y n t h e t i c a c t i v i t y which holds together and f o c a l i z e s the 
di s p e r s i n g d i s p o s i t i o n s of the l i v i n g organism f o r a c o n s t r u c t i v e 
purpose." The i n t e l l e c t t r i e s t o reduce the r i c h v a r i e t y o f 
experience t o a concept, b u t i n t u i t i o n does not proceed by 
u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n and as a consequence i s able t o r e v e a l the 
t r u e character o f concrete t h i n g s , namely, t h a t every l i v i n g 
e n t i t y converges upon an egohood.^ Like the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s 
r q b l l T h o l e s - t h a t - t h e i n t u i t i v e consciousness grasps R e a l i t y 
not i n an a b s t r a c t t h e o r e t i c a l way but i n a d e c i s i v e l y 
personal manner. This ' i n t u i t i v e i n s i g h t i n t o i n d i v i d u a l 
essence' has been a p t l y described by Mr. Roth w r i t i n g on the 
philosophy of Spinoza: "Abstract r e c o g n i t i o n passes i n t o 
1. Khatfton, J. The Place o f God. Man, and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of I q b a l . p. 21. 
2. The Reconstruction o f Re l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 18. 
3. I b i d , pp feO-61. 
U. Malik, G. R. "The Nature of Ego" p. U5. 
5. 'Erfan, N r "What i s common between the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s and I q b a l " p. 26. 
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concrete a p p r e c i a t i o n . Man i s then conscious of nature as a 
u n i t y , "but not as before from the outside. He f e e l s i t i n 
himself; he understands i t s wholeness i n and from h i s own 
being. He thus not only contemplates e x t e r n a l l y the ways of 
the universe i n which, l i k e e v e r y thing e l s e , he i s caught up. 
He not only Bees himself as one item i n the d e t a i l c o n t r o l l e d 
by an all-embracing cosmic order. Nature f o r him i s more 
than an a b s t r a c t whole of general laws. I t i s a concrete 
system of s e l f - d i r e c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l i t i e s . He knows himself 
i n i t as an i n d i v i d u a l , and r e a l i z e s h i s place i n i t among 
other i n d i v i d u a l s . He grasps both himself and t h i n g s , not 
i n t h e i r u n i v e r s a l aspect o n l y , but i n t h e i r unique 
s i n g u l a r i t y . 
REASON AND INTUITION 
The dependence o f Reason upon I n t u i t i o n : I n t u i t i o n i s opposed 
to demonstration i n t h a t i t needs no proof and_isi.single act 
while reasoning i s a complicated process. But reason cannot 
f u n c t i o n w i t h o u t i n t u i t i o n . A l l demonstration s t a r t s w i t h 
p r o p o s i t i o n s which are themselves incapable of p r o o f . P l a t o 
had b e l i e v e d t h a t i t was p o s s i b l e t o have innate knowledge 
of u n i v e r s a l ideas. "Knowledge of t r u t h , he would have s a i d , 
1. Mr. Roth quoted i n Stocks, J. L. "Reason and I n t u i t i o n " 
P. 12. 
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i s acquired by metaphysical i n t u i t i o n , and the f u n c t i o n 
of l o g i c or s c i e n t i f i c method i s then d e d u c t i v e . 1 , 1 Not 
only does a l l reasoning begin w i t h i n t u i t i o n s , i n t u i t i o n 
i s o p erative continuously throughout every process o f 
reasoning, since every step i n the reasoning, taken by 
i t s e l f , i s an i n t u i t i o n , s e l f - e v i d e n t and needing no e x t e r n a l 
2 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I t has been t r u l y s a i d t h a t the necessity 
! 
1 ! f 5 
of i n t u i t i v e experience rhas i n the p r i n c i p l e t h a t we discover 
new t r u t h s n e i t h e r by l o g i c nor by s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n , 
but by reaching out beyond the given, grasping the new thoughts, 
as i t were, i n the dark, and only afterwards c o n s o l i d a t i n g 
3 _ 
them by means of reasoned proof. I q b a l w r i t e s of the 
i n t e l l e c t ' s indebtedness t o i n t u i t i o n 
Bayam-e-Mashriq, p. 156) 
Reason i s also dependent on i n t u i t i o n i n another way. 
While speaking of thought and i n t u i t i o n I q b a l s a i d , "the one 
grasps R e a l i t y piecemeal,the other grasps i t i n i t s wholeness. 
1. Read, H. "The L i m i t s of Logic" The Tenth Muse. 
London, 1957. p. 108. 
2. Stocks, J. L. "Reason and I n t u i t i o n " p. 8. 
3. Collingwood, R. G. "Can the new Idealism dispense w i t h 
Mysticism?" R e l a t i v i t y , Logic and Mysticism. A 
r i s t o t e l i o n Society Supplementary Volume I I I ) London, 
1923. P. 17U. 
k» The I n t e l l e c t , whose b o l d flame enkindles the universe, 
Learns from Love the a r t o f l i g h t i n g i t up. 
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The one i s p r e s e n t enjoyment of the whole of R e a l i t y ; the 
o t h e r aims a t t r a v e r s i n g the whole "by s l o w l y s p e c i f y i n g 
and c l o s i n g up t he v a r i o u s r e g i o n s of the whole f o r 
e x c l u s i v e observation."'' Now, an a c t of r e a s o n i s a p r o c e s s 
w h i c h o c c u p i e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r e t c h of t i m e . The q u e s t i o n 
a r i s e s : how does the t h i n k e r h o l d t o g e t h e r the s u c c e s s i v e 
moments o f h i s t h o u g h t 9 A t t h e end o f a p r o c e s s o f r e a s o n i n g 
t h e r e i s a c o n c l u s i o n b u t i t depends f o r i t s t r u t h and 
meaning on what was r e v e a l e d i n t he c o u r s e o f t h e p r o c e s s . 
I t i s i n t u i t i o n " i n i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f u n c t i o n of making 
2 
p o s s i b l e t h e k e e p i n g o f a whole m mind," w h i c h e n a b l e s 
the t h i n k e r t o h o l d toe-ether m h i s mind a l l t h e s t e p s o f 
t h e p r o c e s s . "We cannot suppose", s a y s J . L . S t o c k s , t h a t 
t h e t h i n k e r , a s he p r o c e e d s t o e a c h new p r o p o s i t i o n , remembers 
a3J.the p r o p o s i t i o n s w h i c h he has p r e v i o u s l y a s s e r t e d , and i t 
i s e q u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t h a t he has f o r g o t t e n them: he has them, 
e v i d e n t l y , m some r e a l s e n s e m mind. As p r o p o s i t i o n s , a s 
a s s e r t i o n s , thev a r e dead and gone; b u t t h e i r woEk r e m a i n s . 
E a c h p r o p o s i t i o n , a s i t i s a s s e r t e d , has i t s f e l t s o u r c e and 
c o n f i r m a t i o n i n an i n t u i t i o n of t h e r e l e v a n t whole, and 
c o n t r i b u t e s something to the development of the i n t u i t i o n , so 
t h a t , when the development i s f r u i t f u l , o t h e r a s s e r t i o n s a r e 
p o s s i b l e t h e r e a f t e r which were not p o s s i b l e b e f o r e . " ^ 
1. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 2-3. 
2. S t o c k s , J . L. "Reason and I n t u i t i o n " p. 9. 
3. £bid. P. 9. 
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I t i s i m p l i c i t i n I q b a l ' s thought t h a t reasoning i s not 
an autonomous, s e l f - d i r e c t i n g power, but dependent on 
i n t u i t i o n ( o r 'Love' as he c a l l s i t i n h i s p o e t r y ) i f i t i s 
t o possess r e a l value and v a l i d i t y . A philosophy which i s 
not based on ' i n t u i t i o n ' i s l i f e l e s s : 
1 
(Zarb-e-KalTm, 5 p. 37) 
He r e j e c t s reason which does not recognise i n t u i t i o n : 
2 _ " 
(Zabur-e-*Ajam, p. l 6 l ) 
Spinoza had described i n t u i t i v e knowledge as the goal 
of thought and "the f u n c t i o n of reasoning may i n f a c t be 
described without inaccuracy as p r e c i s e l y ^ h e ^ e y e l o p m e n t 
of i n t u i t i o n . " - ^ I q b a l approves whole-heartedly of 'reason' 
which has ' i n t u i t i o n ' as i t s goal: 
1. I t i s e i t h e r dead or i n a s t a t e of stupor 
The philosophy which i s not w r i t t e n w i t h the heart's blood. 
2. B e t t e r a man were b l i n d , 
B e t t e r a thousandwise, 
Than knowledge t o have m mind 
That the seeing heart denies. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by A r b e r r y , A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 103. 
* Stocks, J. L. "Reason and I n t u i t i o n " p. 10. 
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si <i9'a^y 
i 
(JavTd Nama, p. 222) 
The dependence of I n t u i t i o n upon Reason. 
I q b a l states t h a t i n t u i t i o n and thought rejuvenate 
2 
each other. The Ego grasps R e a l i t y b o t h by i n t u i t i o n and 
i n t e l l e c t : 
3 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 209) 
I n h i s Lectures I q b a l supports GazzalT's view t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l 
h 
d i s c i p l i n e ought to precede i n t u i t i v e i n s i g h t . 
Although the f i n a l i n t u i t i o n remains unproven and 
unprovable y e t i n t u i t i o n i s not a c e r t a i n t y - a r i s i n g - from mere 
inspections t o which reason makes and can make no c o n t r i b u t i o n . 
Although i n t u i t i o n goes beyond reason y e t i t does not exclude 
1. I f V i s i o n i s the goal of the I n t e l l e c t , 
I t becomes bot h the path and the guide! 
I n t e l l e c t e l u c i d a t e s t h i s world o f smell and colour, 
I t n u r t u r es the eye and the emotions._ 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by S a i y i d a i n , K. G. I q b a l ' s Educational 
Philosophy, p. 150) 
2. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 3. 
3. There i s a whole worl d i n the c y y s t a l bowl he has, 
But he reveals i t slowly phase by phase. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Husain, H. The New Rose - Garden of 
Mystery, p. k»±' 
k. Dar, B. A. I a b a l ' s Gulshan-i Raz-i J a d l d and Bandagi 
Namah. p. 15. 
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i n t e l l e c t u a l spade-work. 
1 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 97) 
B e r g s o n a l s o s t a t e s "We do not o b t a i n an i n t u i t i o n from 
r e a l i t y t h a t i s , an i n t e l l e c t u a l sympathy w i t h t h e most 
i n t i m a t e p a r t o f i t - u n l e s s we have won i t s c o n f i d e n c e by 
2 
a l o n g f e l l o w s h i p w i t h i t s s u p e r f i c i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . " 
I q b a l would not have s u b s c r i b e d t o a r a t i o n a l i s m w h i c h 
s t o o d f o r " t h e v i e w t h a t the w o r l d c a n be known and l i f e 
2 
l i v e d by something l i k e a s e t of g e o m e t r i c a l theorems," b u t 
i f r a t i o n a l i s m s t o o d " f o r t h e f a i t h t h a t t r u t h , i n d ependent 
3 _ 
o f p l a c e and p o s i t i o n , i s a t t a i n a b l e to man"" t h e n I q b a l 
would have s u p p o r t e d i t w h o l e h e a r t e d l y . He r e a l i z e d , a s 
L o c k e and M i l l had done, t h a t "an i n t u i t i o n w h i c h c l a i m s 
s a c r o s a n c t i t y and d e c l i n e s t h e t e s t o f r e a s o n i s ... a moral 
and s o c i a l o f f e n c e , a mere misnomer f o r b l i n d p r e j u d i c e and 
c r a s s s u p e r s t i t i o n . " ^ 
I q b a l i s v e r y a n x i o u s t o f i n d i n r e a s o n an a l l y f o r 
i n t u i t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . He s a y s , " I n d e e d , m v i e w o f i t s 
f u n c t i o n , r e l i g i o n s t a n d s i n g r e a t e r need o f a r a t i o n a l 1. The w o r l d r e g a r d s t h e i n t e l l e c t a s the l i g h t o f the way, 
Who knows t h a t p a s s i o n a l s o has a f a c u l t v of r e a s o n i n g 9 
2. B e r g s o n , H. An I n t r o d u c t i o n to M e t a p h y s i c s 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Hulme, T. E.) London, 1913. p. 77. 
3. S t o c k s , J . L . "Reason and I n t u i t i o n " p. 18. 
h. I b i d , p. 17. 
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foundation o f i t s u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e s than even the dogmas of 
science. Science may ignore a r a t i o n a l metaphysics; indeed, 
i t has ignored i t so f a r . R e l i g i o n can h a r d l y a f f o r d t o 
ignore the search f o r a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the oppositions of 
experience and a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the environment i n which 
humanity f i n d s i t s e l f . " ^ I q b a l s t a t e s c l e a r l y t h a t as regions 
of normal experience are subject t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f sense-
data f o r our knowledge of the e x t e r n a l world, so the region 
of mystic experience i s subject t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r our 
2 
knowledge of God. I n one sense, then, reason i s the 
i n t e r p r e t e r o f i n t u i t i v e experience, and "philosophy has 
f> — 
j u r i s d i c t i o n t o judge r e l i g i o n . But, as I q b a l p o i n t s out, 
r e l i g i o n has no need t o be a f r a i d o f reason which can give 
only a s e c t i o n a l view of Reality.^" I t can f i n d room w i t h i n 
i t s "universe t h a t t h i n k s and knows" f o r a l l values, whether 
s c i e n t i f i c , a e s t h e t i c , e t h i c a l or m y s t i c a l , f i n d i n g i n the 
transcendent the worth and meaning of the immanent, and i n the 
5 
immanent a graded . r e v e l a t i o n of the transcendent-r- - -
The r e l a t i o n s h i p and r e l a t i v e importance of Reason and 
I n t u i t i o n . 
At the very outset of h i s Lectures, I q b a l states t h a t 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 2. 
2. I b i d , p. UT. 
3. I b i d , p. 2. 
U'» I b i d , p. 
5. U n d e r h i l l , E. "Can the new I d e a l i s m d i s p e n s e w i t h 
M y s t i c i s m ? " pp 155-156. 
log. 
there i s no reason " t o suppose t h a t thought and i n t u i t i o n 
are e s s e n t i a l l y opposed t o each other.""'' More has been 
w r i t t e n on the apparent c o n f l i c t between reason and 
i n t u i t i o n (or between ' ' a q l ' or ' ' i l m ' and " i s h q ' ) i n 
I a b a l ' s works than on any other aspect of h i s thought. Yet, 
there i s no doubt t h a t "as a philosopher .... I q b a l has 
given i n t e l l e c t i t s f u l l n i g h t besides the i n t u i t i o n a l 
2 
experience." He went so f a r as to say t h a t "thought and 
i n t u i t i o n are o r g a n i c a l l y r e l a t e d . " ^ 
I f Reason and I n t u i t i o n are o r g a n i c a l l y r e l a t e d , i t 
f o l l o w s t h a t n e i t h e r can f u n c t i o n alone but both must 
operate together.^ I n i t s deeper movement thought becomes 
almost i d e n t i c a l w i t h i n t u i t i o n (which, f o l l o w i n g ^ergson, 
I q b a l describes as a higher k i n d of i n t e l l e c t ) . I n i t s 
narrower sense, reason may be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h i n t u i t i o n , 
but only i n the way i n which analysis-synthesis may be 
opposed as complementary processes w i t h i n a developing 
whole of thought. The basic r e l a t i o n s h i p between remains. . 
reason and i n t u i t i o n remains u n a l t e r e d , since i n t u i t i o n , " i s 
always found i n i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n t o the reasoning process, 
never i n sheer o p p o s i t i o n t o i t . " ^ 
1. The Reconsturction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 2. 
2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 157. ~ 
3. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp 5-6. 
U. Rahman, F. "Modern Muslim Thought" p. 2l7 
5. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 
6. Stocks, J. L. "Reason and I n t u i t i o n p. 18. 
7. I b i d , p. 16. 
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Throughout h i s w r i t m e r s I q b a l i s a n x i o u s to show t h a t 
t h e r e i s no " b i f u r c a t i o n between the t e m p o r a l and s p i r i t u a l 
a s p e c t s o f l i f e . I f i n t u i t i o n and r e a s o n a r e c o m p l e t e l y 
u n r e l a t e d and i f i n t u i t i o n a l o n e can r e a c h u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y , 
t h e n r e a s o n has t o be l e f t b e h i n d . I n some p l a c e s I o b a l s a y s 
p r e c i s e l y t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be so: 
' <£-U^ My> <-&-(^^ ft A 1 " 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 119) 
But m f a c t , one of the c h i e f aims o f I q b a l ' s p h i l o s o p h y 
i s t o show " t h a t n e i t h e r the w o r l d nor thought s h o u l d be 
2 
l e f t b e h i n d , " H i s i d e a l i s to u n i t e R eason and I n t u i t i o n , 
Power and Love, S t a t e and R e l i g i o n : 
3 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 210) 
B o t h r e a s o n and i n t u i t i o n a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e f u l f i l m e n t 
o f human d e s t i n y . B o t h must be employed t o g r a s p t h e f u l n e s s 
o f l i f e . "To see t h e s e l f o n l y i n the s t a t e o f c o n c e n t r a t i n g 
1. P a s s beyond the I n t e l l e c t , f o r t h i s l i g h t 
I s b u t the w a y s i d e lamp, i t i s not t h e d e s t i n a t i o n . 
2. Ra;ju, P. T. ^The I d e a l i s m of S i r Mohammad I q b a l " 
The V i s v a b h a r a t i Q u a r t e r l y A u g u s t - O c t o b e r 19U0. 
New S e r i e s , Volume I V . P a r t I I . p. 10/j , 
3. T h i s i s i n d e e d a t r u l y r e g a l s t a t e , 
I n w b i c h R e l i g i o n i s Dominion's comate. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by HadT H u s a i n . The New_ Rose-Gar den of 
M y s t e r y , p. 5) 
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i t s power, o f making i t s e l f a p e a r l or diamond, i s as 
wrong as t o see i t e x c l u s i v e l y i n i t s e x t e r i o r a c t i v i t y . " ^ 
I n "Gulshan-e-Raz-e-JadTd" I q b a l t e l l s us t h a t i t i s s i n f u l 
t o see the world " w i t h one eyeV 
> H b>j c>y^ 
<1^\£L.)J 
2 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 208) 
I q b a l t r i e s t o show t h a t there i s something i n common between 
reason and i n t u i t i o n (or Love) 
3 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam p. 36) 
or between i n t u i t i o n and reason: 
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, pp 105-6) 
2. With one eye i t sees the 'khalvat' ( r e c l u s i o n ) of h i s s e l f , 
With one eye i t sees the ' j a l v a t ' ( m a n i f e s t a t i o n ) o f h i s 
s e l f . 
I f i t closes one eye, i t i s a s i n , 
I f i t sees w i t h both eyes, i t i s the c o n d i t i o n of the Path. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 105. 
3. I n t e l l e c t i s passion t o o , 
And i t knows the j o y t o view. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by A r b e r r y , A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 19) 
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(Pas Gi Bayad Kard A i Aqwam-e-Sharq? p. U) 
P e r f e c t knowledge - that,which u n i t e s reason and 
i n t u i t i o n - destroys the i d o l s which stand i n the way 
of the attainment of u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y . 
03 
ur^ J LLP LTT* 
2 
(Zarb-e-KalTm, p. 19) 
And so I q b a l says: 
3 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 217) 
1. The wo r l d does not understand r e a l i t i e s , 
Passion i s an a t t i r e t h a t f i t s the I n t e l l e c t . 
3. That knowledge i s an Abraham to i t s own i d o l s 
To which God has granted the f r i e n d s h i p of the heart and eye 
Which i s not s h o r t - s i g h t e d and combines 
The v i s i o n of Ifoses and the experiment of the philosopher. 
3. Make i n t e l l e c t a companion of your h e a r t . 
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and "Bergson's Message" i s , i n f a c t , h i s own t o o : 
/ 
(Payam-e-Mashriq., p. 21+7) 
I q b a l has c r i t i c i s e d GazzalT f o r abandoning Reason and 
regarding mystic i n t u i t i o n as the only t r u e source of the 
knowledge of u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y . When eve r y t h i n g has been 
s a i d about I q b a l ' s defence o f reason (as against Bergson 
f o r instance) and the importance he gave t o i t , h i s 
fundamental p o s i t i o n i s , a t l e a s t i n one sense, not very 
d i f f e r e n t from GazzalT's. As Professor Whittemore remarks, 
"At the heart of I q b a l ' s philosophy has the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t R e a l i t y i s i n e x p r e s s i b l e p u r e l y i n terms of 
reason and science. This i s not t o deny the import of these 
l a t t e r - ; "Whatever view of man, Universe and God we u l t i m a t e l y 
a r r i v e a t , i t must, I q b a l t h i n k s , be one m which the data of 
science are accounted f o r , one i n which the demands of reason 
f o r coherence are met. Yet below and above the l e v e l of 
1. I f thou woulilst read l i f e as an open book, 
Be not a spark d i v i d e d from the brand. 
Bring^the f a m i l i a r eye, the f r i e n d l y look. 
Nor v i s i t s t r a n g e r - l i k e thy n a t i v e land. 
0 thou by v a i n imaginings be-fooled, 
Get thee a Reason which the Heart hath_schooled.' 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Nicholson, R. A. " I q b a l ' s ^Message of 
the East'" p. 122) 
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science there i s t h a t which man knows simply "because he f e e l s 
i t and i n t u i t s i t . " " ' " Bergson too had f e l t t h a t there i s 
something i n the universe analogous t o the c r e a t i v e s p i r i t 
o f the poet, a l i v i n g , pushing f o r c e , an elan v i t a l which 
eludes the mathematical i n t e l l i g e n c e and can he appreciated 
only by a k i n d of d i v i n i n g ' sympathy or a f e e l i n g which 
2 
approaches nearer t o the essence of t h i n g s than reason. 
I q b a l holds, then ( w i t h Bergson, Bradley, Whitehead, 
I b n *ArabT, fiazzall, Rum! and others) t h a t i t i s through 
i n t u i t i o n t h a t the U l t i m a t e i s known. The experience which 
leads to t h i s gnosis i s not a "conceptually manageable 
i n t e l l e c t u a l f a c t ; i t i s a v i t a l f a c t , an a t t i t u d e consequent 
on inner b i o l o g i c a l transformation which cannot "he captured 
3 
i n the net of l o g i c a l c a tegories." Whitehead c a l l s t h i s 
v i t a l way "transmutation" and Bradley r e f e r s to i t as the 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n v o l v e d i n the passage from the r e l a t i o n a l 
t o the s u p e r - r e l a t i o n a l l e v e l of experience.^" I q b a l , 
f o l l o w i n g the Q&r'an c a l l s i t "Tman" which i s not j n e r e l y a 
passive b e l i e f i n one or more p r o p o s i t i o n s of a c e r t a i n k i n d , 
5 
i t i s a l i v i n g assurance begotten o f a r a r e experience." 
I t i s "Tman" which makes the reader of the Book i n t o the 
1. Whittemore, H. " I q b a l 1 s Panentheism" p. 61+. 
2. T h i l l y , P. A H i s t o r y of Philosophy, New York. 1931. P 5,7,8. 
3. The Reconstruction o f R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 
k. Whittemore. R. "I q b a l ' s i n Panentheism" p. 71. 
5. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 109. 
I l l 
Book i t s e l f : 
-i 
I 
(-Zarb-e-Kalim, p* 57) 
Contrast "between Reason and I n t u i t i o n (Love) i n I q b a l ' s 
Poetry: 
Perhaps the most common co n t r a s t i n I q b a l ' s poetry i s 
between ''ishq' and ' ' a q l ' . S c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s 
equated w i t h ' ' a q l ' and mystic knowledge w i t h ' *ishq.t I . 
The former i s u s u a l l y associated w i t h the West and the 
l a t t e r w i t h the East. 
I n I q b a l ' s verse the use of both 'Reason' and 'Love' 
i s very wide. We are t o l d t h a t Love "as ap p l i e d t o the 
mystics i s to be understood i n i t s deepest f u l l e s t sense; 
as the_ u l t i m a t e .expression of the self-'s m o s t - v i t a l - t e n d e n c i e s , 
not as the s u p e r f i c i a l a f f e c t i o n or emt>tion o f t e n d i g n i f i e d 
by t h i s name ... I t i s a c o n d i t i o n of humble access, a l i f e -
movement of the s e l f : more d i r e c t i n i t s methods, more v a l i d 
m i t s r e s u l t s - even i n the hands of the l e a s t l e t t e r e d o f 
i t s adepts - than the most p i e r c i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l g i s i o n of 
2 
the greatest p h i l o s o p h i c a l mind." 
1. No one knows t h i s secret t h a t the Homin' 
Though he appears as the reader, i s i n f a c t the Book (Qor£n) 
2. U n d e r h i l l , E. Mysticism. London, 1960. p. 85£ . ' .' " 
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Underlying I q b a l ' s poetry i s the idea t h a t the world 
y i e l d s i t s secret only t o him who sees w i t h the eyes of 
Love: Jj V 
, v r f v ^-oU 
i 
(Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 178) 
What i s the d i f f e r e n c e between s c i e n t i f i c and mystic 
experience? the poet aji£r&s The answer i s given i n JavTd Mama: 
j** *<z-> j)s j^Jr* uT 
(JavTd Nama, pp 133-13U) 
I q b a l o f t e n r e f e r s _to I n t e l l e c t as_ "the ^wayside-lamp" — 
which shows the way t o the destination hut cannot give 
1. Look a t the world w i t h the eyes of love t o a t t a i n i t s 
s e c r e t , 
For the w o r l d , i n the eye of the i n t e l l e c t i s merely a show 
2. The task of science i s t o see and consume, ° f m aSi*» 
the work of gnosis i s t o see and augment; 
science weighs i n the "balance of technology, 
gnosis v/eighs i n the balance of i n t u i t i o n ; 
science holds i n i t s hand water and e a r t h , 
gnosis holds i n i t s hand the pure s p i r i t ; 
science casts i t s gaze upon phenomena} 
gnosis absorbs phenomena i n t o i t s e l f . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arb e r r y , A. J. JavTd !Nama, p. 90) 
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knowledge o f the U l t i m a t e : 
i 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 120) 
The poet i s i n s p i r e d by Love and so he has a more d i r e c t 
and i n t i m a t e access t o R e a l i t y than the metaphysician:^ 
^Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 122) 
Knowledge which i s not incandescent w i t h love and 
remains a stranger t o i t s t r a v a i l s , i s of no a v a i l 
i-gjff^0-* JJXS»^ 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 83) 
T~. I n t e l l e c t l i g h t s up the wayfarer's eyes; 
What i s I n t e l l e c t ? I t i s the wayside lamp! 
What tumult i s w i t h i n the inner house 
What can the wayside lamp know of i t ? 
2. Avicenna gets l o s t i n the dust r a i s e d by CLaila*s)camel; 
But the hand of Rum! goes s t r a i g h t t o the c u r t a i n o f Cher) 
palanquin. 
3. Naravane, U. S. Modern I n d i a n Thought. London, 196!+. p. 299. 
U. VahTduddTn, S. "The Philosophy of Muhammad IqbalV The 
Aryan Path_Bombay. December 1957. Volume X X V I I I , p. 550. 
5. Be i t ' A t t a r or RumT or RazT or GazzalT, 
Nothing can be achieved without the lamentation a t dawn. 
Ilk 
Reason can y i e l d only 'Khabar* (knowledge) and 
cannot y i e l d to 'Nazar' ( v i s i o n ) 
l _ 
( B a l - e - J i b r l l , p. 65) 
The seeker, needs something more than mere i n f o r m a t i o n : 
2 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 70) 
And so he p r o t e s t s , , 1 j CL**>>9 oJ uWLyi 
3 
(JavTd Nama, p. 5) 
I q b a r c a l l s the I n t e l l e c t "a question" and Love "the 
1. Par o f f from the d e s t i n a t i o n though i t i s n o t , 
Yet i t w i l l never he granted ai v i s i o n . 
Ask God also f o r a di s c e r n i n g heart, 
For the s i g h t of eye i s not the s i g h t o f he a r t . 
2. The I n t e l l e c t can y i e l d only i n f o r m a t i o n (Khabar) 
Your cure l i e s only i n the v i s i o n (E&^ar) 
3. This w o r l d of mountain and p l a i n , ocean and lan d -
We yearn f o r v i s i o n , and i t speaks of r e p o r t . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry A. J. J a v i d Nama, p. 33) 
11'5 
answer. ti 
(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 13) 
The 'heart' ( d i l ) says t o the 'mind' (*aql) 
(Bang-e-Dara, p.26) 
The mind i n s i s t s t h a t v i s i o n of God i s impossible, 
and yet Love prays h o p e f u l l y : ^ 
(Payam-e-Mashriq,_ p.30) 
1. Creation's m i r a c l e i s due t o the f i r e of Love, 
Knowledge stops at A t t r i b u t e s , Love sees the Essence. 
Love i s peace and s t i l l n e s s , Love i s l i f e and death, 
Knowledge was born a question, and Love the hidden answer. 
2. You apprehend the secret of l i f e , 
I see i t w i t h my eyes. 
You y i e l d knowledge and I the d i r e c t v i s i o n , 
You seek God, I r e v e a l Him. 
3. "The Eye cannot a t t a i n Him," said the Mind: 
Yet Yearning's glance trembles i n hope and f e a r . 
I t grows not o l d , the t a l e of S i n a i , 
And every heart yet whispers Moses' prayer. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J. The T u l i p of S i n a i , p. 8 ) . 
/ 
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Compared w i t h the treasures hidden i n the ocean of Love, 
the i n t e l l e c t has very l i t t l e t o o f f e r : 
i 
(Payam=e~Mashriq, p. 203) 
Reason gives power but i t cannot answer some fundamental 
questions: 
2 
(Zarb-e-KalTm, p. 78) 
and so the e x h o r t a t i o n comes: 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. k8) 
An idea found o f t e n i n I q b a l ' s poetry i s t h a t i t i s 
Love and not Reason which l e a d t o l i f e - g i v i n g and l i f e -
renewing a c t i o n : 
1. Pass beyond the I n t e l l e c t and come t o g r i p s w i t h the waives 
o f the ocean of Love, 
Because m the shallow stream of the I n t e l l e c t there are 
no p e a r l s . 
2. I n knowledge there i s wealth, and power and j o y , 
But there i s one d i f f i c u l t y - one cannot f i n d oneself. 
3. Lose y o u r s e l f i n your heart and discover the secret of l i f e . 
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1 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 218) 
And so the poet urges: j 
2 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 87) 
i t i s a sheath w i t h o u t a sword: 
y 
" ( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 17) 
For a seeker of knowledge, I q b a l prays t h a t he may l e a r n t o 
understand what l i e s beyond the s u p e r f i c i a l meaning of words: 
^Zarb-e-KalTra, p. 81) 
1^ The s c i e n t i s t s or philsophers give form to what i s inner 
but cannot give i t l i f e , 
For they have neither the Hand of Moses nor the S p i r i t of 
Jesus. 
2. Let your heart be wakeful, f o r t i l l i t is awake 
I n e f f e c t i v e i s your s t r o k e , i n e f f e c t i v e i s my s t r o k e . 
3. Who has s t o l e n the mighty sword of Love? _ 
I n the Band of Knowledge there i s but an empty sheath 0 saqT. 
U.. May God acquaint you w i t h some t h i n g momentous 
For i n your ocean's waves there i s no motion. 
You cannot do w i t h o u t your books because 
You only read the books, you do not know them. 
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Love " f l i e s i n t o the Divine Presence" u n l i k e reason 
which moves through the crooked paths of secondary causes: 
6>i>i; y i > ^ 
2 
(JavTd Nama, p. 179) 
Love, on the other hand, i s not circumscribed by anything, 
and works l i k e l i g h t n i n g : 
3 
(JavTd Nama, p. 17) 
Reason i s cautious and f e a r f u l and proceeds slowly. 
Love i s audacious and proceeds u n h e s i t a t i n g l y - b o l d m 
manner and unswerving i n - r e s o l v e : - - - - " 
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 359. 
2. Reason makes i t s way from f a c t t o f a c t . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry A. J. JavTd Nama, p. 113) 
3. Love knows nothing of months and years, 
l a t e and soon, near and f a r upon the road. 
Reason dr i v e s a f i s s u r e through a mountain, 
or else makes a c i r c u i t round i t ; 
before love the mountain i s l i k e a straw, 
the heart darts as s w i f t l y as a fishC -mooA) 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J. JavTd Nama, p. 32) 
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( j a v i d Nama, p. 139) 
One s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between Reason and Love i s 
t h a t the former i s c a l c u l a t i n g and cowardly but the l a t t e r 
r i s k s a l l without f e a r : ^ 
(Bang-e-Dara, p._ 312) - - - - - - - - -
~. Science i s founded upon f e a r and hope, 
Lovers are t r o u b l e d by n e i t h e r hope nor f e a r , 
science i s f e a r f u l o f the grandeur of c r e a t i o n , 
Love i s immersed i n the beauty o f c r e a t i o n , 
science gazes upon the past and the present, 
l o v e c r i e s , 'Look upon what i s coming! ' 
Science has made compact w i t h the canon of c o n s t r a i n ^ 
and has no other resource but c o n s t r a i n t and r e s i g n a t i o n , 
Love i s f r e e and proud and i n t o l e r a n t 
And b o l d l y i n v e s t i g a t e s the whole of Being. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J. JavTd Nama. p. 93) 
2. I f the i n t e l l e c t i s c a l c u l a t i n g i t i s mature, 
I f love i s c a l c u l a t i n g i t i s imperfect. _ 
Fe a r l e s s l y Love l e a p t i n t o the f i r e of Nimrud, 
While I n t e l l e c t y e t watches by the b r i n k . 
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To the West (which I q b a l i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the c o l d , l o v e l e s s 
I n t e l l e c t ) I q b a l sent t h i s message: 
^ . M . . . 
1 
(Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 225) 
And because Love i s "more brave than I n t e l l e c t " the poet 
w r i t e s : . 
2 
(garb-e-Kallm, p. 71) 
I q b a l "struggles m e r c i l e s s l y against t h a t I n t e l l e c t 
which i s separated from Love."^ Wisdom comes only through 
suffering or'soz* (a synonym for love) and the poet prefers 
such wisdom to a n a l y t i c knowledge: 
1^  0 breeze take t h i s message from me t o the wise men of the 
West, 
That I n t e l l e c t since i t opened i t s wings has become more 
of a p r i s o n e r . 
For Love s t r i k e s the heart l i k e l i g h t n i n g w h i l e I n t e l l e c t 
only domesticates i t . 
Love i s more brave than I n t e l l e c t the p r a c t i s e r of d e c e i t s . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Singh, I . The Ardent P i l g r i m , pp 116-117.) 
2. On the morn of C r e a t i o n , ^ - a b r i e l s a i d t o me, 
Do not accept the h e a r w i s a slave of the mind. 
3. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel*s Wing, p. 135. 
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s » / 
1 (Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 32) 
The I n t e l l e c t i s waylaid "by a thousand doubts but Love 
pursues i t s o b j e c t i v e w i t h single-minded d e d i c a t i o n : 
2 
(Payam-e-Maahriq,, p. 19U) 
I q b a l regards loveless I n t e l l e c t as being a l l i e d t o 
Satan and forces of e v i l , of magic and i d o l a t r y . I n Payam-e-
Meshriq he quotes RumT's famous l i n e "Prom Satan l o g i c and 
from Adam love.""^ I n JavTd Nama he w r i t e s : 
1. B e t t e r one d i s t r e s s of heart 
Than a l l Plato's learned a r t 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arb e r r y , A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 17) 
2. Do not seek guidance from the I n t e l l e c t 
Which has a thousand w i l e s ! 
Come t o Love which excels 
By the singleness of i t s purpose. _ 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by S a i y i d a i n , K. G. I q b a l ' s Educational 
Philosophy. p p 135-136) 3. RumT's Ma^JiawT Book IV Line 101+2 quoted i n Pay5m-e-Mashriq. 
p. 2hG. 
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«• 
^ ^ ^ ^ 
1 
(JavTd Nama, pp 82-83) 
I q b a l o f t e n r e f e r s t o the mind as a c r e a t o r of I d o l s , 
and as Love as the destroyer of these i d o l s : 
\ J L>^a \r 
2 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 108) 
This m o t i f pervades I q p a l 1 s whole work. Often Atol^haift i s 
1. r f i t (jscience) a t t a c h e s _ i t s hear_t_to God, i t i s prophecy-, 
hut i f i t i s a stranger t o God, i t i s u n b e l i e f . 
Science w i t h o u t the heart's glow i s pure e v i l , 
f o r then i t s l i g h t i s darkness over sea and l a n d ... 
I t s power becomes the f a i t h f u l - a l l y of Satan; 
l i g h t becomes f i r e by a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h f i r e . 
Science w i t h o u t love i s a demonic t h i n g , 
science together w i t h love i s a t h i n g d i v i n e . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by A r b e r r y , A. J. J a v l d Mama, p. 6k. 
2. Now and now ttind breaketh through 
What i d o l s i t designed; 
Come, f o r love b e l i e v e t h t r u e , 
And i n f i d e l i s ttind 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Ar b e r r y , A. J. Persian Pslams, p. 67) 
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shown breaking the i d o l s of h i s f a t h e r . Love i s a r e a l 
!< 
'Muslim' because i t only worships the One, whereas Leason 
s t i l l wears the Zannar - the Magian's G i r d l e - "which means 
not only t h a t i t creates new i d o l s before which ignorant 
people p r o s t r a t e themselves but also t h a t i t i s s t i l l 
l i m i t e d by the s p e l l of s e r i a l time which hinders man from 
grasping the fulness of Divine time." 
The thought i s repeated i n times such as these: 
2 ( B a l - e - J i b r i l , p. 153) 
Love, i n e f f e c t , becomes the c r i t e r i o n f o r f a i t h : 
\&A>> 'jfauU-'S/' ***** 
" ^ B a l - e - J i b r i l , p. 5k) 
I q b a l i s unhappy over the f a c t t h a t modern education 
does not teach the value of Love but i n s i s t s on the 
supremacy of reason: 
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 135. 
2. Love i s the f i r s t teacher of the Mind, the Heart and the Eye, 
I f there i s no Love, r e l i g i o n and i t s precepts are but an 
idol-house of f a n t a s i e s . 
3» I f there i s Love, even u n b e l i e f i s f a i t h , 
I f there i s no Love, even a Muslim i s a pagan. 
12Z; 
/J 
1 
(Asrar-e-KhudT, p. 77) 
Only Love can l e a d to v i s i o n , t o the t r u e r e a l i z a t i o n 
of man's deepest s e l f : 
-» 
(JavTd Nama, pp h~5-) 
Reason can conquer only the v i s i b l e w o rld, but Love i s 
more ambitious: _ _ _ 
1. Modern knowledge i s the g r e a t e s t b l i n d 
Idol-making, i d o l - s e l l i n g , i d o l - w o r s h i p p i n g ! 
Shackled i n the prison-house of phenomena, 
I t has not overleaped the l i m i t s o f the sensible-
( T r a n s l a t i o n by S a i y i d a m , K. G. I q b a l ' s Educational 
Philosophy, p. 136) 
2. So long as knowledge has no p o r t i o n of love 
i t i s a mere p i c t u r e - g a l l e r y of thoughts. 
This peep-show i s the SamlrT's 
knowlege without the Holy Ghost i s more s p e l l - b i n d i n g 
Without r e v e l a t i o n no wise man ever found the way, 
he died b u f f e t t e d by h i s own imaginings; 
w i t h o u t r e v e l a t i o n l i f e i s a m o r t a l sickness, 
reason i s banishment, r e l i g i o n c o n s t r a i n t . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J. JavTd Mama, p. 23) 
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i _ 
(JavTd jNama, p. 9) 
And i f man i s constant i n love, he can capture God Himself: 
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 165) 
The embodiments of Love are not s u b j e c t to decay. The Mosque 
a t Cordoba, f o r i n s t a n c e , i s a work of a r t c r e a t e d out of 
love and f a i t h , and so i t l a s t s while_ generations, of .human 
beings pass away. The whole poem - one of the most 
b e a u t i f u l i n a l l I q b a l ' s works - i s a poem on the potency 
and e f f i c a c y of Love: 
1. Man's reason i s making a s s a u l t on the world, 
but h i s love makes a s s a u l t on t h e _ I n f i n i t e 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J . JavTd Nama, p. 26) 
2. Be a l o v e r constant i n devotion to thy beloved, 
That thou mayst castanoose and capture God. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n Nicholson, R. A. The 8 e c r e t s of the S e l f , p.36. 
3. Love i s the preface to the an c i e n t book of E t e r n i t y , 
Human i n t e l l e c t i s mortal but Love i s e t e r n a l . 
(Asrar-e-KhudT 23 T) 
Love l i v e s on, though reason d i e s : 
3 
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1 ( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 129) 
Perhaps one of the t e s t known c o n t r a s t s between Reason 
and Love occurs i n Rumuz-e-BekhudT where I q b a l sums up the 
c h i e f d i f f e r e n c e s which, i n h i s opinion, are to he found 
between them: 
J 
1. Shrine of Cordoba\ from Love a l l your e x i s t e n c e i s sprung, 
Love t h a t can know no end, stranger to then - and - now. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Kiernan, V. G. Poems from I q b a l . p . 38) 
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! ^>/> J^oJ^ 
(Rumuz-e-Bekhndi, pp 125-126) 
1. Unto Love "belongs 
The t r u e " b e l i e v e r , and Love unto him 
Love maketh a l l t h i n g s p o s s i b l e t o us. 
Reason i s r u t h l e s s , Love i s even more, 
P u r e r , and n i m b l e r , and more u n a f r a i d . 
L o s t m t h e maze o f cause and o f e f f e c t 
I s Reason: Love s t r i k e s b o l d l y i n t h e f i e l d 
Of A c t i o n . C r a f t y - Reason s e t s a snare; 
Love ov e r t h r o w s t n e p r e y w i t h s t r o n g r i g h t arm. 
Reason i s r i c h m f e a r and doubt; b u t Love 
Has f i r m r e s o l v e , f a i t h i n d i s s o l u b l e . " 
Reason c o n s t r u c t s , t o make a w i l d e r n e s s ; 
Love l a y s wide waste, t o b u i l d a l l up anew. 
Reason i s cheap, and p l e n t i f u l as a i r ; 
Love i s more scarce t o f i n d , and o f g r e a t p r i c e . 
Reason stands f i r m upon phenomena, 
But Love i s naked o f m a t e r i a l robes. 
Reason savs, " T h r u s t t h y s e l f i n t o t he f i r e ; " 
Love answers, " T r y t h y h e a r t , and prove t h y s e l f . " 
Reason by a c q u i s i t i o n i s i n f o r m e d 
Of o t h e r : Love i s b o r n o f i n w a r d grace 
And makes account w i t h S e l f . Reason d e c l a r e s , 
"Be happy, and be p r o s p e r o u s ; " Love r e p l i e s , 
"Become a s e r v a n t , t h a t t h o u mayest be f r e e . " 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by A r b e r r y , The M y s t e r i e s o f S e l f l e s s n e s s , p.26) 
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IQBAL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE; I n c o n c l u s i o n 
I n a l e t t e r to K. G. S a i y i d a m I q b a l has summed up h i s 
theory of knowledge and made i t s aims c l e a r : " I have 
g e n e r a l l y used the word 'knowledge' i n the sense of 
knowledge based on the senses. I t g i v e s man Power which 
should be subordinated to R e l i g i o n . I f i t i s not subordinated 
to R e l i g i o n , i t i s a S a t a n i c f o r c e . T h i s knowledge i s the 
f i r s t step to true knowledge, as I have pointed out i n 
J a v i d Mama. The knowledge of Truth i s gained f i r s t through 
the senses and then through d i r e c t r e a l i z a t i o n . I t s 
ul t i m a t e stages cannot be encompassed w i t h i n consciousness. 
Knowledge, which cannot be c i r c u m s c r i b e d w i t h i n consciousness 
and which i s the f i n a l stage of Truth i s a l s o c a l l e d Love or 
I n t u i t i o n . I n t e l l e c t , divorced from Love, 4s a r e b e l ( l i k e 
Satan) while I n t e l l e c t , wedded to Love, had d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e s . 
A Muslim should t r y to convert such knowledge, which i s based 
on senses and i s the source of l i m i t l e s s power, to I s l a m , i . e . 
transform - t h i s (unbeliever) Bu -Lahab, i n t o (the perfect'Momin) 
'AlT. I n other words, i f the power of knowledge i s i n s p i r e d 
by r e l i g i o n , i t i s the g r e a t e s t b l e s s i n g f o r mankind.""'" 
I q b a l , the poet-philosopher, scanning the mass of 
phenomena, f i n d s h i s own h e a r t , and i n h i s h e a r t and a t the 
heart of the u n i v e r s e l i k e T. S. E l i o t and Dante, he f i n d s l o v e / 
IT I q b a l 1 s l e t t e r quoted i n S a i y i d a i n , K. G. I q b a l ' s*"~ 
E d u c a t i o n a l Philosophy, pp LU5-1U6. _ 
2. McCarthy, E. " I q b a l as a poet and philosopher" I q b a l 
Review, October I 9 6 I . p. 20. 
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Knowledge begins with sense-perception ('*Ilm') and ends 
with knowledge of u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y ('^Ishq'). A s y n t h e s i s of 
'ftlm' and !<Ishq' i s the b a s i s of 'KhudT.' 
Knowlege i s d e s i r e d not f o r i t s own sake, but f o r the 
sake of the power and v i s i o n i t g i v e s . Man should possess 
knowledge so t h a t he can transform the world and h i m s e l f . 
Philosophy and a l l t h i n k i n g should not be j u s t the product 
of one's mind, but must c o n t a i n and express the ^ r ^ r concern 
of a human being. Philesophy, f o r I q b a l , i s not a 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d study of concepts and i d e a s . I t i s a v o c a t i o n 
where one's whole l i f e i s a t stake. Philosophy aims not to 
i n c r e a s e knowledge, but to give v i s i o n and to l e a d to 
purposeful a c t i o n . As the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s b e l i e v e the 
u l t i m a t e aim of philosophsing i s not to see something but to 
be something."'" 
I q b a l was f a c i n g a problem which other poets and t h i n k e r s 
have faced before and s i n c e h i s time - the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of 
s c i e n c e and r e l i g i o n , reason and f a i t h , i n t e l l e c t and 
i n t u i t i o n . L i k e T.'S". " E l i o t I q b a l too seems to wonder "where 
i s the wisdom we have l o s t i n knowledge? 1^ While reading h i s 
poetry one i s a l s o reminded of Tennyson who f a c i n g a s i m i l a r 
dilemma had a r r i v e d a t a c o n c l u s i o n not very d i f f e r n t from 
I q b a l ' s : 
1. 'Erfan, N._ "What i s common between the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s 
and I q b a l " p. 60. 
2. E l i o t , T. S. "The Rock" c i t e d i n B a r t l e t J . F a m i l i a r 
Quotations New York, 1956, p. 118. 
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Who loves not knowledge? Who s h a l l r a i l 
A g a i n s t her beauty? May she mix 
With men and prosper! Who s h a l l f i x 
Her p i l l a r s ? L e t her work p r e v a i l . 
Half-grown as y e t , a c h i l d , and v a i n -
She cannot f i g h t the f e a r of death. 
What i s she, cut from love and f a i t h , 
But some w i l d P a l l a s from the "brain 
Of Demons? f i e r y - h o t to h u r s t 
A l l h a r r i e r s m her onward ra c e 
For power. L e t her know her p l a c e , 
She i s the second, not the f i r s t . 
A higher hand must make her mild, 
I f a l l he not i n v a i n ; and guide 
Her f o o t s t e p s , moving s i d e by side 
With wisdom, l i k e the younger c h i l d : 
For she i s e a r t h l y of the mind, 
But Wisdom heavenly of the s o u l . ^ 
I n h i s theory of knowledge, as i n other p a r t s of h i s 
philosophy, I q b a l was t r y i n g to demonstrate t h a t there was 
no b i f u r c a t i o n between the temporal and s p i r i t u a l a s p e c t s of 
l i f e , to show t h a t r e l i g i o n could be compatible with s c i e n c e , 
t h a t r e l i g i o u s experience could " u n i f y , i n s p i r e and crown 
man's deepest thought and w i l l , and place the s e l f i n f u l l e r 
2 
and t r u e r r e l a t i o n with the o b j e c t i v e world." _I„t l i a s _ t r u l y -
been observed t h a t I q b a l was "one of the most important 
v i n d i c a t o r s of the power of r e l i g i o n . He proved t h a t the 
s c i e n t i f i c modern man can a l s o be the man of f a i t h and t h a t 
out of the most r i g o r o u s questioning to which a powerful i n t e l -
l e c t can s u b j e c t i t , f a i t h can emerge not only unimpaired, but 
3 
strengthened." 
JT Tennyson, A. " I n Memoriam A. H. Hi' P o e t i c a l Works. London, 
1953. p.260 
2. U n d e r h i l l , E. "Can the new I d e a l i s m dispense with 
Mysticism?" p. 15U. 
3. Avery, P. " I q b a l and the Message of P e r s i a n Metaphysics," 
a paper read on I q b a l Way Meeting i n London i n A p r i l 1960. 
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CHAPTER I I I 
IQBJEL'S IDEAS ON SPACE AND TIME. 
A theory of space and time i s an i n t e g r a l part of 
cosmology. I n h i s L e c t u r e s , I q b a l too has devoted 
considerable a t t e n t i o n to e l u c i d a t i n g the concepts of 
space and time (he places much g r e a t e r emphasis on the 
l a t t e r than on the former). He has d i s c u s s e d a number 
of conceptions of space and time held by v a r i o u s t h i n k e r s 
through the ages« I t i s u s e f u l to see how f a r he agrees 
with or d i f f e r s from them, f o r i t throws considerable 
l i g h t on h i s own cosmology. 
S P A C E . 
Zeno's arguments: u n r e a l i t y of space. 
To examine f i r s t the concept of space, i t i s to be 
seen t h a t I q b a l begins by r e f e r r i n g to Zeno's paradox. 
Zeno's arguments, i n some form have afforded grounds f o r 
most of the t h e o r i e s of space and time and i n f i n i t y which-
-l 
have been co n s t r u c t e d from h i s day to our own. These 
arguments are as f o l l o w s : 
( a ) I n order to t r a v e r s e a d i s t a n c e , a body must f i r s t 
t r a v e r s e h a l f the d i s t a n c e . There s t i l l remains h a l f 
of the d i s t a n c e l e f t to t r a v e r s e . When i t t r a v e r s e s 
h a l f of t h i s d i s t a n c e , there s t i l l remains h a l f , and so on 
1. R u s s e l l , B. Our Knowledge of the E x t e r n a l World, London, 
1926, p.183-
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ad i n f i n i t u m , (b) A c h i l l e s and a t o r t o i s e run a r a c e . 
I f the t o r t o i s e i s given a s t a r t , A c h i l l e s can never 
catch up wi t h i t . For he must f i r s t run to the place 
from where the t o r t o i s e s t a r t e d . When he gets there, 
the t o r t o i s e w i l l have reached another point. When 
A c h i l l e s reaches that point the t o r t o i s e w i l l have reached 
a t h i r d p o int. T h i s w i l l go on ad i n f i n i t u m , and so 
A c h i l l e s w i l l never c a t c h up with the t o r t o i s e , ( e ) An 
object cannot be i n two pl a c e s a t the same time. There-
fore a t any given moment i n i t s f l i g h t , an arrow i s i n one 
place and not i n two. But to be i n one place i s to be a t 
r e s t . Therefore i n each and every moment of i t s f l i g h t 
1 
i t i s a t r e s t , and cannot move. 
Zeno bases h i s argument on the idea that space i s 
i n f i n i t e l y d i v i s i b l e , and consequently a l l movement i n 
space i s u n r e a l because i t i s impossible to pass through 
an i n f i n i t y of p o i n t s i n a f i n i t e time. The u n r e a l i t y 
_ o f motion i m p l i e s the u n r e a l i t y of an independent and 
o 
o b j e c t i v e space. Zeno asks the question: how can one 
go from one p o s i t i o n at one moment to the next p o s i t i o n 
at the next moment without i n the t r a n s i t i o n being a t no 
p o s i t i o n at no moment? T h i s argument r e s t s on the assum-
t i o n that space and time c o n s i s t of an i n f i n i t e number of 
1. Stace, W. T. A C r i t i c a l H i s t o r y of Greek Philosophy. 
London, 19U1. p. 5h* 
2. The Reco n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 35. 
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points and i n s t a n t s . I f between two p o i n t s the moving 
body w i l l be out of place, then c l e a r l y motion cannot 
take p l a c e . 
The A s h ' a r i t e s : atomic space. 
The A s h ' a r i t e s t r i e d to r e s o l v e the paradox of Zeno. 
They d i d not b e l i e v e i n the i n f i n i t e d i v i s i b i l i t y of space 
and time, "but put f o r t h r a t h e r a quantum theory of space 
and time inasmuch as they considered space, time and motion 
to be made up of p o i n t s and i n s t a n t s which cannot be 
2 
f u r t h e r subdivided." I f there was a l i m i t t o the d i v i -
s i b i l i t y of space and time, then movement from one point 
to another would be p o s s i b l e i n a f i n i t e time. They 
explained motion thus: space i s generated by the aggrega-
t i o n of atoms. Motion i s the atom's passage through space. 
They could not, however, say that when i n motion a body 
passed over a l l the i n t e r v e n i n g p o i n t s i n space, as t h i s 
would imply the e x i s t e n c e of a vacuum as an independent 
r e a l i t y . ^ Hence they put forward the_notion-of-*Taf-ra' 
or 'Jump' which i s s i m i l a r to the modern quantum jamps 
p o s t u l a t e d by Planck and Bohr. According to t h i s theory 
the changes of s t a t e of a dynamical system are d i s c r e t e 
and not continuous. A p a r t i c l e appears at c e r t a i n d i s c r e t e 
1. SiddTql, R. " I q b a l ' s Gonception of Time and Space", I q b a l 
as a Thinker, pp 10-11. 
2» i o i a * PP H-12. 
3. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 68-9. 
13k 
o r b i t s and takes no n o t i c e of any intermediate o r b i t s . 
P r o f e s s o r Whitehead w r i t e s , " I t i s as though an automobile 
moving at the average r a t e of 30 m i l e s an hour along a 
road did not t r a v e r s e the road continuously, but appeared 
s u c c e s s i v e l y at the s u c c e s s i v e milestones remaining f o r 
two minutes at each milestone." Ibn Hazm r e f u t e d the 
A s h ' a r i t e notion of atomic time and space. He regarded 
time and space as continuous, a view shared by the 
3 _ 
mathematician Cantor and h i s s u c c e s s o r s . I q b a l confesses 
that he i s unable to understand the A s h ' a r i t e s o l u t i o n to 
the paradox of Zeno i n v o l v i n g the question of an independent 
Space.^ 
R u s s e l l ; theory of mathematical c o n t i n u i t y . 
Bertrand R u s s e l l has t r i e d to r e f u t e Zeno's paradox 
by arguments based on Cantor's theory of mathematical con-
t i n u i t y . I n the modern theory of numbers and s e t s of 
p o i n t s , i t i s shown t h a t between any two points there are 
a n - i n f i n i t e number of points^ There are no i n f i n i t e s i m a l s 
which make the movement impossible. The arrow i s a t r e s t 
a t every moment of i t s f l i g h t but t h i s does not mean th a t 
i t does not move. There i s a one - one correspondence 
between the i n f i n i t e s e r i e s of p o s i t i o n s and i n f i n i t e 
1. S i d d l q i , R. " I q b a l ' s Conception of Time and Space", p. 12. 
2. Whitehead, A. N. Science and the Modern World. Cambridge, 
1933, £. U5. 
3. S i d d i q i , R. " I q b a l ' s Conception of Time and Space " pp 13-11+. 
k» The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 69. 
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s e r i e s of i n s t a n t s . Thus to every given i n s t a n t of time 
there i s a corresponding p o s i t i o n of the moving body, and 
to every p o s i t i o n of the moving body there i s a correspon-
ding i n s t a n t of time. T h i s correspondence, between i n s t a n t 
and point i s c a l l e d movement. T h i s theory makes i t 
p o s s i b l e to a f f i r m the r e a l i t y of space, time and movement, 
1 
and a t the same time to avoid Zeno's paradox. 
According to I q b a l the one - one correspondence between 
the i n f i n i t e m u l t i p l i c i t y of i n s t a n t s i n a f i n i t e i n t e r v a l 
of time and an i n f i n i t e m u l t i p l i c i t y of p o i n t s i n a f i n i t e 
portion of space, does not solve the d i f f i c u l t y a r i s i n g from 
d i v i s i b i l i t y . The mathematical conception of c o n t i n u i t y 
a p p l i e s not to movement regarded as an a c t , but to the 
p i c t u r e of movement as seen from outside. The a c t of 
movement as i t i s experienced -and s i n g l e and i n d i v i s i b l e . 
The f l i g h t of the arrow observed as a passage i n space i s 
d i v i s i b l e , but i t s f l i g h t regarded as an a c t cannot be 
2 _ -
d i v i d e d . 
Bergson: p s y c h o l o g i c a l approach. 
I q b a l agrees w i t h Bergson that Zeno's paradox can only 
be res o l v e d by approaching the problem p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y . 
According to Bergson, motion i s an i n d i v i s i b l e act which 
should be looked upon as a unit or whole and not reduced 
to i t s component p a r t s . I n other words, i f movement i s 
1» The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 36-37. 
2. I b i d , p. 37. 
136 
d i v i d e d in t o s t a t i c u n i t s , i t i s impossible to get back 
the o r i g i n a l movement out of the di s p a r a t e p a r t s . The 
space t r a v e r s e d by the arrow i s d i v i s i b l e because i t i s 
a matter of qua n t i t y or extension but the movement i s not 
d i v i s i b l e because i t i s an i n t e n s i v e a c t or q u a l i t y . I t 
was t h i s confusion between q u a l i t y and quantity or between 
r e a l time and s p a t i a l i z e d time which gave r i s e to Zeno's 
•i 
p u z z l e s . 
* I r a q i ; space as r e l a t i v e 
I q b a l r e f e r s i n some d e t a i l to the conception of space 
held by the Muslim t h i n k e r ' I r a q i who b e l i e v e d i n more than 
one kind of space. According to him there are three kinds 
of space: 
( a ) The space of m a t e r i a l bodies. T h i s has three c l a s s e s : 
( i ) The space of gross bodies of which we p r e d i c t roominess. 
I n t h i s space movement takes time, bodies occupy c e r t a i n 
places and r e s i s t displacement, ( i i ) The space of s u b t l e 
bodies, e.g. a i r . and sound. I n t h i s space two" bodies 
r e s i s t each other and t h e i r movement can be measured i n 
terms of time which, however, d i f f e r s from the time of 
gross bodies. ( i i i ) The space of l i g h t . The v e l o c i t y 
of l i g h t reduces time to almost a zero. Also, the l i g h t 
of a candle spreads i n a room without d i s p l a c i n g the a i r . 
I t shows that the space of l i g h t i s more s u b t l e than the 
1. Car, B.A. " I n t e l l e c t and I n t u i t i o n i n Bergson and S u f i s " 
p. 70. 
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space of a i r . " I n view of the c l o s e proximity of these 
spaces, however, i t i s not p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h the 
one from the other except by purely i n t e l l e c t u a l a n a l y s i s 
and s p i r i t u a l experience."^ The space ( a ) has a m e t r i c 
2 
i . e . there i s a distance a s s o c i a t e d with i t . 
(b) The space of immaterial bodies. *IraqT b r i e f l y 
d e s c r i b e s the main v a r i e t i e s of space operated upon by the 
v a r i o u s c l a s s e s of immaterial beings, e.g. angels. The 
element of space i s not e n t i r e l y absent from these spaces, 
f o r immaterial beings, while they can e a s i l y pass through 
stone w a l l s , cannot a l t o g e t h e r dispense w i t h motion which, 
according to ' I r a q i , i s evidence of imperfection i n s p i r i -
t u a l i t y . The highest point i n the s c a l e of s p a t i a l 
freedom i s reached by the human s o u l which, i n i t s unique 
essence, i s n e i t h e r at r e s t nor m motion.-* 
( c ) The space of God i s a b s o l u t e l y f r e e from a l l dimen-
k 
s i o n s and c o n s t i t u t e s the meeting point of a l l i n f i n i t i e s . 
According t o _ I q b a l , ' I r a q i i s here vaguely s t r u g g l i n g 
w i t h the concept of space as an i n f i n i t e continuum. But 
due to a l a c k of mathematical knowledge and a p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
i n c l i n a t i o n towards the A r i s t o t e l i a n concept of a f i x e d 
u n i v e r s e , he could not see the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n of h i s 
thought even though h i s mind moved i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n ? 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 135-136. 
2. giddTql, R. " I q b a l ' s Conception of Time and Space." p. 16. 
3« The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 136-137. 
k. I b i d , p. 137. 
5. Tbld'. pp 137-138. 
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I q b a l agrees with ' I r a q i i n holding that there i s more 
than one kind of space. For in s t a n c e s p a t i a l s p e c i f i -
c a t i o n s denoted by words such as 'proximity', 'contact' 
and 'mutual s e p a r a t i o n ' which apply to m a t e r i a l bodies 
do not apply to God. "Divine l i f e i s i n touch w i t h 
the whole u n i v e r s e on the analogy of the s o u l ' s contact 
with the body. The so u l i s n e i t h e r i n s i d e nor outside 
the body, n e i t h e r proximate to nor separate from i t . 
Yet i t s contact with every atom of the body i s r e a l , 
and i t i s impossible to conceive t h i s contact except by 
p o s i t i n g some kind of space which b e f i t s the su b t l e n e s s 
of the s o u l . The e x i s t e n c e of space i n r e l a t i o n to the 
l i f e of God, t h e r e f o r e , cannot be denied; only we should 
c a r e f u l l y d e f i n e the kind of space which may be pre-
2 
d i c a t e d of the Absoluteness of God." 
In Iqbal»s opinion i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t merely to 
reduce space and time to a v a n i s h i n g p o i n t - i n s t a n t when 
d e s c r i b i n g the space of-time of God.- The p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
path leading to God as the omnipsyche of the u n i v e r s e 
l i e s through the d i s c o v e r y of l i v i n g thought as the 
u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e of space-time. ' I r a q i s conceived 
God's r e l a t i o n to the universe on the analogy of the 
human s o u l to the body, but he d i d not reach t h i s 
p o s i t i o n through a c r i t i c i s m of the s p a t i a l and temporal 
1« The Rec o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 135-* 
2. I b i d . 
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aspects of experience ( o r , i n other words, by r e a l i z i n g 
the true nature of space and time) but simply p o s t u l a t e d 
A 
i t on the b a s i s of h i s s p i r i t u a l experience.' However, 
although I q b a l does not agree w i t h ' I r a q i i n toto, he 
seems to think that by i n s i s t i n g on the p l u r a l i t y of 
s p a c e - o r d e r s , ' I r a q i made a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
2 
Muslim thought. 
Ouspensky: v a r y i n g dimensions of space. 
I t i s c l e a r that f o r I q b a l space i s r e l a t i v e to 
s u b j e c t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n . The Russian t h i n k e r P. D. 
Ouspensky i n h i s Teitium Organum supports t h i s viewpoint. 
According to Ouspensky, the space of the human being has 
three dimensions. I t i s , however, p o s s i b l e to i n c r e a s e 
or decrease the number of dimensions by i n c r e a s i n g or 
decreasing the psychic powers. For the s n a i l which 
possesses only s e n s a t i o n and sees the world as a l i n e , 
space i s one-dimensional. Animals have perception and 
s_ee_jthe_ world as avslir£a$e, and f o r them space'is"two-
dimensional. Human beings are able to form concepts and 
measure cubes and f o r them space i s three-dimensional. 
Thus space i s r e l a t i v e to the p s y c h i c l e v e l . 3 The f a c t 
of there being dimensions l e s s than t h r e e , leads us to 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of there being dimensions more than three, 
j.The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp 137-138. 
2. I b i d , p. 183. 
3. Enver I , H. Metaphysics of I q b a l , pp 15-16. 
li+O 
depending on an augmentation i n p s y c h i c powers. 
Newtonian view of space. 
I n the C a r t e s i a n scheme of t h i n g s , extension cons-
t i t u t e s matter, and matter c o n s t i t u t e s space, which i s 
th e r e f o r e a plenum - there i s no void.2 Gassendi r e j e c t e d 
the d o c t r i n e t h a t space i s a plenum, and regarded matter 
not as being co-extensive with space, but as being capable 
of movement i n space of which i t occupied only a part.-* 
Newton adopted Gassendi's p r i n c i p l e s and regarded space 
as having a r e a l i t y of i t s own, independently of i t s 
occupation by m a t e r i a l bodies or of i t s perception by any 
human mind: i t was i n f i n i t e in extent and e t e r n a l i n 
du r a t i o n . Thus Newton d e c l a r e s that "absolute space, i n 
i t s own nature, without regard to anything e x t e r n a l , 
remains s i m i l a r and immovable," and " a l l things are pla c e d 
i n space as regards order of s i t u a t i o n . " ^ - I q b a l does not 
hold that space i s absolute and consequently r e j e c t s the 
Newtonian conception of space.as w e l l as the m a t e r i a l i s m ~~ 
5 
to which i t l e d . J 
Space and R e l a t i v i t y . 
According to Newton space and time presented frame-
works of r e f e r e n c e s u b s i s t i n g independently of the observe r . ^ 
1. Enver I , H. Metaphysics of I q b a l , pp 15-16. 
2. Whittaker, E. Space and S p i r i t , London, 19U6, p. 72. 
3. I b i d , pp 75-76. 
U« Newton quoted i n I b i d , p. 76. 
5. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 3U-35. 
6. Haldane, R". The Reign of R e l a t i v i t y , London. 1922. p. I4.5. 
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E i n s t e i n who put forward h i s general theory of R e l a t i v i t y 
i n 1915» discarded the assumption t h a t space was a uniform 
characterless vacuum and p o s t u l a t e d t h a t i t had a property 
•1 
of c urvature, v a r y i n g from p o i n t t o p o i n t . According to 
E i n s t e i n , so f a r from being frameworks i n which, as 
perceived by us, t h i n g s e x i s t i n the same way under a l l 
sets of c o n d i t i o n s , and which are always uniform, i t i s 
due t o the p o s i t i o n of the observer t h a t they present them-
selves w i t h the shapes and measurements we a t t r i b u t e t o 
them as being of t h e i r essence. I t i s only r e l a t i v e l y t h a t 
the current ideas of the r e l a t i o n s i n them of objects are 
t r u e , or t h a t they themselves e x i s t as they are. The space 
and time we observe may have derived t h e i r form from the 
con d i t i o n s a f f e c t i n g the observers, and so they may t u r n 
2 
out t o be r e l a t i v e , not absolute. 
Just as we are i n the habit of t h i n k i n g t h a t a unique 
meaning i s t o be given to space, t h a t whatever meaning i s 
given t o s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s i n respect t o - t h e instrument 
on the e a r t h the same meaning must be given t o them i n 
respect t o the instrument on the comet or at r e s t i n the 
ether,3 we tend t o t h i n k t h a t the framework of time i s 
quit e independent of the framework of space. "But i f b o t h 
space and time are s t r i p p e d of what i s u n e s s e n t i a l , and 
1. Whittaker, E. Space and S p i r i t , p. 102. 
2. Haldane, R. The Reign of R e l a t i v i t y , p. U3» 
3» Whitehead, A. N. Science and the Modern World, pp H4 . 7 —llj . 8 . 
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presented i n t h e i r bare nakedness, they look d i f f e r e n t . 
I f there were no succession i n time, and everything 
appeared as at one i n s t a n t , a l i t t l e r e f l e c t i o n shows 
th a t we could not apprehend the p o s i t i o n s of points i n 
space. Their r e a l i t y depends f o r us on t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n , 
which i t s e l f depends on t r a n s i t i o n , and t h i s on succession 
i n time. On the other hand, i f , i n the absence of a l l 
separation i n space, there were only one s p a t i a l p o i n t i n 
which existence centred f o r us as time elapsed, i t i s 
e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t i n t e r v a l s of time would have no meaning. 
Duration could be immeasurable, f o r i t i s by s p a t i a l i s i n g , 
as on the d i a l of a watch, t h a t we measure i t . Space and 
time are r e a l l y a b s t r a c t i o n s from a r e a l i t y which includes 
both I n mutual i m p l i c a t i o n . " 1 
Thus, according t o the theory of r e l a t i v i t y , time and 
space are m u t u a l l y dependent. The universe i s not made 
up of two separate categories, time and space, but of a 
s i n g l e space-time continuum. The three-dimensional world 
becomes four-dimensional, having f o u r elements, i . e . l e n g t h , 
breadth, height and time. Space and time are r e a l , but 
r e l a t i v e . 2 " I t i s not as frameworks s u b s i s t i n g as s e l f -
contained phenomena independently of the objects m them, 
such as are the independent space and time Newton thought 
o f , but as what gets meaning only i n our thought about them, 
1. Haldane, R. The Reign of R e l a t i v i t y , p. 
2. SiddTql", R. " I q b a l ' s Conception of Time and Space" p. 2U-. 
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t h a t we r e a l l y discover space and time i n our a c t u a l 
experience a " ' ' 
I q b a l i s i n general agreement w i t h the theory of 
p 
r e l a t i v i t y as regards the nature of space. He regards 
space not as something given or s t a t i c , but as a "dynamic 
appearance" -^ which i s r e l a t i v e t o various l e v e l s of 
experience. The t r u e nature of space (and time) i s 
r e a l i z e d when one sinks i n t o "one's deeper s e l f , " or, i n 
other words, when one does not take a p u r e l y i n t e l l e c t u a l 
v i e w p o i n t , because, i n I q b a l ' s words: 
^(Zabur-e-'Ajam p. 2 1 6 ) 
T I M E . 
Time i s a c e n t r a l concept i n I q b a l ' s philosophy. 
From various accounts we know t h a t the t r a d i t i o n ' l a 
tasubbu ad-dahr* i . e . Do not v i l i f y Time ( f o r Time i s God), 
accompanied I q b a l a l l his l i f e . ^ He even s u r p r i s e d Henri 
Bergson w i t h i t when he v i s i t e d the French philosopher i n 
1 . Haldane > R . The Reign of R e l a t i v i t y , pp 1 + 6 - 1 + 7 . 
2 . §iddTqI, R. " I q b a l ' s Conception of Time and Space" p. 2 9 . 
3 » The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 1 3 7 . 
l+o The i n t e l l e c t b u i l t Space upon the v o i d . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Husain, A. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, 
P. 7 ) . 
5 . Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 2 9 0 . 
P a r i s . "He took t h i s p r o p h e t i c a l word f o r a designation 
of t h a t overwhelming r e a l i t y of which time and space are 
only aspects." I n 1 9 3 3 * he wrote, " I f Mahr' i s continuous 
and extended and i f i t i s A l l a h himself - what then, i s 
space? Just as i f time i s a k i n d of r e f l e c t i o n of 'dahr,' 
2 
so space must also be a ki n d of r e f l e c t i o n of 'dahr.nf 
I q b a l emphasises time more than space. Time i s more 
fundamental than space; i t i s r e l a t e d t o space as soul i s 
to the body. I t i s the mind of space. Pure d u r a t i o n 
i s the m a t r i x of the whole universe.^ 
Hewton; absolute time. 
Newton conceives of time as he conceives of space, as 
a k i n d of a c t u a l l y s u b s i s t i n g framework i n which objects 
are s e t , and so as belonging t o the a c t u a l i n the same fashio n 
f o r every k i n d of i n d i v i d u a l observer, however he may observe, 
5 
and without reference t o any c o n d i t i o n . According t o 
Newton, a l l motions may be accelerated or retarded, only 
the flow of absolute time cannot be changed.- The same 
d u r a t i o n w i t h the same persistence occurs i n the existence 
of a l l t h i n g s , whether the motion be r a p i d , slow or zero.^ 
I q b a l r e f e r s t o Newton's d e s c r i p t i o n of time as 'something 
which i n i t s e l f and from i t s own nature flows e q u a l l y ' and 
1 . Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, pp 2 9 0 ^ 2 9 1 . 
2 . I q b a l quoted i n I b i d , p. 2 9 1 . 
3 « The Reconstruction of Re l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 1 3 7 . 
U« Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of I q b a l . p. 1 0 3 . 
5 » Haldane, g. The Reign of R e l a t i v i t y , p. U3» 
6 . SiddTqi, R. " I q b a l ' s Conception of Time and Space" pp 1 9 - 2 0 . 
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says t h a t the metaphor of stream i m p l i e d i n t h i s d e s c r i p -
t i o n , suggests serious objections t o Newton's view of time. 
"We cannot understand how a t h i n g i s a f f e c t e d on i t s 
immersion i n t h i s stream and how i t d i f f e r s from things 
t h a t do not p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t s f l o w . Nor can we form 
any idea of the beginning, the end, and the boundaries of 
time i f we t r y to understand i t on the analogy of a stream. 
Moreover, i f f l o w , movement, or 'passage' i s the l a s t word 
as t o the nature of time, there must be another time t o 
time the movement of the f i r s t time, and another which 
times the second time, and so on t o i n f i n i t y . 1 Thus, 
according t o I q b a l the n o t i o n of time as something w h o l l y 
o b j e c t i v e i s beset w i t h d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The Ash-'arites; atomic time 
Time, though i t cannot be regarded as o b j e c t i v e , i s 
not t o be regarded as something u n r e a l . I q b a l a l s o 
admits t h a t although we possess no sense-organ t o perceive 
time, i t i s a_ k i n d of flow,-and as such, has a~ genuine 
2 
o b j e c t i v e or atomic aspect. Modern quantum theory which 
assumes the d i s c o n t i n u i t y of matter, confirms the Ash'arite 
theory of atomic time. I q b a l quotes Professor Rongier i n 
support: "Contrary t o the ancient adage, Nature non f a c i t 
s a l t u s , i t becomes apparent t h a t the universe v a r i e s by 
sudden jumps and not by imperceptible degrees. A p h y s i c a l 
1 . The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 7 3 = 7 ^ . 
2. I b i d . p . 7 U » 
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system i s capable of only a f i n i t e number of d i s t i n c t 
s t a t e s . Since between two d i f f e r e n t and immediately 
consecutive states the world remains motionless, time i s 
suspended, so t h a t time i t s e l f i s discontinuous: there i s 
1 
an atom of time." According t o the A s h ' a r i t e s , then, 
time i s a succession of i n d i v i d u a l 'nows'. I t f o l l o w s 
t h a t between moments of time there i s an unoccupied moment 
of time or a v o i d of time.^ I q b a l f i n d s the idea of atomic 
time u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . " 3 This idea i s due t o the ignorance 
or neglect of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y s u b j e c t i v e aspect of time 
and considers time almost as a created, o b j e c t i v e l y given 
f a c t , whereas a personal, l i v i n g Creator i s p o s i t e d . Now 
i f t h i s Creator i s l i v i n g , one must somehow be able t o 
predicate a time of Him.'4' I n Iqb a l ' s words, "we cannot 
apply atomic time t o God and conceive Him as a l i f e i n the 
making, as Professor Alexander seems t o have done i n h i s 
Lectures on Space, Time and D e i t y . " ^ A b e t t e r understanding 
of D i v i n e Time can be_ obtained through i n t r o s p e c t i o n , 
s e i z i n g t h a t experience of a p p r e c i a t i v e time which alone 
can account f o r creativeness. I n t h i s way, time precedes 
space p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , and i s the source of space.^ 
1« The Reconstruction of Rel i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 7 1 + . 
2 . I b i d , p. 7 3 . 
3 . Battsani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Religious Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l " p. 180. 
k» I b i d . . 
5» The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 7 5 . 
6 . Bansani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Re l i g i o u s Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l " p. 180. 
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Time and R e l a t i v i t y . 
As we have seen, I q b a l i s i n general agreement w i t h 
the theory of r e l a t i v i t y as regards the concepts of space 
and time but he raises one o b j e c t i o n to i t . I q b a l t h i n k s 
t h a t E i n s t e i n ' s theory considers time t o be unr e a l . "A 
theory which takes time t o be a kind of f o u r t h dimension 
of space must, i t seems, regard the f u t u r e as something 
already given, as i n d u b i t a b l y f i x e d as the past. Time as 
a f r e e c r e a t i v e movement has no meaning f o r the theory. 
I t does not pass, events do not happen; we simply meet 
1 _ 
them." According t o an eminent mathematician, I q b a l 
has a misconception about the theory of r e l a t i v i t y which 
regards time as a f o u r t h dimension, not of space, but of 
the space-time continuum. Thus the theory gives as much 
r e a l i t y t o time as t o space. I t i s t o be pointed out 
th a t I q b a l d i d not presume t o understand a l l the i m p l i -
cations of the theory of r e l a t i v i t y , since he was not a 
mathematician. " I t i s not p o s s i b l e , " he said-, " f o r us 
laymen t o understand what i s the r e a l nature of E i n s t e i n ' s 
t i m e . " 3 
Ouspensky - time as the f o u r t h dimension of space. 
I q b a l objects t o the conception of time h e l d by the 
Russian w r i t e r Ouspensky i n h i s book Tertium Organum.^ 
Ouspensky regards time as a f o u r t h dimension of space and 
1. The Reconstruction of Religio u s Thought i n Islam, pp 3 0 - 3 9 . 
2 . S i d d l q l , R. " I q b a l ' s Conception of Time and Space," pp 2 9 - 3 0 . 
3» The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 3 9 . 
k» I b i d , pp 3 9 - 1 4 - 0 . 
12+8 
conceives the f o u r t h dimension t o be the movement of a 
three-dimensional f i g u r e i n a d i r e c t i o n not contained i n 
i t s e l f . Just as the movement of the p o i n t , the line, and 
the surface i n a d i r e c t i o n not contained i n them gives us 
the o r d i n a r y three dimensions of space, m the same way 
the movement of the three-dimensional f i g u r e i n a d i r e c t i o n 
not contained i n i t s e l f must give us the f o u r t h dimension 
of space. And since time i s the distance s e p a r a t i n g events 
i n order of succession and b i n d i n g them i n d i f f e r e n t wholes, 
i t i s obviously a distance l y i n g i n a d i r e c t i o n not contained 
m the three-dimensional space. I t i s perpendicular t o a l l 
d i r e c t i o n s of three-dimensional space and i s not p a r a l l e l 
t o any of them. Ouspensky describes our time-sense as a 
misty space-sense and argues t h a t our psychic c o n s t i t u t i o n 
i s such, t h a t to one-dimensional, two-dimensional or t h r e e -
dimensional beings the higher dimension always appears as 
1 
succession i n time. I n other words, what appears t o us 
as time i s r e a l l y space. This-means t h a t time I s not "a 
genuine c r e a t i v e movement, and what we c a l l f u t u r e events 
are not f r e s h happenings but things already given and located 
i n an unknown space. I q b a l p o i n t s out t h a t i n h i s search 
f o r a f r e s h d i r e c t i o n Ouspensky needed a r e a l s e r i a l time, 
i . e . a distance separating events i n the order of succession. 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 39-1+0. 
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Thus time which was viewed as succession, at one stage, 
i s reduced, at another stage, t o what does not d i f f e r i n 
anything from the other l i n e s and dimensions of space. 
Ouspensky regarded time as a genuinely new d i r e c t i o n i n 
space because of i t s s e r i a l character. I f i t i s dive s t e d 
of t h i s character, i n Iqbal's o p i n i o n i t cannot be regarded 
2 _ 
as an o r i g i n a l d i r e c t i o n . I q b a l has another o b j e c t i o n 
t o Ouspensky's view p o i n t . Ra?i-ud-DTn §iddiqT w r i t e s , 
" I q b a l i s r i g h t when he objects t o the theory of s e r i a l 
time put forward by Ouspensky... t h a t on the basis of t h i s 
t heory, i t would be po s s i b l e , by a c a r e f u l choice of the 
v e l o c i t i e s of the observer and the system i n which a given 
set of events i s happening, t o make the e f f e c t precede the 
c 8 » » 8 « . " " I t appears t o me" w r i t e s I q b a l , " t h a t 
time regarded as a f o u r t h dimension of space r e a l l y ceases 
t o be time." 1* 
Time as r e l a t i v e ; Dawani and ' I r a q i . 
Mulla Jalal-ud^Dln- Daw an i and ' - I r a q i take a r e l a t i v i s t i c 
view of time. According t o the former i f we take time t o be 
ki n d of span which makes possible the appearance of events 
as a moving procession and conceive t h i s span t o be a u n i t y , 
then we cannot but describe i t as an o r i g i n a l s t a t e of 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 39—2+0. 
2. I b i d , p. 1+0. 
3. I S i d d i q l , R. " I q b a l ' s Conception of Time and Space", p. 30 
i+. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 39. 
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Divine activity,encompassing a l l the succeeding states of 
t h a t a c t i v i t y . Dawanl adds t h a t a deeper i n s i g h t i n t o 
the nature of succession reveals i t s r e l a t i v i t y , so t h a t 
i t disappears i n the case of God t o Whom a l l events are 
present m a s i n g l e act of perception.^ 
I q b a l f i n d s ' I r a q i ' s view of time even more s a t i s -
f a c t o r y . 2 ' I r a q i conceives of i n f i n i t e v a r i e t i e s of time, 
r e l a t i v e t o the l e v e l of being i n t e r v e n i n g between mater-
i a l i t y and pure s p i r i t u a l i t y . The time of gross bodies 
may be d i v i d e d i n t o past, present and f u t u r e , and u n t i l 
one day i s over the succeeding day does not come. The time 
of immaterial beings also possesses a s e r i a l character but 
i t s passage i s such t h a t a whole year i n the time of gross 
bodies i s not more than a day m the time of an immaterial 
being. R i s i n g t o the highest l e v e l we reach Divine time 
which i s a b s o l u t e l y f r e e of the q u a l i t y of passage, and 
does not admit of d i v i s i b i l i t y , sequence and change. I t 
i s above_eternity, having n e i t h e r beginning nor end. ~ The" 
p r i o r i t y of God i s not due t o the p r i o r i t y of time; on the 
other hand, the p r i o r i t y of time i s due t o God's p r i o r i t y . 
The Qor'an describes Divine time as the 'Mother of Books* 
i n which the whole of h i s t o r y f r e e d from causal sequence, 
i s gathered up i n a s i n g l e super-eternal 'now'.^ 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 7 5 . 
2. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Relig i o u s Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l " p. 181. 
3 - The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp 7 5 - 7 6 . 
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As has been pointed out, I q b a l ' s conception of "time 
i n God" d i f f e r s , i n f a c t , even from ' I r a q i ' s v i e w p o i n t , 
being based on psychological experience unknown t o the 
Muslim philosophers,'' According t o ' I r a q i ' s conception 
of Divine Time, d i v i n e knowledge i s the same as "omniscience 
i n the sense of a s i n g l e i n d i v i s i b l e act of perception which 
makes God immediately aware of the e n t i r e sweep of h i s t o r y 
p 
regarded as an order of s p e c i f i c events, i n an e t e r n a l *now'*" 
I q b a l does not h e s i t a t e " t o c a r r y the robust anthropomorphic 
conception of God i n the Qor'an t o i t s f a r t h e s t consequeoces^c, 
denying God t h i s 'passive omniscience* of t r a d i t i o n a l theology." -
I q b a l says, "By conceiving^ God's knowledge as a ki n d of 
r e f l e c t i n g m i r r o r , we no doubt save His fore-knowledge of 
f u t u r e events, but i t i s obvious we do so at the expense of 
His freedom. The f u t u r e c e r t a i n l y p r e - e x i s t s i n the organic 
whole of God's c r e a t i v e l i f e , but i t p r e - e x i s t s as an open 
p o s s i b i l i t y , not as a f i x e d order of events w i t h d e f i n i t e 
outlines.' 1^" — 
Razi and the debate on time. 
For I q b a l , Fakhruddih Razi sums up the debate on time i n 
Muslim thought w i t h a d e c l a r a t i o n of scepticism concerning 
5 6 the r e a l nature of time. Razl's book i s mainly explanatory. 
1. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Religious Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l " , p. 181. 
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 7 8 . 
3» Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Religious Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l " pp 181-182. 
!+• The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 7 9 . 
5. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Religi o u s Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l " p. 181. 
6 . The Recontruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 7 6 . 
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This does not s u r p r i s e I q b a l since RazT's method was, on the 
whole, o b j e c t i v e , and "a pur e l y o b j e c t i v e p o i n t of view i s 
only p a r t i a l l y h e l p f u l i n our understanding of the nature of 
time. The r i g h t course i s a c a r e f u l p sychological a n a l y s i s 
of our conscious experience which alone reveals the t r u e 
nature of time." 
McTaggart - the u n r e a l i t y of time. 
I q b a l r e f e r s to Dr. McTaggart's argument r e l a t i n g t o 
the u n r e a l i t y of Time. According t o McTaggart, time i s 
unreal because every event i s past, present and f u t u r e . 
"Past, present, and f u t u r e are incompatible determinations. 
Every event must be one or the other, but no event can be 
more than one... But every event has them a l l . I f M i s past, 
i t has been present and f u t u r e . I f i t i s f u t u r e , i t w i l l 
be present and past. I f i t i s present, i t has been f u t u r e 
and w i l l be past. Thus a l l the three incompatible terms 
are predicable of each event, which i s obviously I n c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h t h e i r , being incompatible, and i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r 
producing change." 2 To i l l u s t r a t e the p o i n t l e t us take a 
concrete example. Queen Anne's death i s past t o us, i t was 
present t o her contemporaries and f u t u r e t o W i l l i a m I I I . 
Thus the event of Queen Anne's death combines c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
which are incompatible w i t h each other.3 
1 . The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 7 6 . 
2 . McTaggart, J. E. "The U n r e a l i t y of Time. Mind, London, 1 9 0 8 . 
Volume X V I I . New Series, No. 6 8 , p. 1 + 6 8 . 
3 » The Reconstruction of Relig i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 5 7 . 
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I n I q b a l ' s opinion, McTaggart's argument proceeds on 
the assumption th a t s e r i a l time i s f i n a l , " I f we regards 
past, present, and f u t u r e as e s s e n t i a l t o time, then we 
p i c t u r e time as a s t r a i g h t l i n e , p a r t of which we have 
t r a v e l l e d and l e f t behind, and pa r t l i e s yet u n t r a v e l l e d 
before us. This i s t a k i n g time, not as a l i v i n g c r e a t i v e 
movement, but as a s t a t i c abisolute, h o l d i n g the ordered 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of f u l l y - s h a p e d cosmic events, r e v e a l i n g 
s e r i a l l y , l i k e the p i c t u r e of a f i l m , t o the outside observer." 
I q b a l r e f e r s t o C. D. Broad who points out t h a t a f u t u r e event 
cannot be cha r a c t e r i s e d as an event. Before the death of 
Queen Anne the event of her death e x i s t e d only on an unrea-
2 _ 
l i z e d p o s s i b i l i t y . I q b a l ' s answer to McTaggart's argument 
i s that the f u t u r e e x i s t s only an open p o s s i b i l i t y and not 
as a r e a l i t y . When an event i s described as being b o t h past 
and present i t cannot be sa i d t o combine incompatible 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . ^ "The f a l l a c y i s i n regarding 'E i s 
occurring now' as analysable i n a_ way- s i m i l a r to-the-ana-lysis 
of 'X i s red': not only i s 'now' regarded as a q u a l i t y l i k e 
'red', but a confusion i s made between E, an event, and X, 
a s u b s t a n c e . I q b a l states t h a t when an event X does 
happen i t enters i n t o an u n a l t e r a b l e r e l a t i o n w i t h a l l the 
events t h a t have happened before i t . These r e l a t i o n s are 
1 . The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought m Islam, p. 5 7 . 
2 . I b i d . 
3 - I b i d , p. 5 8 . 
4 . Cleugh, M. F. Time London, 1 9 3 7 , P- 1 5 2 . 
15k 
not at a l l a f f e c t e d by the r e l a t i o n of X w i t h other events 
which happen a f t e r X by the f u r t h e r becoming of R e a l i t y , 
Hence there i s no l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t y i n regarding an event 
as both past and present." 1 I q b a l admits, however, t h a t 
McTaggart's argument "requires much f u r t h e r t h i n k i n g " even 
though i t does not touch r e a l time or pure d u r a t i o n t o 
which the d i s t i n c t i o n s of past, present and f u t u r e do not 
a p p l y . 2 
Nietzsche - c y c l i c time. 
I q b a l c r i t i c i s e s Nietzsehe's view of time as i t appears 
i n connection w i t h h i s d o c t r i n e of E t e r n a l Recurrence. -^ 
I n the t h i r d book of Thus Spake Zarathustra Nietzsche 
introduces the theme of E t e r n a l Recurrence. This d o c t r i n e 
s t a t e s " t h a t a l l t h i n g s recur e t e r n a l l y , and we ourselves 
w i t h them, and t h a t we have already e x i s t e d an i n f i n i t e 
number of times before and a l l t h i n g s w i t h us."^" So f o r 
Nietzsche " e v e r y t h i n g goes, everything comes back; e t e r n a l l y 
5 
r o l l s the .wheel of being."^ Whatever i s happening now w i l l 
happen again and has happened before. The great things of 
the world recur, but so do the small. The r e t u r n i s "not 
t o a new l i f e or a b e t t e r l i f e or a s i m i l a r l i f e : I s h a l l 
1 . The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 58 . 
2 . I b i d . 
3 . I b i d , p. 111+. 
1+. Nietzsche quoted i n Holingdale, R. J. Nietzsche. London, 
1965, p. 199-
5 . Nietzsche quoted i n M a g i l l , P. N. Masterpiece of World 
Philosophy, p. 690 . 
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r e t u r n e t e r n a l l y t o t h i s i d e n t i c a l and self-same l i f e , i n 
-j 
the g r e a t e s t t h i n g s and i n the smallest." 
According to Nietzsche, time i s not a s u b j e c t i v e form; 
i t i s a r e a l and i n f i n i t e process which can only be conceived 
2 
as ' p e r i o d i c * . On the p r i n c i p l e of the conservation of 
energy the q u a n t i t y of energy i n the universe i s constant. 
The world i s a closed o f f u n i t y i n which there can be no 
d i s s i p a t i o n of energy. The amount of energy being f i x e d , 
various combinations of energy-centres recur an i n f i n i t e 
number of t i m e s . 3 Time i s thus p i c t u r e d by Nietzsche as 
r e p e a t i n g i t s e l f i n i d e n t i c a l cycles. I t has no beginning 
or end. I q b a l regards Nietzsche's viewpoint as a k i n d of 
mechanism based on the h y p o t h e t i c a l constancy of q u a n t i t y of 
energy.** According t o I q b a l , Nietzsche does not " s e r i o u s l y 
grapple w i t h the question of time. He takes i t o b j e c t i v e l y 
and regards i t merely as an i n f i n i t e s e r i e s of events r e t u r n i n g 
t o i t s e l f over and over again."-' I q b a l p o i n t s out the 
d i f f e r e n c e between Nietzsche.'s concept of time and his -own" 
concept as described i n Asrar-e-KhudT ) i t i s regarded as a 
A 
s t r a i g h t l i n e . L i f e , t h e r e f o r e , t o Nietzsche i s r e p e t i t i o n , 
t o Asrar-e-KhudT c r e a t i o n . The p e r f e c t i o n of the p e r f e c t 
man according t o Islam consists i n r e a l i s i n g t h i s aspect of 
time which can be described only as the e t e r n a l 'now'. To 
1. Nietzsche quoted i n Holingdale, R. J. Nietzsche, p. 199^ 
2. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m . p l l U . 
3. Enver, I . H. The_Metaphysics of I q b a l , p. 53. 
k» SiddiqT, R. "I q b a l ' s Conception of Time and Space" pp 21-22. 
5» The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 115. 
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Nietzsche there i s no such t h i n g as the e t e r n a l 'now'." 
Ibn i£haldun - time as movement. 
I q b a l commends the work of the Muslim h i s t o r i a n Ibn 
Khaldun who broke away from the Magian conception o f time 
as a c i r c u l a r movement and regarded the h i s t o r i c a l process 
as a f r e e c r e a t i v e movement and not as a process which had 
2 
already been worked out w i t h d e f i n i t e landmarks. This view 
has been put forward w i t h greater accuracy i n modern times by 
3 
Bergson. Bergson " l i n k e d the s o l u t i o n of the problem of 
time w i t h such v i t a l problems as l i b e r t y and p e r s o n a l i t y , 
thus f o r e s t a l l i n g I q b a l ' s a c t i v e v a l u a t i o n o f time as a sword. 
I q b a l c o r r e c t s Bergson i n a t h e i s t i c sense, p o i n t i n g t o a 
d i r e c t i o n t h a t Bergsonhimself was e v e n t u a l l y t o f o l i o ? / i n 
the course of h i s r e l i g i o u s evolution."^" 
Bergson; s e r i a l and n o n - s e r i a l time. 
I n h i s view of t i m e , I q b a l comes nearest to Bergson 
of whom he says "among the rep r e s e n t a t i v e s of contemporary 
thought Bergson i s the only t h i n k e r who has made a keen 
5 
study of the phenomenon of dur a t i o n i n ti m e . " Bergson uses 
'time' i n two senses. I n i t s narrow or s u p e r f i c i a l sense 
i t means s p a t i a l i z e d or clock time. I n i t s wider or r e a l 
1 . Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l , p . 2 4 » 
2 . I b i d , p. 251 and 296. 
3. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Re l i g i o u s Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l , " p. 183. 
4 . I b i d . 
5 « The Reconstruction o f Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 4 6 . 
6 . Cleugh, E. M. Time, p . 1 0 9 . 
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sense i t i s conceived as 'duree' which i s not mere blank 
l a s t i n g n e s s , enduring through a hypostatized, s p a t i a l i z e d 
Time - i t i s ceaseless, continuous flow i n which a l l things 
A 
l i v e and move and have t h e i r being. Like H e r a c l i t u s ^ 
Bergson i n s i s t s t h a t the n o t i o n of ceaseless change i s 
fundamental, but u n l i k e him he does not s t u l t i f y the n o t i o n 
by p e r m i t t i n g c y c l i c r e p e t i t i o n . For him, duree evolves 
2 
ever new and newer forms, t h a t i s , i t i s genuinely c r e a t i v e . 
L i k e Bergson, I q b a l d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the s e r i a l and 
n o n - s e r i a l aspects of time. The former i s associated w i t h 
what I q b a l c a l l s the e f f i c i e n t s e l f and the l a t t e r w i t h the 
a p p r e c i a t i v e s e l f . The e f f i c i e n t or p r a c t i c a l s e l f i s 
r e l a t e d to the s p a t i a l world. While r e t a i n i n g i t s u n i t y as 
a t o t a l i t y , the e f f i c i e n t s e l f reveals i t s e l f as a s e r i e s of 
d i s c r e t e (quantum) s t a t e s . The time of t h i s e f f i c i e n t s e l f 
i s j u s t a dimension of the space-time continuum. I t i s of 
the s e r i a l character postulated by the A s h ' a r i t e s . ^ The 
time in_ which the e f f i c i e n t s e l f l i v e s i s the time-of which 
we predicate 'long' and 'short'. I t i s hardly d i s t i n g u i s h -
able from space. Time, thus regarded, i s not t r u e time, 
according t o Bergson.^ The a p p r e c i a t i v e ego l i v e s i n pure 
d u r a t i o n , i . e . change without succession. According t o 
I q b a l , the u n i t y of the a p p r e c i a t i v e ego i s l i k e the u n i t y 
1. Cleugh, E. M. Time, p. 109. 
2. I b i d ^ 
3. S i d d i q i , R. "Iq b a l ' s Conception of Time and Space," pp 32-33. 
k» The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. hi* 
158 
of the germ i n which the experiences of i t s ancestors e x i s t , 
not as a p l u r a l i t y , but as a u n i t y i n which every experience 
permeates the whole e There i s no numerical d i s t i n c t n e s s 
of s tates i n the t o t a l i t y of the ego, the m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
whose elements i s wholly q u a l i t a t i v e . There i s change and 
movement but they are not d i v i s i b l e * T heir elements i n t e r -
penetrate and are wholly n o n - s e r i a l i n character. The time 
of the a p p r e c i a t i v e s e l f i s a s i n g l e 'now' which the e f f i c i e n t 
1 
s e l f s p a t i a l i z e s i n t o a series of 'nows'. 
Bergson also points out the d i f f e r e n c e between time as 
i n f e c t e d by the idea of space and pure time: "When we speak 
of time we g e n e r a l l y t h i n k of a homogeneous medium i n which 
our conscious states are ranged alongside one another as i n 
space, so as to form a d i s c r e t e m u l t i p l i c i t y . Would not 
time, thus understood, be t o the m u l t i p l i c i t y of our psychic 
states what i n t e n s i t y i s t o c e r t a i n of them - a s i g n , a 
symbol, a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t from t r u e duration? Let us ask 
c 
consiousness t o i s o l a t e i t s e l f from the e x t e r n a l worldy and7 ~ ~ 
by a vigorous e f f o r t of a b s t r a c t i o n , t o become i t s e l f again. 
We s h a l l then put t h i s question t o i t : does the m u l t i p l i c i t y 
of our cons Cious states bear the s l i g h t e s t resemblance t o the 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of the u n i t s of a number? Has t r u e d u r a t i o n 
anything to do w i t h space? ... i f time, as the r e f l e c t i v e 
consciousness represents i t , i s a medium m which our conscious 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 1+8. 
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states form a d i s c r e t e s e r i e s so as to admit of being counted, 
and i f on the other hand our conception of number ends i n 
spreading out m space ev e r y t h i n g which can be d i r e c t l y 
counted, i t i s to be presumed t h a t time, understood i n the 
sense of a medium i n which we make d i s t i n c t i o n s and count, 
i s nothing but space ... i t f o l l o w s t h a t pure d u r a t i o n must 
-j 
be something d i f f e r e n t . " I t has been pointed out t h a t 
Bergson does not deny succession t o pure d u r a t i o n . For him 
the f l o w of pure d u r a t i o n i s a succession of i n t e r p e n e t r a t i n g 
s t a t e s . I q b a l takes away succession a l t o g e t h e r . For him 
pure d u r a t i o n i s e t e r n i t y i n the sense of change without 
2 
succession. 
Bergson; pure d u r a t i o n known i n t u i t i v e l y . 
I q b a l agrees w i t h Bergson t h a t pure d u r a t i o n i s known 
3 
i n t u i t i v e l y r a t h e r than i n t e l l e c t u a l l y . Bergson p o i n t s 
out the barrenness and a r t i f i c i a l i t y of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
a b s t r a c t i o n which cannot perceive the organic u n i t y of l i f e . 
" Instead of a t t a c h i n g ourselves - t o the inner-becoming of 
t h i n g s , we place ourselves outside them m order t o recompose 
t h e i r becoming a r t i f i c i a l l y . We take snapshots, as i t were, 
k 
of the passing r e a l i t y . " I q b a l ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between 
i n t e l l e c t and i n t u i t i o n , l i k e rl-qbal^s, i s i n alignment w i t h 
1. Bergson, I I . Time and Free W i l l ( t r a n s l a t e d by Pogson, F.L. ) 
London, 1910, pp 90-91. 
2. S h a r i f , M.M. " I q b a l on the Nature of Time", I q b a l Review, 
October, 1960, p. 37. 
3. Cleugh, E. M. Time, p. 116. 
1+. Bergson, H. Creative E v o l u t i o n ( t r a n s l a t i o n by M i t c h e l l , A.) 
London, 1911, p. 322. 
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h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between s p a t i a l i z e d time and duree. I n 
"Gulshan-e-Raz-e-Jadld" I-qbal says: 
"(Zabur-e-'Ajam p 216) 
and again he comments upon the inadequacy of the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
approach t o the question of time: 
i> >>^ uf. ^ >j 
( *s • • ? 
2' (Zabur-e-'Ajam p 229) 
1 • Unable t o perceive i n f i n i t y , 
The i n t e l l e c t j u s t m u l t i p l i e s pure u n i t y . 
Lame, i t l i k e s t o stand s t i l l ; 
And b l i n d , give up the k e r n e l f o r the s h e l l . 
The s t a r s and planets t h a t we see 
Are fragments of r e a l i t y -
Creations of the i n t e l l e c t 
Which must d i s s e c t . 
We never saw Time w i t h our inner s i g h t 
And have invented year and month and day and n i g h t . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, p.7 
2. The I n t e l l e c t counts every breath 
With a clock's hand, 
As i f breath were Time's u n i t . 
So i t can never comprehend 
And take the measure of I n f i n i t y . 
I t only fashions n i g h t and day, 
Imaginary parts of Time. 
A f r a i d to seize the flame, 
I t gathers sparks alone. (Trans, by gusain, H. I b i d , p . l f l 
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He compares the i n t u i t i v e and the i n t e l l e c t u a l mode of 
per c e i v i n g r e a l i t y : 
<jU; c ^ Ik. ^ " 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam p. 228) 
Thus f o r I q b a l , i t i s "only i n the moments of profound 
m e d i t a t i o n , when the e f f i c i e n t s e l f i s i n abeyance, t h a t we 
sink i n t o our deeper s e l f and reach the inner centre of 
experience." However, i t i s t o be remembered here t h a t 
I q b a l does not agree w i t h Bergson i n t h i n k i n g t h a t thought 
only s p a t i a l i z e s l i v i n g processes. For him, i n i t s deeper 
movement, t h a t i s " i n i t s t r u e nature" thought " i s i d e n t i c a l 
w i t h l i f e . " - 5 
Bergson: time as c r e a t i v e . 
I q b a l shares w i t h enthusiasm an idea found both i n the 
Qor'an and i n Bergson's philosophy, namely, t h a t time i s 
c r e a t i v e . Bergson vehemently opposed the ol d jidea expressed 
i n Ecclesiastes t h a t "there i s nothing new under the sun."^ 
On the c o n t r a r y , he urges, t h a t i f we p i c t u r e d u r a t i o n as a 
1. L i f e ' s essence i s e t e r n a l , though 
Seen w i t h the body's eye 
I t i s a pa r t of Time. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, p. 
2. The Reconstruction of Religi o u s Thought i n Islam, pp 2+7—^4.8. 
3. I b i d , pp 51-52. 
!+• Cleugh, E. M. Time, p. 119. 
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ceaseless f l o w , we are bound t o hold some k i n d of a evo l u -
t i o n a r y view m conj u n c t i o n w i t h i t . Time i s not s t a t i c , 
i t i s a process c o n t i n u a l l y working towards ever new forms 
which cannot be p r e d i c t e d . He takes the example of a 
p a i n t e r . "The p a i n t e r i s before his canvas, the colours 
are on the p a l e t t e , the model i s s i t t i n g - a l l t h i s we see, 
and a l s o we know the p a i n t e r ' s s t y l e : do we foresee what 
w i l l appear on the canvas? We possess the elements of the 
problem; we know i n an a b s t r a c t way, how i t w i l l be solved, 
f o r the p o r t r a i t w i l l s u r e l y resemble the model and w i l l 
s u r e l y resemble also the a r t i s t ; but the concrete s o l u t i o n 
brings w i t h i t t h a t unforeseeable nothing which i s every-
2 
t h i n g i n a work of a r t . " 
According to Bergson, "science can work only on what 
i s supposed t o repeat i t s e l f - t h a t i s t o say, on what i s 
withdrawn, by hypothesis, from the a c t i o n of r e a l time"^ 
and thus "concentrated on t h a t which repeats, s o l e l y pre-
occupied m welding the same t o the same," i n t e l l e c t turns 
away from the v i s i o n of ti m e . " ^ I q b a l also p o i n t s out 
t h a t c r e a t i o n and not r e p e t i t i o n i s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
r e a l time. " I f time i s r e a l , and not a mere r e p e t i t i o n of 
homogeneous moments which make conscious experience a 
del u s i o n , then every moment i n the l i f e of r e a l i t y i s 
1. Cleugh, E. II. Time, p. 120% 
2. Bergson, H. Creative E v o l u t i o n , p. 360. 
3. I b i d , p. 31. 
I4.. Bergson, H. Creative E v o l u t i o n , p. 1+8. 
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o r i g i n a l , g i v i n g b i r t h t o what i s a b s o l u t e l y novel and 
unforeseeable... To e x i s t i n r e a l time i s not to be bound 
by the f e t t e r s of s e r i a l time, but to create i t from 
moment t o moment and t o be a b s o l u t e l y f r e e and o r i g i n a l 
i n c r e a t i o n . . . c r e a t i o n i s opposed t o r e p e t i t i o n which i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of mechanical a c t i o n . That i s why i t i s 
impossible to e x p l a i n the c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y of l i f e i n 
- j 
terms of mechanism.11 
Bergson: time as n o n - t e l e o l o g i c a l movement. 
Despite the many s i m i l a r i t i e s between the thought of 
Bergson and I q b a l , there are c e r t a i n s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s . 
Bergson denies the t e l e o l o g i c a l character of R e a l i t y on the 
ground t h a t i t makes time u n r e a l . According t o him "the 
p o r t a l s of the f u t u r e must remain wide open to R e a l i t y " 
2 
othereoise i t w i l l not be f r e e and c r e a t i v e . Thus i f 
t e l e o l o g y i s admitted the p r i m o r d i a l freshness of duree 
w i l l be n u l l i f i e d . I q b a l points out t h a t t h i s o b j e c t i o n 
only holds good so-long as-teleology means _the~acting oulT 
of a plan i n view of a pre-determmed purpose. "Such a 
r e l i g i o u s p r e d e s t i n a t i o n i s m would destroy the freedom of 
3 
both God and man." Teleology i s t o be understood not as 
a mechanical but as a v i t a l i s t i c - c r e a t i v e process - a l i n e 
1. The Reconstruction of Religi o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 50. 
2. I b i d , pp 53-5*4-. 
3. Bataisani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Religious Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l " Die Welt Pes Islams, 1951+, New Series 
Volume I I I , p. 161. 
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not already drawn, but a l i n e i n the drawing - an actua-
l i z a t i o n of open p o s s i b i l i t i e s * The world-process " i s 
purposive only i n t h i s sense tha t i t i s s e l e c t i v e i n 
character and brings i t s e l f t o some s o r t of present 
f u l f i l m e n t by a c t i v e l y preserving and supplementing the 
past." For I q b a l , then, u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y " i s pure 
d u r a t i o n m which thought, l i f e and purpose i n t e r p e n e t r a t e 
t o form an organic u n i t y . " I n his opinion Bergson's 
mistake was t h a t he overlooked the forwar d - l o o k i n g aspect 
3 
of consciousness which makes i t t e l e o l o g i c a l . 
According to I q b a l , Bergson was wrong i n th a t he 
considered pure time as preceding the Person, of whom 
alone both pure d u r a t i o n and elan v i t e l can be predicated.^*" 
Pure time cannot keep the m u l t i p l i c i t y of objects and 
events together. The m u l t i p l i c i t y of nature broken up 
i n t o innumerable i n s t a n t s can only be grasped by the 
app r e c i a t i v e act of a l a s t i n g s e l f which can b u i l d i t up 
together i n a l a s t i n g synthesis.5 For I q b a l , time~although 
r 
an e s s e n t i a l element i n r e a l i t y , i s not r e a l i t y i t s e l f . 0 
I n Greek and Hindu thought time was bound t o things v i s i b l e 
and escape from i t was possible only through s e l f - a n n i -
h i l a t i o n , but I q b a l b o l d l y introduces Time i n t o the very 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, PP5U--55. 
2« I b i d . P* 55* 
3« Khatoon, "DV 'The Place of God, §4anv and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of IqbaT* p. 109. 
h» Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Rel i g i o u s Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l " p. 161. 
5. I b i d , pp 161-162. 
6. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 58. 
heart of God. God i s not the unmoved mover; the God 
portrayed by the Qor'an i s an a c t i v e , changing and l i v i n g 
God.2 For I q b a l , God l i v e s both m e t e r n i t y and i n 
s e r i a l time. The former means change w i t h o u t succession 
wh i l e the l a t t e r i s o r g a n i c a l l y r e l a t e d to e t e r n i t y i n so 
f a r as i t i s a measure of e t e r n i t y . ^ I n JavTd Fama, 
I q b a l attempts to p o r t r a y l i f e i n the n o n - s e r i a l time of 
the world beyond c r e a t i o n : 
J ? ? fc^ ''J* 'J'-5 J ^ 
1. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Religi o u s 
Philosophy of Muhammad I q b a l " , p. 162. 
2. I b i d , p. 163. 
3. I b i d . 
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9 J' 
( j a v i d Name PP 173-180) 
The Qor'an and the two aspects of tune. 
S e r i a l time comes i n t o existence only by the very act 
of c r e a t i o n : "The Time of the Ultimate Ego i s revealed 
as change without succession, i . e . an organic whole which 
appears atomic because of the c r e a t i v e movement of the ego. 
This i s what Mir Damad and Mulla Baqir mean when they say 
t h a t time i s born w i t h the act of c r e a t i o n by which the 
Ultim a t e Ego r e a l i z e s and measures, so t o speak, the 
3 
i n f i n i t e wealth of His own undetermined p o s s i b i l i t i e s . " 
Hence i t i s possible f o r I q b a l t o i n t e r p r e t l o g i c a l l y the 
two c o n t r a s t i n g statements on c r e a t i o n i n the Qor'an: " A l l 
things have we created bound by a f i x e d decree: and Our 
command i s no"more than a s i n g l e word, l i k e the t w i n k l i n g 
1. I passed beyond the bounds of t h i s universe 
and set f o o t i n the undimensioned world, 
a world without both r i g h t and l e f t , 
a world devoid of n i g h t and day. 
In t h a t universe was another world 
Whose o r i g i n was from Divine f i a t , 
undecaying, and every moment transformed, 
unimaginable, yet there c l e a r l y v i s i b l e , 
every moment c l o t h e d i n a new p e r f e c t i o n , 
every moment clad i n a new beauty. 
I t s time had no need of moon and sun; 
i n i t s expanse the nine spheres are contained. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A.J. Jav i d Nama, pp 113-11I+). 
2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel*s Wing, p. 292. 
3« The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 76-77. 
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of an eye" (5U:50); "and do thou t r u s t i n Him who l i v e t h 
and d i e t h not; and c e l e b r a t e His p r a i s e who hath c r e a t e d 
the heavens and the ea r t h , and whatever i s between them, 
i n s i x days; and then ascended His Throne; the M e r c i f u l . " 
p 
(25:60) Viewed i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , one D i v i n e day, i n the 
terminology of the Qor'an and the Old Testament becomes 
equal to a thousand y e a r s . But from another viewpoint, 
the process of c r e a t i o n i s a s i n g l e act as s w i f t as the 
tw i n k l i n g of an eye. I q b a l i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s point f u r t h e r . 
The s e n s a t i o n of red i s caused by a wave-motion of the 
frequency of 1+00 b i l l i o n s per second and i s p r a c t i c a l l y 
i n c a l c u l a b l e , yet i t i s r e c e i v e d by the eye i n a s i n g l e 
momentary a c t of per c e p t i o n . ^ 
Time: to sum up. 
I q b a l b e l i e v e d that "a keen sense of the r e a l i t y of 
time and the concept of l i f e as a continuous movement i n 
L 
time i s t y p i c a l of Islam." We have seen the importance 
he att a c h e s to time i n h i s own philosophy. His concept 
of time " f i t s i n n i c e l y i n t o the general movement of 
r i v i v a l of personalisra which i s under way i n today's 
5 
r e l i g i o u s philosophy." P r o f e s s o r Bausani observes, 
" I q b a l ' s own c o n t r i b u t i o n i s that of I s l a m i c experience, 
1. S a l e , G. T r a n s l a t i o n of The Koran, p. 275-
2. I b i d , p. 393. 
3* The Rec o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Isl a m , pp 1+8-1+9. 
i+. i b i d , p. urn 
5. Baasani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the R e l i g i o u s Philosophy of Muhammad I q b a l " p. 185. 
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which we would do w e l l to consid e r with g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n 
and a p p r e c i a t i o n . " P r o f e s s o r Schimmel t h i n k s that the 
r e l i g i o u s importance of I q b a l ' s ideas about time deserves 
s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n , f o r "what he wanted was s u r e l y not to 
add a new system of s c i e n t i f i c explanations to t h i s most 
d i f f i c u l t problem, but to draw the a t t e n t i o n of the Muslim 
world back to the contact with the l i v i n g God. Through 
a r e v a l u a t i o n of the twofold aspect of time he aimed at 
an a c t u a l i z a t i o n of t h i s burning but long f o r g o t t e n i s s u e 
f o r Muslim r e l i g i o u s l i f e . " 
TIME (AND SPACE) IN IQBAL'S POETRY. 
I n h i s poetry, I q b a l often d e s c r i b e s s e r i a l time as 
the 'zannar' the magian's g i r d l e . T h i s symbol "shows 
I q b a l ' s f i n e p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n s i g h t - he could not yet 
f o r e s e e what H. Corbin proved many year s l a t e r that the 
zannar i s the t y p i c a l Z u r v a n i s t i c symbol."^ Zarvan i s 
the old I r a n i a n God of Time.** He i s conceived as a 
s o r c e r e r whose s p e l l has to be broken. The man of God 
re c o g n i s i n g the personal c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y of God, and 
r e a l i z i n g t h i s power i n h i s own s e l f can break the s p e l l 
_ 5 
of Zarvan by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n God's time. 
1. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the R e l i g i o u s Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l " , p.185., 
2. Schimmel, A.M. G a b r i e l * s Wing, p. 298. 
3. T h i a . p. 296. 
U. Schimmel, A.M. "Time and E t e r n i t y i n the work of Muhammad 
I q b a l " Proceedings of the X I n t e r n a t i o n a l Congress f o r 
R e l i g i o n s . Marburg, 1961, PJP 55-56* 
5. Schimmel, A.M. "The Javidname i n the l i g h t of the 
comparative H i s t o r y of R e l i g i o n s . " p. 32. 
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Most of I q b a l ' s ideas on time are brought together 
i n "Nawa-'-e-Waqt" a poem "which has been p r a i s e d by Dr. 
Ra^I-ud-Din SiddTql", P a k i s t a n ' s w e l l known a u t h o r i t y on 
atom-physics, as a p e r f e c t commentary on E i n s t e i n ' s theory 
A 
of r e l a t i v i t y . " ' I t i s worth quoting i n f u l l : 
iw J.j. „. fir. tf> <y " -( u/; ^ . ^ j 
1. Schimmel, A. M. G a b r i e l ' s Wing, p. 293 
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OJ, 
(Payam-e-Mashriq pp 102-103) 
1. I n my bosom I hold the sun and the s t a r s , 
I f you look w i t h i n me, I am nothing, i f you look w i t h i n 
y o u r s e l f , I am l i f e i t s e l f . 
My dwelling-place are c i t i e s and d e s e r t s , palaces and 
s o l i t a r y dens. 
I am malady and pain, I am the balm and l i m i t l e s s joy; 
I am the world-vanquishing sword, I am the f o u n t a i n of 
e t e r n a l l i f e . 
Cingez and Temur r a i s e d but specks of my storm, 
The turmoil of the west i s but a spark of my f i r e . 
Man and h i s u n i v e r s e are my handiwork, 
From the labour of great men, my s p r i n g i s born. 
I am the f i r e of h e l l and the peace of heaven. 
See t h i s wondrous^ phenomenon - I am s t i l l , yet I move, 
I n the c r y s t a l b a l l of my present see the glimpse of 
f u t u r e days. 
See hidden i n me a thousand g l o r i o u s worlds, 
Thousands of swift-moving s t a r s and thousands of blue s k i e s . 
I am the garment of humanity, and God I behold, 
My s p e l l i s d e s t i n y , f r e e w i l l i s your chant, 
You love a L a i l a I am the w i l d e r n e s s where you roam so 
w i l d l y . 
L i k e the soul I am f r e e of your how and wherefore, 
You are the s e c r e t of my being and I of yours. 
I n your soul I am hidden, out of your s o u l I a r i s e . 
I am the t r a v e l l e r and you the d e s t i n a t i o n , I the f i e l d 
and you the h a r v e s t . 
You are the glow and the music of the gatherings. 
0 wanderer on sea and land, r e t u r n to your h e a r t ; 
See i n a cup an ocean without bound, 
You are the l o f t y wave from which my storm arose. 
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Space and Time are not absolute r e a l i t i e s , says I q b a l : 
( J a v i d Nama p. 19) 
S e r i a l time i s r e l a t e d to, i n f a c t i t d e r i v e s i t s r e a l i t y 
from, pure d u r a t i o n : j / 
' , • .< 
2 ( B a l - e - J i b r n p. 127) 
I n h i s L e c t u r e s , I q b a l s a i d , " t i m e l e s s experience 
embodies i t s e l f i n a world-making or world-shaking a c t 
and i n t h i s form d i f f u s e s i t s e l f i n the time-movement and 
3 
makes i t s e l f e f f e c t i v e l y v i s i b l e to the eye of h i s t o r y . " 
He repeats t h i s thought again i n h i s famous poem on the 
Mosque of Cordoba - the Essence r e v e a l s i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
i n a t a n g i b l e form m s e r i a l time: 
1. Open wide your eyes upon Time and Space, 
f o r these two are but a s t a t e of the s o u l . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J . JavTa Kama, p. 33) • 
2. What other sense have your n i g h t s , what have your days, 
but one 
Long blank current of time empty of sunset or dawn? 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Kiernan, V. G. Poems from I q b a l , p. 38) 
3« The R e construction of R e l i g i o u s Thought m Is l a m , p. 18U« 
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''(Bal-e - J i b r n p. 126) 
Space and Time are brought i n t o e x i s t e n c e by the very 
act of c r e a t i o n and are then broken i n t o moments:** 
5 ( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 175) 
I n J a v i d Nama, ZSrvan the God of s e r i a l time, i n s t r u c t s 
the adept how to conquer him and how to reach the E t e r n a l 
Now:** 
1. Day succeeding to night - moulder of j i l i L jtime i s _ works. 
Day succeeding to n i g h t - " f o W t a i n " o f l i f e and of death. 
Chain of the days and ni g h t s - two-coloured thread of s i l k 
Woven by Him that i s , i n t o His being's robe. 
Chain of the days and n i g h t s - s i g h of e t e r n i t y ' s harp, 
Height and depth of a l l things p o s s i b l e , God-revealed. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Kiernan, ,V.G. Poems from I q b a l , p. 37.) 
2. Schimmel, A. G a b r i e l ' s Wing, p. 29U. 
3« New t i d i n g s slowly come drop by drop from my p i t c h e r 
g u r g l i n g of time's new s i g h t s , 
As I count over the beads strung out on my threaded r o s a r y 
of days and n i g h t s . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Kiernan, V.G. Poems from I q b a l , p. 50. 
1+. Schimmel, A. M. G a b r i e l ' s Wing, p. 295« 
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1(javTd Fama p. 22). 
The Prophet's saying " I I ma 'a Allah waqf," i.e. * I have 
a time with God(where even Gabriel has no access)' has become, 
i n more or less e x p l i c i t form,aleitmotif of Iqbal's whole 
_ p 
t h i n k i n g , beginning from the Asrar." Many mystics have 
1. I am l i f e , I am death, I am resurrection, 
I am the Judgment, H e l l , Heaven and Houri, 
Man and angel are both i n bondage to me, 
This t r a n s i t o r y world i s my own c h i l d ; 
I am every rose that you pluck from the branch, 
I am the matrix_of jgveryjhing that. you _see.^ ~ - - - - - -
This-world^is^a"prisoner i n my talisman, 
every moment i t ages through my breath. 
But he who has i n his heart ' I have a time with God', 
that doughty hero has broken my talisman; 
i f you wish that I should not be i n the midst, 
r e c i t e from the depths of your soul ' I have a time with God.' 
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. JavTd Nama, p. 34) • 
2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 297. 
Ilk 
1 expressed t h e i r u n i t i v e experiences through t h i s t r a d i t i o n . 
Maulana Rural has quoted i t several times, and many mystics 
have b u i l t upon i t a whole ed i f i c e of mystical meanings 
of the word 'wagt', as HujwIrT sums up: "V/aqt is that 
whereby a man becomes independent of the past and the 
future... he has no memory of the past and no thought 
2 
of that which is not yet come." 
In a section of Asrar-e-Khudf e n t i t l e d "Time i s a 
sword," Iqbal gave his f i r s t detailed exposition of the 
concept of time. He wanted to make i t clear that "the 
world of time is not to be regarded as a world of shadows 
s i g n i f y i n g nothing, a play of i l l u s i o n on the edge of a 
void as the Hindu mystagogues had preached. Time i s rea l 
and time is important."-' Time becomes a cu t t i n g sword: 
J»j AA^^y^A C^^iJ" t r ' y ^ ^  LT 
^(Asrar-e-Khudl p. 80) 
To he who i s bound by s e r i a l time, the poet says: 
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Y/ing, p. 297. 2. I b i d . 3. Singh, I . The Ardent Pi l g r i m , p. 89. 
J+. Now s h a l l I say what i s the secret of t h i s sword? 
In i t s flashing edge there i s l i f e . 
I t s owner i s exalted above hope and fear, 
His hand i s whiter than the hand of Moses. 
(Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the Self, 
I * > A 
P. 13U). 
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> ^ 'y-» c r ^ * ^ J « = £ . ! 
' / < ^ I 
(Asrar-e-KhudT, pp 81-82) 
The mystic HujwTrT also refers to Time as a sword which 
"cuts the root of the future and the past, and obliterates 
care of yesterday and tomorrow from the heart. The sword 
i s a dangerous companion: either i t makes i t s master a king 
o 
or i t destroys him." For Iqbal, to l i v e i n pure duration 
1. Look, 0 thou enthralled by Yesterday and To-morrow, 
Behold another world i n thine own heart. 
Thou hast sown the seed of darkness i n thy clay, 
Thou hast imagined ^ me_ a^_a^ lane j 
- Thy thought^measures length of Time 
With the measure of night and day. 
Art thou a Moslem? Then cast o f f t h i s g i r d l e . 
Be a candle to the feast of the r e l i g i o n of the fre e . 
Knowing not the o r i g i n of Time, 
Thou a r t ignorant of everlasting L i f e . 
L i f e i s of Time, and Time i s of L i f e : 
"Do not abuse Time." was the command of the Prophet. 
(Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the Self 
pp 135-138). 
2. Hujwrrl quoted i n Schimmel, A.M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 298. 
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•j 
is t o be at the centre of destiny. " I t i s time regarded 
as an organic whole that the Quran describes as 'TaqdTr' 
2 
or the destiny." By p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n God's time, man i s 
no longer the vehicle of s e r i a l time, he i s the r i d e r of 
the mount. 
3(2arb=e~Kairm p. 36) 
Real l i f e i s possible only "on t h i s s t i l l point of 
time" • * r . • c . -v 
i 
v.. / 
^(Zabur-e-'Ajam P» 93) 
From "There i s no God but God" too Iqbal infers that 
man must free himself from the bondage of s e r i a l time 
through Love: 
1. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Religious Philosophy 
of Muhammad Iqbal" p. 162. 
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. US* 
3« The 'qalandar' i s not the mount of time but the r i d e r of 
the mount. 
k» A l l thy l i f e i s breath to take, 
Knowing not, f r a i l man, 
That true l i v i n g i s to break 
The days' talisman. 
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 58). 
177 
1(Asrar-e-KhudT p. 85) 
Love also frees man from the l i m i t a t i o n s of the i n t e l l e c t : 
/ 
2 •(Zarb-e-KalTm p. 7) 
Iqbal refers to the highly personal character of the 
experience of time by quoting the story of the Seven 
Sleepers (Sura 18:19) 
jjL. ^ 3 ^ 
^(Zabur-e-'Ajam p. 216) 
1. We have honour from "There is no God but Allah," 
We are the protectors of the universe. 
Freed from the vexation of today and tomorrow, 
We have pledged ourselves to love One. 
(Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the Self 
p. li+O). 
2. I n t e l l e c t i s the bondage of time and space, 
There i s no time or space, nothing but "There is no God 
but God." 
3. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 29U. 
1+. Your months and years are meaningless and vain: 
Think over the Qor'an's "How long did you remain?" 
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery 
P. 7). 
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Iqbal does not t i r e of saying: 
1(Zabur-e-'Ajam p. 237) 
or of stressing the importance of Love through which the 
soul is freed from the bondage of time, and led to the 
'me'raj' or the Ascension, to pure duration 
/ 
0 _ (Payam-e-Mashriq p. 219) 
and so i n unforgettable lines Iqbal gives a message based 
on his l i f e - l o n g philosophy: ^ 
^(-Ba-l-e-Jibrll pp 89-90) 
1. The Self's day i s not measured by 
The revolutions of the sky. 
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, ) 
2. The reckoning of which is not by years or months. 
3« There are yet other worlds beyond the stars, 
There are yet other tests of Love to come. 
With t h i s world of hue and scent be not content, 
For there are other gardens too to see. 
Be not entangled i n t h i s Day and Night, 
There are other times and spaces too f o r you. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE UNIVERSE AND GOD IN IQBlL'S PHILOSOPHY 
THE NATURE OP THE EXTERNAL WORLD. 
For Iqbal the external world exists. I n perception and 
i n every other form of knowledge, there i s the confronting 
'other'. "The d u a l i t y of subject and object i s a necessity 
of a l l k n o w l e d g e . A c c o r d i n g to the o l d science there i s 
presented i n experience an external extended world, which 
exists i n i t s own r i g h t independently of i t s appearance to 
the mind of the in d i v i d u a l observer. This s c i e n t i f i c approach 
leads to the m a t e r i a l i s t i c world - view - "a void or 
expanse from which a l l objects may be abstracted but which 
i t s e l f i s a homogeneous, immobile, continuous r e a l i t y ; a 
matter whose ultimate nature^undiscovered, possibly 
undiscoverable, but which i s d i s t r i b u t e d unequally i n masses 
i n the expanse; and a duration or a lapse of time from which 
events may be abstracted and which i s then i t s e l f a homo-
2 
geneous, unchanging, continuous, measurable, r e a l i t y . " We 
have seen that Iqbal does not subscribe to such a world-view 
as regards his ideas on space and time. We sh a l l see that 
1. Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of I a b a l . p. 59. 
2. Carr, W. H. The General Pr i n c i p l e of R e l a t i v i t y . London, 
1922. p. U6. 
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h i s concept of matter a l s o d i f f e r s from the m a t e r i a l i s t i c 
and d u a l i s t i c standpoint. 
D e s c a r t e s . Locke and Berkeley: theory of Matter and 
i t s r e f u t a t i o n . I q b a l disagrees w i t h those p h y s i c i s t s 
who hold t h a t nature i s m a t e r i a l , ma&e up of s m a l l , hard, 
i n e r t , i n p e n e t r a b l e , and i n d i v i s i b l e p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s 
c a l l e d atojms of which o b j e c t s are made, and e x i s t i n g i n 
a v o i d c a l l e d space. According to I q b a l , t h i s view i s 
based on the a t t r i b u t i o n of s u b s t a n t i a l i t y to t h i n g s . 
I q b a l p o i n t s out that the s c i e n t i f i c view of nature as 
pure m a t e r i a l i t y i s a s s o c i a t e d with the Newtonian view of 
space as an absolute v o i d i n which a l l things are s i t u a t e d . 
However, "the c r i t i c i s m of the foundations of the mathematic&l 
s c i e n c e s has f u l l y d i s c l o s e d that the hypothesis of a pure 
m a t e r i a l i t y , an enduring s t u f f s i t u a t e d i n an absolute space 
2 
i s unworkable." 
According to D e s c a r t e s , matter meant simply corporeal 
3 
form. E x t e n s i o n was the only a t t r i b u t e which was i n s e p a r a b l e 
and i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from m a t e r i a l substance. Every other 
a t t r i b u t e - c o l o u r , weight, s o n o r i t y , shape could be thought 
absent, but i f we a b s t r a c t e d from i t s e x t e n s i o n , m a t e r i a l 
substance i t s e l f would be a n n i h i l a t e d . ^ Locke d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
between primary and secondary q u a l i t i e s of substance. 
L. £ufail, M. M. I q b a l ' s Philosophy and Education, Lahore, 1966. pp 60-61. 2. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 3U~35. 
3. Whittaker, E. Space and S p i r i t , p. 73. 
U. C a r r , W. H. The General P r i n c i p l e of R e l a t Y v i t v . p. 97. 
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Primary q u a l i t i e s are those "such as are u t t e r l y i n s e p a r a b l e 
from the body, i n what s t a t e so ever i t be; such as i n a l l 
the a l t e r a t i o n s and changes i t s u f f e r s ... i t c o n s t a n t l y 
keeps; and such as sense c o n s t a n t l y f i n d s i n every p a r t i c l e 
of matter which has bulk enough to be p e r c e i v e d . P r i m a r y 
q u a l i t i e s include s o l i d i t y , extension, f i g u r e , motion or 
r e s t , and number. Secondary q u a l i t i e s "are nothing i n ; t h e 
o b j e c t s themselves, but powers to produce v a r i o u s s e n s a t i o n s 
i n us by t h e i r primary q u a l i t i e s i . e . by the bulk, f i g u r e , 
t e x t u r e , and motion of t h e i r i n s e n s i b l e p a r t s , as c o l o u r s , 
2 
sounds, t a s t e s , e t c . " I n other words, primary q u a l i t i e s 
are o b j e c t i v e , they e x i s t "whether any one's senses p e r c e i v e 
them or not', but secondary q u a l i t i e s are s u b j e c t i v e . 
I q b a l r e f e r s to B e r k e l e y ' s r e f u t a t i o n of the theory 
of matter as the unknown cause of our s e n s a t i o n s . ^ Berkeley 
pointed out that Locke's primary q u a l i t i e s were as s u b j e c t i v e 
as h i s secondary q u a l i t i e s . The idea of extension and s o l i d i t y 
obtained-through-the sense of touch" i s a l s o a s e n s a t i o n i n 
the mind. The idea of extension cannot be separated from 
the idea of colour and other secondary q u a l i t i e s . One never 
p e r c e i v e d an extended thing which was not a t the same time 
coloured and so on. The primary q u a l i t i e s are i n s e p a r a b l y 
u n i t e d with the secondary. One could not a b s t r a c t the l a t t e r 
1. Locke, J . P h i l o s o p h i c a l Works, pp 143-U|4» 
2 - I b i d , p. 144. 
3. I b i d , p. 145. 
4. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 33. 
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and leave behind an extended substance, which i s that and 
nothing e l s e . 1 Hence the subjective idealism of Berkeley-
refutes the theory of matter as the s o l i d substratum 
underlying phenomenal r e a l i t y and being the cause of our 
2 
sensations. 
Iqbal observes that on the basis of Locke's theory, 
colours and sounds are nothing more than subjective states. 
He writes " I f physics constitutes a r e a l l y coherent and 
genuine knowledge of perceptively known objects, the 
t r a d i t i o n a l theory of matter must be rejected f o r the 
obvious reason that i t reduces the evidence of our senses 
on which alone the physicist ,as observer and experimenter, 
must r e l y } to the mere impressions of the observer's mind. 
Between Nature and the observer of Nature, the theory 
creates a gulf- which he i s compelled to bridge over by 
resorting to the doubtful hypothesis of an imperceptible 
something, occupying an absolute space l i k e a thing i n a 
receptacle and causing our sensation by some kind of impact. 
I n the words of Professor Whitehead, the theory reduces 
one h a l f of Nature to a 'dream' and the other h a l f to a 
'conjecture'. Thus physics, f i n d i n g i t necessary to 
c r i t i c i s e i t s own foundations has eventually found reason to 
break i t s own i d o l , and the empirical a t t i t u d e which appeared 
1. T h i l l y , P. A History of Philosophy, p. 338. 
2. Khatoon, J. The Place of God. Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of I q b a l . p. 77. 
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to n e c e s s i t a t e s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m has f i n a l l y ended i n 
a r e v o l t a g a i n s t matter.""*" 
I q b a l supports Berkeley i n h i s r e j e c t i o n of Locke's 
theory of matter, hut u n l i k e Berkeley, he does not deny the 
2 
e x i s t e n c e of the e x t e r n a l world. There are times when he 
speaks i n Berkeley's i d e a l i s t i c v e i n and seems to regard the 
world as being r e d u c i b l e to the s e l f ^ i . e . as not e x i s t i n g 
m i t s own r i g h t : ^ 
h 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 213) 
but on the whole t h i s i s not I q b a l ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n . 
I n h i s L e c t u r e s he says " s i n c e o b j e c t s ... are not s u b j e c t i v e 
s t a t e s caused by something i n p e r c e p t i b l e c a l l e d matter, they 
are genuine phenomena which c o n s t i t u t e the very substance of 
Nature and which we know as they are i n Nature."^ 
Matter and R e l a t i v i t y " 
I q b a l does not deny the e x i s t e n c e of matter but he does 
deny i t s s u b s t a n t i a l i t y and i n t h i s he i s supported by the 
theory of r e l a t i v i t y which d e s t r o y s , not the o b j e c t i v i t y of 
nature but the view of substance as simple l o c a t i o n i n space.' 
1. The Re c o n s t r u c t i o n of Religious_Thought i n I s l a m , p. 33. 
2. Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of I q b a l , p. 60. 
3. Apart from our m a n i f e s t a t i o n the world i s nothing, 
For without us there would be no l i g h t and no sound. 
U. Schimmel, A. M. G a b r i e l ' s Wing, p.111+. 
5. The Rec o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 3h» 
6. Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of I q b a l , p. 
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As R u s s e l l observes, the theory of r e l a t i v i t y by merging 
time i n t o space-time has damaged the t r a d i t i o n a l notion of 
substance more than a l l the arguments of the philosophers."'" 
The commonsense view of matter i s something v/hich p e r s i s t s m 
time and moves i n space, but modern r e l a t i v i t y - p h y s i c s holds 
matter to be a system of i n t e r - r e l a t e d events r a t h e r than a 
2 
p e r s i s t e n t thing w i t h v a r y i n g s t a t e s . As P r o f e s s o r 
Whitehead p o i n t s out about the new s c i e n c e , " i n the p l a c e of 
the A r i s t o t e l i a n notion of the p r o c e s s i o n of forms, i t has 
s u b s t i t u t e d the notion of the forms of process. I t has 
swept away space and matter, and has s u b s t i t u t e d £he study 
of the i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n a complex s t a t e of a c t i v i t y . " 
I n other words, the whole s p a t i a l u n i v e r s d has become a f i e l d 
or f o r c e or a f i e l d of i n c e s s a n t a c t i v i t y . ^ " 
1. The Re c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 34. 
2. I b i d . 
3. Whitehead, A. N. Nature and L i f e . Cambridge, 1934* p. 27. 
4. I b i d , p. 36. 
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Thus f o r I q b a l R e a l i t y i s not something i n e r t or given. 
I t i s a process of becoming.''" He agrees with P r o f e s s o r 
Whitehead that "Nature i s not a s t a t i c f a c t s i t u a t e d i n an 
a-dynamic v o i d , but a s t r u c t u r e of events p o s s e s s i n g the 
ch a r a c t e r of a continuous c r e a t i v e flow which thoughtcuts 
up i n t o i s o l a t e d i m m o b i l i t i e s out of whose mutual r e l a t i o n s 
p 
a r i s a t h e concepts of space and time." 
I q b a l ' s Conception of Matter 
We have seen t h a t I q b a l d e s c r i b e s Nature as an event 
r a t h e r than as a 'thing'. "What we c a l l things are events 
i n the c o n t i n u i t y of Nature which thought s p a t i a l i z e s and thus 
regards as mutually i s o l a t e d f o r purposes of a c t i o n . The 
1. HamTd, K. A. " I q b a l ' s Philosophy of the Human Ego" 
The VisvabharatT Quarterly F e b r u a r y - A p r i l 19UU. New s e r i e s 
Volume IX P a r t I . p. 301. 
2. The Reco n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 34. 
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universe which seems to us to be a c o l l e c t i o n of things i s 
not a s o l i d s t u f f occupying a void. I t i s not a thing but 
an a c t . " 1 
Matter exists but matter i s not that which i s 
"elementally incapable of evolving the synthesis we c a l l 
l i f e and mind and needing a transcendental Deity to 
2 
impregnate i t with the sentient and mental." Iqbal defines 
matter as "a colony of egos of a low order nut of which 
emerges the ego of a higher order, when t h e i r association 
and i n t e r a c t i o n reacVsSa certain degree of co-ordination." 
Like Bergson, Iqbal believes that an analysis of 
conscious experience throws l i g h t on the nature of matter, 
space and time.^ When we analyse our inner experience we 
f i n d constant change and movement. " I pass from state to 
state. I am warm or cold, I am merry or sad, I work or I 
do nothing, I look at what i s around me or I think of 
something else. Sensations, feelings, v o l i t i o n s , ideas -
such are-the changes into which my existence i s divided and 
i 
which colour i t i n turns. I change, then, witho>ufc„ ceasing."' 
Now change or movement from one state to another takes place 
i n time. On the analogy of the se l f i t may now be maintained 
that the physical world too exists i n time. Since time -
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 51. 
2. I b i d , p. 106. ~~ 
3. I b i d , p. 
U. Khatoon, J. The Place of G-od, Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of I q b a l , p. 98. 
5. Bergson, H. Creative Evolution, p. 1. 
6. Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of I q b a l , p. 65. 
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i s the p e c u l i a r p o s s e s s i o n of a s e l f , the world must a l s o 
be regarded as a s e l f or ego.'*' Thus i n I q b a l , as a l s o i n 
Whitehead, philosophy of nature becomes a philosophy of 
2 
organism. 
L i k e L e i b n i z and McTaggart, I q b a l b e l i e v e s t h a t R e a l i t y 
3 
i s s p i r i t u a l and c o n s i s t s of only s e l v e s or monads. 
According to L e i b n i z , a monad i s a simple, unique, 
i n d i s s o l u b l e substance.^" There i s a h'epjrarchy of monads 
some being s u p e r i o r to others i n the c l e a r n e s s and 
5 
d i s t i n c t n e s s with which they mirror the u n i v e r s e . The monads 
range from the completely a c t i v e to the almost i n e r t . No 
c r e a t e d monad i s completely i n a c t i v e and none i s completely 
a c t i v e , but those a t the lowest end of the s c a l e would be 
mere matter, i f there were any such t h i n g . God i s the only 
completely a c t i v e monad. I q b a l too b e l i e v e s i n degrees of 
consciousness. "Every atom of Divine energy, however low 
i n the s c a l e of e x i s t e n c e , i s an ego. But there are degrees 
i n the e x p r e s s i o n of egohood. Throughout the e n t i r e gamut 
of being runs the g r a d u a l l y r i s i n g note of egohood u n t i l i t 
reaches i t s p e r f e c t i o n i n man."^ There i s , however, one 
s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between I q b a l ' s e g o - u n i t i e s and L e i b n i z ' s 
1. Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of I q b a l , p. 65. 
2. Whittemore, R~. " I q b a l ' s Panentheism" p. 66. 
3. Raju, P. T. "The I d e a l i s m ol S i r fllohammed I q b a l " p. 107. 
k. L e i b n i z , G. W. P h i l o s o p h i c a l Writings ( t r a n s l a t e d by 
Morris, M.) London, 1965. PP 3~k* 
5. R u s s e l l , B. A H i s t o r y of Western Philosophy, London, 1961. p. 5W. 6. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 71-72. 
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monads, namely, t h a t I q b a l does not b e l i e v e i n the 
'windowlessness' of the monads."'" T h i s 'windowlessness' 
makes i n t e r a c t i o n of any k i n d between monads impossible 
and n e c e s s i t a t e s the assumption of some ki n d of "pre-
e s t a b l i s h e d harmony" to e x p l a i n how m f a c t the s t a t e s of 
one monad synchronise with the s t a t e s of the other craofiads 
a c l o s e d - o f f u n i t . He v i s u a l i s e s the l i f e of an ego as "a 
k i n d of t e n s i o n caused by the ego invading the environment 
and environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand 
outside t h i s area of mutual i n v a s i o n . " ^ 
For I q b a l , then, the u n i v e r s e i s made up of e g o - u n i t i e s 
which are l i v i n g , f l u i d and dynamic. They are i n constant 
f l u x and any immobility and s o l i d i t y which seems to e x i s t i s 
only an appearance.^ I n the language of poetry 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 171) 
I q b a l b e l i e v e s that we l i v e i n a growing u n i v e r s e which : 
T. Rashid, A. " G o t t f r i e d Wilhelm L e i b n i z : His l i f e and work". 
I q b a l January 1962. Volume 9. No. 3. p. 40. 
2. R u s s e l l , B. A C r i t i c a l E x p o s i t i o n of the Philosophy of 
L e i b n i z , London, 1939. p. 134. 
3. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m . 
4. Immobility and r e s t are deceptions of the eye, 
Each p a r t i c l e of the u n i v e r s e throbs with r e s t l e s s n e s s . 
and the a c t u a l i t y of perception. For IqbM the eg o i s not 
U W *o >y» &- U J3 
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i s "not an already completed product which l e f t the hand of 
i t s maker ages ago, and i s now l y i n g stretched out i n space 
as a dead mass of matter to which time does nothing, and 
consequently i s nothing."'*' The question arises: can we 
conceive the universe as. lacking deity? Iqbal's answer i s : 
2 
"By no means". This i s so "because "the movement of l i f e , 
as an organic growth, involves a progressive synthesis of 
i t s various stages. Without t h i s synthesis i t w i l l cease 
to "be an organic growth. I t i s determined "by ends, and the 
presence of ends means that i t i s permeated by i n t e l l i g e n c e . " ^ 
At the l e v e l of cosmic u n i t y t h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e must he 
conceived as Ultimate Self or Divine Ego.^ " We shall see that 
Iqbal bases his"working proof 5'for the existence of God on t h i s 
idea. 
PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 
Since r e l i g i o u s experience i s personal and incommunicable, 
Iqbal advances reasons f o r believing i n God's existence. He 
begins with an analysis of the th e o r e t i c a l arguments t r a d i -
t i o n a l l y supposed to prove the existence of God, namely the 
Cosmological, Teleological and Ontological arguments. 
The Cosmological argument may be stated thus: "Events 
continually happen i n the world and every event requires a 
cause. And the non-divine substances which exist i n the 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 55. 
2. Whittemore, R. "Iqbal's Panentheism" p. 6?. 
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 52. 
U. Whittemore, R. "Iqbal's Panentheism" p. 67. 
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world, cannot have existed e t e r n a l l y } t h e commencement of the 
existence of each of these substances i s also an event, and 
w i l l require a cause. Now an event may "be caused by another 
event, hut then t h i s e a r l i e r event w i l l , l i k e every other, 
require a cause. I f we recognize no causes but events, every 
cause w i l l i t s e l f require a cause, and the series w i l l never 
be completed. We must, therefore, believe that the ultimate 
cause of a l l events i s not an event but a being, who never 
began to e x i s t , and who therefore needs no cause. And t h i s 
being i s said to be God.1,1 
Iqbal objects to t h i s argument on the following frounds:-
(a) A f i n i t e effect can only be traced back to a f i n i t e cause 
or to an i n f i n i t e series of f i n i t e causes. To use the law of 
causation which states that everything must have a cause, to 
prove that there i s an uncaused f i r s t cause, i s to f a l s i f y 
2 
the very basis on which the argument proceeds. 
(b) The f i r s t cause i n the argument excludes i t s e f f e c t . 
Thus the' e f f e c t l i m i t s the cause and reduces i t to a f i n i t e 
cause.^ 
(c) The cause i n t h i s case cannot be regarded as necessary, 
because i n a cause-effect r e l a t i o n s h i p , the cause and the 
eff e c t are equally necessary. Furthermore, the necessity of 
existence i s not i d e n t i c a l with the conceptual necessity of 
1. McTaggart, J. E. Some Dogmas of Religion, London, 1906.P191' 
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 28. 
3 . I b i d . 
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causation which i s the utmost t h i s argument can prove. 
I n Iqbal's words, the Cosmological argument " r e a l l y t r i e s 
to reach the i i n f i n i t e "by merely negating the f i n i t e . But 
the i n f i n i t e reached by contradicting the f i n i t e i s a 
false i n f i n i t e , which neither explains i t s e l f nor the f i n i t e . 
The true i n f i n i t e does not exclude the f i n i t e ; i t embraces 
the f i n i t e without effacing i t s f i n i t u d e , and explains and 
2 
j u s t i f i e s i t s being." Thus, f o r I q b a l , the movement from 
the f i n i t e to the i n f i n i t e as embodied i n t h i s argument i s 
quite unwarranted, and the argument f a i l s i n to t o . ^ 
Iqbal would agree with the summing up of Kant's c r i t i c i s m 
of the argument: "The transcendental idea of a necessary and 
a l l - s u f f i c i e n t o r i g i n a l Being i s so overwhelming, so high 
above everything empirical, which i s always conditioned, that 
we can f indiaexperience enough material to f i l l such a concept, 
and can only grope about among things conditioned, looking i n 
vain for the unconditioned, of which-no rule of any^empirical 
synthesis can ever give us an example, or even show the way 
towards i t . I f the highest Being should stand i t s e l f i n that 
chain of conditions i t would be a linR i n the series, and would, 
exactly l i k e the lower l i n k s , above which i t i s placed, require 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 28. 
2 » i P i d . PP 28-29. 
3 . I b i d , p. 29. 
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f u r t h e r investigation with regard to i t s own s t i l l higher 
caose- I f , on the contrary, we mean to separate i t from 
that chain, and, as a purely i n t e l l i g i b l e Being, not 
comprehend i t i n the series of natural causes, what "bridge 
i s then open fo r reason to reach i t , considering that a l l 
rules determining the t r a n s i t i o n from e f f e c t to cause, nay, 
a l l synthesis and extension of our knowledge i n general, 
refer to nothing "but possible experience, and therefore 
to the objects of the world of sense only, and are v a l i d 
nowhere else?""*" 
What Iqbal c a l l s the t e l e o l o g i c a l argument has also 
been called the argument from design or the physico-
theological argument. I t proceeds thus: "We seem f i r s t of 
a l l to desire the concept of purposiveness from our 
acquaintance with human action and to apply t h i s concept by 
analogy to the l i v i n g organisms observed on the surface of 
our planet. We then, by an immense leap, extend i t to cover 
the whole of the vast universe, perhaps on the ground that 
t h i s also i s governed by lav/, although by law of a d i f f e r e n t 
kind; and we may f e e l t h i s extension to be confirmed by our 
experience of the beauty i n nature. F i n a l l y we argue that 
purposive a c t i v i t y i n beings without i n t e l l i g e n c e must be 
directed by an i n t e l l i g e n c e outside and beyond themselves; and 
so we pass, because of the magnitude and power and order and 
1. Kant, I . Critique of Pure Reason (Translated by MUller, P.M.] 
London, 1925, p. 500. 
193 
beauty of the world, to the existence of an all-powerful 
and all-wise i n t e l l i g e n c e , to which we give the name of 
God."1 
Iqbal objects to the te l e o l o g i c a l argument on the 
following grounds: (a) The argument, at best, gives us 
an external contriver and not a creator and c e r t a i n l y not 
2 
an Omnipotent God. As J. S. M i l l points out, fcjvfc-ry 
i n d i c a t i o n of design i n the universe i s "so much evidence 
against the Omnipotence of the Designer. For what i s meant 
by Design? Contrivance: the adaptation of means to an end. 
But the necessity f o r contrivance - the need of employing 
means - i s a consequence of the l i m i t a t i o n of power. Who 
would have recourse to means i f to a t t a i n his end his mere 
word was sufficient?""^ 
(b) I f we suppose the external contriver also to be the 
creator of his material then i t does no c r e d i t to his wisdom 
to create his own d i f f i c u l t i e s by f i r s t creating intractable 
material, and then- overcoming i t s resistance by the application" 
of methods a l i e n to i t s o r i g i n a l nature.^ "Our admiration of 
the power and s k i l l of human designer i s enhanced by the 
supposed intractableness of the materials with which he works; 
but when the divine designer i s conceived of as himself the 
creator of these materials, he must ... be himself responsible 
for the o r i g i n a l intractableness which he i s supposed 
T~. Paton, H. J. The Modern Predicament. London. 1955. T>r> 215-6. 
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 21+. 
3 . M i l l , J. S. "Theism" i n Three Essays on Religion, London, 
1871+. PP 176-177. 
1+. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 29. 
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afterwards to manifest his s k i l l i n overcoming. Where 
d i f f i c u l t i e s are of one's own creating, no cr e d i t f o r wisdom 
can "be due to the act which evades or vanquishes them.""*" 
(c) I f the contriver i s external to his material then he must 
always he l i m i t e d hy i t , and must solve his problems l i k e a 
2 
human mechanic. As M i l l observes, according to t h i s argument, 
the Deity had "to work out his ends by combining materials 
of a given nature and properties. Out of these materials he 
had to contruct a world m which his designs should be carr i e d 
int o e f f e c t through given properties of Matter and Force, 
working together and working int o one another. This did 
require s k i l l and contrivance, and the means by which i t i s 
affected are often such as j u s t l y excite our wonder and 
admiration: but exactly because i t requires wisdom, i t implies 
l i m i t a t i o n of power. 
(d) There i s no real analogy between the natural phenomena 
that we see and the work of a contriver. An a r t i f i c e r must 
isola t e and then integrate his material, while Nature J.s 
composed of organic wholes.*4" 
Kant points out that the Physico - Theological argument 
r e a l l y rests on the Cosmological argument. I t proceeds "from 
the order and design that can everywhere be observed i n the 
world, as an e n t i r e l y contingent arrangement, to the existence 
of a cause, proportionate to i t . ... The fact i s th a t , a f t e r 
~ Caird, J. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 
Glasgow. 1920. p. 136. ~ 
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 29. 
3 . M i l l , J. S. "Theism" p. 178. 
U. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 29. 
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having reahhed the stage of admiration of the greatness, the 
wisdom, the power, etc. of the Author of the world, and 
seeing i n further advance possible, one suddenly leaves the 
argument carried on by ecopirical proof, and lays hold of that 
contingency which, from the very f i r s t , was in f e r r e d from 
the order and design of the world. The next step from that 
contingency leads, by means of transcendental concepts, only 
to the existence of something absolutely necessary, and 
another step from the absolute necessity of the f i r s t cause 
to i t s completely determined or determining concept, namely, 
that of an all-embracing r e a l i t y . Thus we see that the 
physico-theological proof, b a f f l e d i n i t s own undertaking ; 
takes suddenly refuge i n the cosmological proof. 
The Ontological argument was formulated f i r s t by Anselari 
and elaborated by thinkers such as Descartes, Leibniz and 
Hegel. This argument i s an inference from God's nature to 
2 
His r e a l i t y . The Cartesian fovm of t h i s argument, which 
I qba-1 quotes, i s as follows: "To say that an a t t r i b u t e i s 
contained i n the nature or i n the concept of a thing i s the 
same as to say that the a t t r i b u t e i s true of t h i s thing and 
and that i t may be affirmed to be iA i t . But necessary e x i s t -
ence i s contained i n the nature or the concept of God. Hence i t 
may be with t r u t h affirmed that necessary existence i s i n God, 
or that God exi s t s . " ^ God i s by d e f i n i t i o n a Perfect Being. I f 
1. Kant, I . Critique of Pure Reason, pp 505-506. 
2. Paton, H. J. The Modern Predicament, p. 176. _ 
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 30. 
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existence i s an element of perfection, no doubt the idea of 
a Perfect Being must include the idea of His existence. 1 
But the crux of the Ontological argument i s the contention 
thatw« weentitled, and indeed obliged, to pass from the 
thought or notion of God's perfection to knowledge of His 
2 
existence - to knowledge that He must necessarily e x i s t . 
Iqbal refers to Kant's well-known c r i t i c i s m of t h i s 
3 
argximent. The notion of a hundred dollars i n my mind does 
not prove that I have them i n my pocket. This argument move$ 
from the l o g i c a l to the r e a l . Existence i s not a q u a l i t y at 
a l l . A thing with a l l i t s q u a l i t i e s either exists or i t does 
not. I f receives no additional q u a l i t y by e x i s t i n g . " I f we 
decide to say that a being i s perfect only when we are able 
to say that i t e x i s t s , we are e n t i t l e d to say that a perfect 
being must ex i s t . But t h i s alleged necessity i s a l o g i c a l 
necessity based on the use of language, and i t should not be 
mistaken for an insight i n t o the r e a l necessity of things."^ 
Descartes, ^ advances another argument to prove the"existence 
of God. This argument i s often referred to as the Argument 
from Innate Ideas. Descartes i s sure that he has the idea of 
"a Being sovereignly perfect" and " i t only remains to me to 
examine how I have obtained t h i s idea. I have not acquired i t 
through the senses, and i t i s never presented to me unexpect-
~. Caird. J. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, n. 
146. 
2. Paton, H. J. The Modern Predicament, p. 176. 
3 . The Recontruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 30. 
4 . Paton, H. J. The Modern Predicament, p. 177. 
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edly, as sensible things are wont to be, when these act, 
or seem to act, on the external sense-organs. Nor i s i t a 
product or f i c t i o n of my mind; for i t i s not i n my power to 
take from or add anything to i t . Consequently the only 
a l t e r n a t i v e i s to allow that i t i s innate i n me, j u s t as ife 
the idea of myself."^ This argument r e l i e s on an application 
to the realm of ideas of the p r i n c i p l e that the less cannot 
give r i s e to the greater. An idea of a Perfect Being, 
Descartes argues could not be brought being by an imperfect 
agency. But he himself i s imperfect, as i s shown by his state 
of doubt, which i s i n f e r i o r to knowledge. Hence there must 
2 
r e a l l y be a Perfect Being, who i s the o r i g i n of t h i s idea. 
Iqbal points out that " t h i s argument i s somewhat of the nature 
of the cosmological argument since i t moves from ef f e c t to 
cause. 
Iqbal's 'working proof" for the existence of God. ^ _ 
According to I q b a l , the l i v i n g God" of the Qor'an i s 
different from the purely i n t e l l e c t u a l God reached through the 
t r a d i t i o n a l arguments fof> the existence of- God. The 
Ontological and Teleological arguments f a i l because "they look 
upon 'thought* as an agency working on things from without. 
This view of thought gives us a mere mechanician i n the 
one case, and creates an unbridgeable gulf between the ideal 
and the r e a l i n the other."^ These arguments would acquire 
1. Descartes, R. "Meditation I I I " i n Descartes' Philosophical 
Writings (selected and translated by Smith, N. K. 
London, 1952, p. 229. 
2. Urmson, J. 0. (Editor) The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western 
Philosphv and Phi losoTihars.. London. iqfeO. p. Oh. 
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 30. 
U. I b i d , p. 31. 
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l i f e only i f thought and "being are shown to he u l t i m a t e l y 
one. 1 Iqbal does not give an elaborate "proof" of the 
existence of God, the true and l i v i n g God, but he establishes 
2 
the basis for a working proof. 
According to Einstein, objective r e a l i t y i s not wholly 
independent of the act of knowledge. For the knower i s 
intimately related to the object known, and the act of 
knowledge i s a c o n s t i t u t i v e element m the objective r e a l i t y . 
Thus i n a sense, Einstein's theory confirms the i d e a l i s t i c 
p o s i t i o n of Kant. I n "Gulshan-e-Raz-e-JadTd" Iqbal too 
denies the seeming absoluteness or independence of the objects 
of perception: 
^ si \ r> * > * iX* J 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 212) 
T~, Bausani, A. "Iqbal Philosophy of Religion and the West" ~ 
The Pakistan*Quarterly. 1952. Volume I I No. 3. p. 18. 
2. I b i d . 
3. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal. pp 110-111. 
k. You think you see the world outside yourself - these plains, 
H i l l s , forests, deserts, seas and mines? 
But no, t h i s world of smell and colour i s a bouquet made 
by us: 
Each flower s e l f - e x i s t e n t , a l l c o l l e c t i v e l y arrayed by us. 
I t i s the s e l f that binds i t with the s t r i n g of vision's 
u n i t y , 
Which mak.es the earth, the sky, the sun, the moon parts 
of one e n t i t y . 
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of 
Mystery, pp 5~6) 
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According to Iqbal and the theory of r e l a t i v i t y , then, 
the object known i s r e l a t i v e to the observing s e l f ; i t s 
size and shape change as his position and speed change. "But 
whatever the p o s i t i o n and spped of the observer, whatever 
his frame of reference, something must always remain which 
confronts him as his 'other' V"*" Iqbal puts forward a question: 
I s there something absolute i n what appears to us as objective 
r e a l i t y ? His answer i s an unqualified "No". "We cannot 
construe ever-present e x t e r n a l i t y to mean the t o t a l 
independence or absoluteness of what appears as external to 
the s e l f . Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would contradict the very 
p r i n c i p l e which discloses i t s r e l a t i v i t y . I f , then, i n view 
of the p r i n c i p l e of r e l a t i v i t y , the object confronting the 
subject i s r e a l l y r e l a t i v e , there must be some se l f to whom 
i t ceases to exist as a confronting 'other'. This s e l f must 
be non-spatial, non-temporal Absolute, to whom what i s 
external to us must cease to exist as external. Without such 
an assumption-objective^reality cannot be r e l a t i v e to the 
sp a t i a l and temporal s e l f . To the absolute Self, than, the 
p 
Universe i s not a r e a l i t y confronting Him as His 'other'." 
Royce. _ 
— —Here Iqbal's argument resembles that of Royce who f i r s t 
proves the existence of objective r e a l i t y and then passes on to 
3 
prove the existence of God. According to Royce, our experience 
1. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqb a l , p. 111. 
2. I b i d . P. 111-112. 
3. Khatoon, J. The Place of God. Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of Iqb a l . p. 33. 
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i s dependent upon our c o n s t i t u t i o n and environment. We 
experience r e a l i t y i n fragments, "Every i n t e l l i g e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of an experience involves however, the appeal from t h i s 
experienced fragment to some more organised whole of experience, 
i n whose un i t y t h i s fragment i s conceived as -fhoding i t s 
organic place." 1 Supposing we deny, says Roycd, that there i s 
any absolutely organised experience and i n s i s t on a 
fragmentary experience. Then the question w i l l arise: "What 
Reality has t h i s fact of the l i m i t a t i o n and fragmentariness 
of the actual world of experiences? I f every r e a l i t y has to 
exist j u s t i n so f a r as there i s experience of i t s existence, 
then the determination of the world of experience to be t h i s 
world and no other, the fact that r e a l i t y contains no other 
facts than these, i s , as the supposed f i n a l r e a l i t y , i t s e l f 
the object of one's experience, f o r which the fragmentariness 
of the f i n i t e world appears as a presented and absolute f a c t , 
beyond which no r e a l i t y i s to be viewed as ever genuinely 
possible. For t h i s f i n a l experience, the conception of any 
possible experience beyond i s known as an ungrounded 
conception, as an actual i m p o s s i b i l i t y . But so, t h i s f i n a l 
experience i s by hypothesis f o r t h w i t h defined as One, as a l l -
inclusive, as determined by nothing beyond i t s e l f , as assured 
of the complete f u l f i l m e n t of i t s own ideas concerning what i s , 
1. Royce, G. The Conception og God, London, 1898. p. 42. 
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- i n "brief, i t becomes an absolute experience. The very-
e f f o r t to deny an absolute experience involves, then, 
the actual assertion of such an actual experience. 1 , 1 Thus 
there must be an Absolute Experience f o r which the conception 
of an absolute r e a l i t y i s f u l f i l l e d by the very contents 
that get presented to t h i s Experience. "This Absolute 
Experience i s related to our experience as an organic whole 
2 
to i t s own fragments." 
Rashdall 3 According to Rashdall also, matter always implies mind. 
Space i s made up of relations which would be meaningless apart 
from the mind which relates. "The r e l a t i o n between point A 
and point B i s not m point A or point B taken by themselves. 
I t i s a l l i n the 'between': 'between' from i t s very nature 
cannot e x i s t m any one point of space or i n several 
isolated points of space or thing, i n space, i t must exist 
only i n some one existent which holds together and jionnects 
these points."^" There can be no relatedness without mind, 
no space without relatedness and no matter without space. 
5 
Therefore i f matter exists, mind also exists. But i t cannot 
exist merely for our sketchy experience. A l l the f i n i t e minds 
put together cannot comprehend the whole. Therefore i f the 
2~. Rovce, J. The Conception of God, pp 42-43. 
2. I b i d , pp 43"44. 
3. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
System of Iqbal, p. 34. 
4 . Rashdall, H. Philosophy and Religion, London 1924. p. H. 
5. I b i d , p. 11. 
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whole i s to exist at a l l , there must be some one mind which 
knows the whole - that mind i s , God."'" 
James Ward , _ 2 -—'tTSflrers" Ward's po s i t i o n also resembles that of I q b a l . 
The experience of f i n i t e individuals i s r e l a t i v e and cannot 
be absolute. But when we remove the r e l a t i v i t y implied by 
i n d i v i d u a l standpoints, we reach an Absolute Experience, the 
centre of l i v i n g and acting s p i r i t , whose centre i s everywhere 
and circumference nowhere, an experience which i s complete 
3 
and a l l inclusive. According to Ward, the world i s 
represented m i t s u n i t y and e n t i r e t y " to God.*4 "His i s not 
a perspective view such as 'stand-point' implies nor i s i t a 
discursive view, such as our l i m i t e d a t t e n t i o n e n t a i l s . God 
ex. 
i s ubiquitous and omni-continuitive. There are no broken l i g h t s ' m him: he alone can say ' I am that I am'."-' Green _ 
Iqbal's po s i t i o n i s algo, i n a sense, similar to that of 
Green who, following Kant's dictum that the synthetic u n i t y 
of apperception is^, present i n every act of knowing, concludes 
that a - s p i r i t u a l - p r i n c i p l e i s implied i n the consciousness of 
events. The act of self-perception i s a synthesis of 
rel a t i o n s i n consciousness which keeps d i s t i n c t the s e l f and 
the various parts of the object although i t holds i t together 
i n the u n i t y of the peceptual a c t . ^ This s p i r i t u a l p r i n c i p l e 1. RashdLall, H. Philsophy and Religion, p. 17. ' . -i~ 
2. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe m iqbal's 
Philosophic System, p. 35. 
3 . Ward, J. The Realm of Ends. Cambridge. 1912. p. 57. 
U. par, B. A. Iqbal and Post-Kantian Voluntarism, Lahore. 
1956, p. Jb&~. 
5. Ward, J. The Realm of Ends pp 1+77-^78. 
6. Khatfron, J. The Place of God. Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of I q b a l . t>. 36. 
7. Green, T. H. Prolegomena to Ethics. Oxford, 1890. pp 15~l6. 
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i s not the passive mind or the •tabula rasa' conceived by Locke. 
I t i s a un i f y i n g r e l a t i n g p r i n c i p l e which i s the condition of 
a l l experience, not a pr e c i p i t a t e of time but a l i v i n g and 
permanent unity."'' 
According to Green, man^s knowledge of Nature i s only i n 
instance of the wider p r i n c i p l e that consciousness i s 
prerequisite to the existence of nature i t s e l f . By nature 
we mean "a system of unalterable r e l a t i o n s " Now, any r e l a t i o n 
involves the f a m i l i a r problem of un i t y i n ^ d i v e r s i t y . But the 
source of unity and connection cannot be inside nature, for 
nature i s a process of change, and that which gives the 
world i t s permanent character cannot i t s e l f be subject to 
change. I n t e l l i g e n c e , however, readily accomplishes that 
which i n nature i s inconceivable. A m u l t i p l i c i t y of feelings 
and sense-impressions i s ordered and u n i f i e d at every moment 
of our experience. This i s the way the world becomes <bhe 
for each i n d i v i d u a l . But, since nature i s obviously not 
dependant on" p a r t i c u l a r hunm i n t e l l e c t s f o r i t s existence, 
there must be a unifying factor p r i o r to our f i n i t e minds. 
I t must be the common source of the re l a t i o n s which constitute 
nature and our conception of i t ; and, "because the function 
which i t must f u l f i l ... i s one which, on however l i m i t e d aii 
scale, we ourselves exercise i n the acquisition of experience, 
and exercise by means of such a consciousness", we are 
1. Green, T. H. Prolegomena to Ethics, pp 15-16. 
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j u s t i f i e d i n concluding that i t , too, i s "a se l f - d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
consciousness" 1 This consciousness i s God. 
To sum up: We have seen that f o r various reasons Iqbal 
re j e c t s the t r a d i t i o n a l arguments fo r the existence of God. 
I t i s through i n t u i t i v e experience that one attain s knowledge 
of God, or Iqbal's Ultimate Ego, who combines the Absolute of 
philosophy with the Person of theology. Since mystic 
experience i s not 'communicable' and 'verifiable'*" m the 
common sense of these words, Iqbal seeks to establish a basis 
for a "working proof" of God's existence. He agrees with 
Einstein's theory of r e l a t i v i t y which does not destroy the 
o b j e c t i v i t y of Nature but regards i t as .being r e l a t i v e to 
the experiencing mind. Iqbal's ideas have also some 
s i m i l a r i t y with those of Royce, Rashdall, Ward and Green. 
NATURE AND GOD 
We have seen that according to Iqbal "the universe does 
not confront the Absolute S e r f - i n the same way as i t confronts 
2 
the human s e l f . " I t i s a f l e e t i n g moment i n the l i f e of 
God. " I t i s a structure of events, a systematic mode of 
behaviour, and as such organic to the Ultimate Self. Nature 
i s to the Divine Self as character i s to the hulnan s e l f . I n 
— — 3 
the pictureque phase of the Quran i t i s the habit of Allah." 
1^  Green, T. H. Prolegomena to Ethics p. 683. 
2. Thoughts and Reflections of I q b a l , p. 112. 
3 . The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 56. 
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Nature i s ego as event and act . " R e a l i t y " , says I q b a l , 
" i s ... e s s e n t i a l l y s p i r i t . But, of course, there are degrees 
of s p i r i t ... I have conceived the Ulti m a t e R e a l i t y as an 
Ego; and I must add now t h a t from the Ul t i m a t e Ego Only^egos 
proceed. The c r e a t i v e energy of the Ul t i m a t e Ego, i n whom 
deed and thought are i d e n t i c a l , f u n c t i o n s as ego-xm\ti£s .-• 
The w o r l d , j n a l l i t s d e t a i l s , from the mechanical movement 
of what we c a l l the atom of matter t o the f r e e movement of 
thought i n the human ego, i s the se.1 ^ - r e v e l a t i o n o f the 
'Great I am'."1 
The Universe as f i n i t e hut "boundless. 
I q b a l supports E i n s t e i n ' s view t h a t the universe i s 
2 
f i n i t e but boundless. I t i s f i n i t e because i t i s a passing 
phase of God's e x t e n s i v e l y i n f i n i t e consciousness, and 
boundless because the c r e a t i v e power of God i s i n t e n s i v e l y 
i n f i n i t e . Nature has no e x t e r n a l l i m i t s , i t s only l i m i t i s 
the immanent s e l f which creates and sustains the whole.^" 
_ 5 
According t o Iqpa1 th& universe i s l i a b l e - t o increase. "He 
t r a n s l a t e s the Qor'anic words "Inna l l a rabbika al-muntaha" 
(53:^-3) as "And v e r i l y towards God i s thy l i m i t . " Professor 
Bausani comments: "This i s a good instance of a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious_Thought i n Islam, p. 71. 
2. Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l , p. 112. 
3. I b i d . 
U. Dar, B. A. I q b a l ' s Gulshan-i Raz-i J a d i d and BandagT 
Hamah, p. 27. 
5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p.68. 
206 
of I q b a l , t h a t of i n t e r p r e t i n g i n modern terms some Qur'anic 
passages which no doubt mean something else i f l i t e r a l l y 
t r a n s l a t e d . So here i t seems t h a t a l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n 
would amount simply t o say t h a t every being's end i s i n 
God, a r e t u r n t o God. However, the metaphyseal i m p l i c a t i o n s 
I q b a l wants t o f i n d i n the verse are i n no wise, i n my 
opin i o n , c o n t r a r y t o the s p i r i t of Qur'an.""'" Since Nature i s 
o r g a n i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o the c r e a t i v e s e l f , i t can grow, and i s 
consequently i n f i n i t e i n the sense t h a t none of i t s l i m i t s i s 
f i n a l - nature i s o r g a n i c a l l y f i n i t e tfmly towards the innermost 
essence o£ God. I q b a l expresses t h i s thought thus i n "Gulshan-
e-Raz-e-Jadid" 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 216) _ -
Pantheism and Deism 
The r e l a t i o n of the Ultimate Ego t o the f i n i t e ego may 
be conceived i n several v/ays. For i n s t a n t the U l t i m a t e Ego 
may be regarded as the sole r e a l i t v absorbing a l l the f i n i t e 
1. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Rel i g i o u s Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l " p. 162. 
2. I b i d . 
3. R e a l i t y i s beyond time and space, 
Don't say any more t h a t the universe i s without a l i m i t . 
I t s l i m i t i s i n t e r n a l , not e x t e r n a l , 
There are no d i s t i n c t i o n s of low and h i g h , more or l e s s , 
i n i t s i n t e r n a l aspect 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Dar, B. A. I q b a l ' s Gulshan-i Raz-i J a d l d 
and Bandagi Namah. p. 23. 
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egos, or as holding the f i n i t e egos w i t h i n His own S e l f 
without o b l i t e r a t i n g t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i t y , or as e x i s t i n g 
1 
apart from f i n i t e egos. The f i r s t of the afore-mentioned 
p o s i t i o n s i s rooted i n pantheism even though i t a t t r i b u t e s 
p e r s o n a l i t y to Ultimate R e a l i t y . I t i s an advance on those 
p a n t h e i s t i c modes of thought which regard the u l t i m a t e nature 
of Reality as "being impersonal i n character e.g., l i g h t , or 
f o r c e . 2 However, i t negates the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of the f i n i t e 
egos. Professor S h a r i f p o i n t s out t h a t i n the f i r s t p e r i o d 
of h i s thought, extending from 1901 t o about 1908, I q b a l ' s 
w r i t i n g had a p a n t h e i s t i c t i n g e . "God i s u n i v e r s a l and a l l -
i n c l u s i v e l i k e the ocean, and the i n d i v i d u a l i s l i k e a drop. 
Again, God i s l i k e the sun and the i n d i v i d u a l i s l i k e a candle, 
and the candle ceases t o burn i n the presence of the sun. Like 
a bubble or a spark, l i f e i s t r a n s i t o r y - nay, the whole of exis-
tence i s t r a n s i t o r y . " - ^ 
The f i r s t p a r t of Bang-e-Dara contains several poems 
_ r e f e r r i n g -to- the doctnine~of the" immanence of God ("wafydat-al-
wujud"). Nature from being the Word of God becomes God. God's 
immanence i s described thus: 
(^ang-e-Dara, p. 71) 
1. Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of I q b a l , pp 80-81. 
2. I b i d , p. 81. 
3. S h a r i f , M. M. About I q b a l and His Thought. Lahore, I96U p.13 
U. Beauty i s One though i t i s seen i n a l l t h i n g s . 
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At t h i s stage, I q b a l ' s God i s Beauty r a t h e r than Love and 
the same Beauty manifests i t s e l f i n a l l t h i n g s : 
1 
(.bang-e-Dara, p. 8&) 
This idea i s d e l i c a t e l y expressed a t one place when the poet 
r e f e r s t o the 'promise' of God t o reveal Himself on the Day 
of Judgment. Since God i s v i s i b l e i n e v e r y t h i n g , ihe 
2 
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 10j&) 
I n 'sham*4' (The Candle) I q b a l states the d o c t r i n e of 
'wahdat-al-wujud" m much the same way as Ibn 'ArabT might 
have done i . e . he makes the beloved i d e n t i c a l w i t h the 
l o v e r , sineehe considers the r e l a t i o n between the world and 
God as one of i d e n t i t y . 
1. V i s i b l e i n everything i s Beauty e v e r l a s t i n g , 
I t i s speech m Man and a sparkle i n the bud. 
The secret of One has become hidden i n the Many, 
The f i r e - f l y i 1 s glow i s the flower's scent. 
2. Those who have s i g h t can see you even here, 
How then i s the Promise o f the Last Day a t e s t of patience? 
3. FaruqT, B. A. The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid, 
Lahore, 19U0, p. 91. ~ 
/ 
/ 
asks: 
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v 1 <* y ( 
1 
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 3%) 
I q b a l ' s p o s i t i o n here resembles t h a t of Galib: 
I q b a l ' s p a n t h e i s t i c ideas derive from Plato's conception 
of God as Et e r n a l Beauty which i s manifest m a l l t h i n g s . 
"This P l a t o n i c conception, as i n t e r p r e t e d by P l o t i n u s , 
adopted by the e a r l y Muslim s c h o l a s t i c s and adapted t o 
pantheism by the p a n t h e i s t i c mystics, came down t o I q b a l as 
a long t r a d i t i o n i n Persian and Urdu po e t r y , and was 
supplemented by h i s study of the Eng l i s h romantic poets".^ 
I q b a l , however, soon outgrew h i s pantheism. His o l d 
teacher a t Cambridge, McTaggart wrote t o him on reading _ 
Nicholson's t r a n s l a t i o n of Asrar-e-KhudT, "Have you not 
changed your p o s i t i o n very much? Surely, i n the days when 
we used t o t a l k philosophy t o g e t h e r , you were much more of 
a pantheist and mystic."-^ This i s a very i l l u m i n a t i n g remark. 
1. The hunter and the object of the hunt are the same. 
2. DTwan-e-Galib Lahore (Taj Company E d i t i o n ) p. 99. 
3. The obje c t ^ ,wltness and witnessing i s a l l the same t h i n g , 
I'm wonderstruck what, then, can ' v i s i o n ' mean? 
h. S h a r i f , M. M. About I q b a l and His Thought, p. 11. 
5. McTaggart quoted by I q b a l i n Thou&ts and R e f l e c t i o n s of 
I q b a l . p. 118. 
m R e f l e c t i o n s 
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For I q b a l , i n h i s l a t e r thought, the r e l a t i o n of the f i n i t e 
to I n f i n i t e Ego i s one i n which " t r u e i n f i n i t e does not 
exclude the f i n i t e , " "but r a t h e r "embraces the f i n i t e w i t h out 
e f f a c i n g i t s f m i t u d e and explains and j u s t i f i e s i t s being.""'" 
" I t i s c l e a r " , says Professor Whittemore, f fthat I q b a l does not 
in t e n d t h a t the I n f i n i t e be regarded merely as an a b s t r a c t 
2 
t o t a l i t y of f i n i t e s . " I q b a l ' s d o c t r i n e i s not pantheism 
(meaning by t h i s term the do c t r i n e t h a t the world i s i d e n t i c a l 
w i t h God). This i s confirmed by the f a c t t h a t nowhere m h i s 
philosophy does I q b S l r e f e r t o God m terms of f e a t u r e l e s s 
t o t a l i t y . ^ R e f e r r i n g t o F a r n e l l ' s view on the a t t r i b u t e s of 
God, I q b a l remarks t h a t the h i s t o r y of r e l i g i o u s thought 
discloses various ways of escape from an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c 
conception of the u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y which i s conceived as some 
vague, v a s t , and pervasive cosmic element, such as l i g h t . 
This i s the view t h a t P a r n e l l has taken ... I agree t h a t the 
h i s t o r y of r e l i g i o n reveals modes of thought t h a t _ t e n d towards 
pantheism; but I venture t o t h i n k t h a t i n so f a r as the 
Quranic i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of God w i t h l i g h t i s concerned F a r n e l l ' s 
view i s i n c o r r e c t ... Personally, I t h i n k the d e s c r i p t i o n of 
God as l i g h t , i n the revealed l i t e r a t u r e of Judaism, 
C h r i s t i a n i t y and Islam, must now be i n t e r p r e t e d d i f f e r e n t l y ... 
1. The Reconstruction of Re l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 29. 
2. Whittemore, R. "I q b a l ' s Panentheism" p. 71. 
3. ro id , pp. 71-72. 
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The metaphor o f l i g h t as a p p l i e d t o God ... must, m view 
of modern knov/ledge, be taken t o suggest the Absoluteness 
of God and not His Omnipresence which e a s i l y lends i t s e l f 
t o p a n t h e i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . " ^ I q b a l always r e f e r s to 
God m terms such "Ultimate Ego", "Creative S e l f , " 
"Ommipsyche" and to the f i n i t e i n terms of egos or selves. 
"The reference i s always p l u r a l . Even m h i s d o c t r i n e of 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n (transmutation) I q b a l i s a t pains t o stress 
h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l i s n e i t h e r i n time nor 
2 
e t e r n i t y l o s t i n God." On I q b a l ' s words, "the end of the 
ego's quest i s not emancipation from the l i m i t a t i o n s o f 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y ; i t i s , on the other hand, a mo-re p r e c i s e 
d e f i n i t i o n of i t . " 3 
I q b a l r e j e c t s deism, the view t h a t the world i s separate 
from God. Outside of God there i s n o t h i n g , so deism i s 
meaningless.^ Neo-Platonic ideas resembling the Buddhist 
Vedantas c u l i m i n a t e d m the famous d o c t r i n e of Monism. 
This d o c t r i n e preached the b e l i e f i n an immanent God and 
considered the world as a mere i n c a r n a t i o n . I t s u b s t i t u t e d 
p a n t h e i s t i c deism f o r the personal and transcendent God of 
the Qor'an, and l e d t o the blossoming of pseudo-mysticism. 
I q b a l attached Monism on p r a c t i c a l ground a l s o . For him 
in The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m ^ p p 65-6k. 
2. Whittemore, R. " I q b a l ' s Panentheism" p. 72. _ 
3. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought m Islam, p. 198. 
h. Whittemore, R. " I q b a l ' s Panentheism" p. 72. _ 
5. M a i t r e , L. C. I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Thought of I q b a l 
(Translated by Dar,""M." A. M. ) ' pp 6-7. ~ - . 
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" a l l l i f e i s i n d i v i d u a l ; there i s no such t h i n g as u n i v e r s a l 
l i f e . " 1 
Panentheism. 
I q b a l ' s view i s p a n e n t h e i s t i c , panentheism being the 
d o c t r i n e t h a t the world i s not i d e n t i c a l w i t h God, nor 
separate from God, but m God, who i n His d i v i n e nature 
transcends i t . I q b a l ' s view i s p a n e n t h e i s t i c because 
"according t o i t God as i n d i v i d u a l , w h i l e not other than 
t h a t universe which i s His p h y s i c a l being, i s more than the 
2 
sum of egos and sub-egos of which t h i s universe i s composed." 
The r e l a t i o n of the Ulti m a t e Ego t o the f i n i t e egos 
m I q b a l ' s philosophy has been summarised thus: "the 
Ultimate Ego holds the f i n i t e egos i n His own Being w i t h o u t 
o b l i t e r a t i n g t h e i r existence. The Ulti m a t e R e a l i t y must 
be regarded as of the nature o f the s e l f . But f u r t h e r t h i s 
s e l f does not lie apart from the universe, as i f separated 
by a space l y i n g between Him and ourselves. The Ultimate 
_ Self., t h e r e f o r e i s not" t r a n s c e n d e n t a s i s oonceived by the 
anthropomorphic t h e i s t s . He i s immanent, f o r He comprehends 
and encompasses the whole universe. But he i s not immanent 
i n the sense of the pantheists of the t r a d i t i o n a l type, 
because He i s a personal and not an impersonal r e a l i t y ... 
He i s , i n short,immanent and transcendent both, and yet n e i t h e r 
the one nor the other. Both immanence and transcendence are 
1. I q b a l quoted by Nicholson, R. A. i n I n t r o d u c t i o n to 3?he 
Secrets of the S e l f , p. XVI I . 
2. Whittemore, R. " I q b a l ' s Panentheism" p. 72. 
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t r u e of the Ultimate R e a l i t y . But I q b a l emphasizes the 
transcendence of the Ulti m a t e Ego r a t h e r than His 
immanence". 
I n h i s r e j e c t i o n of the d o c t r i n e of u n i t y i s m or 'wahdat-
al-wujud' I q p a l was deeply i n f l u e n c e d "by Shaikh Ahmad 
Sir h i n d T , also known as Mujaddid-e-Alf-e-.SanT. I n a l e t t e r 
w r i t t e n i n 1917 I q b a l s a i d " I have very great respect i n 
2 -
my heart f o r Mujaddid S i r h i n d . " L i k e I q b a l , the Mujaddid 
passed through 'wujudiyyat' or u n i t y i s m and reached 
''abdiyyat' or s e r v i t u d e . 3 The Mujaddid stressed the 
transcendence of God. "He i s beyond a l l ' s h u y u n - o - i ' t i b a r a t ' 
or modes and r e l a t i o n s , a l l 4 zcuhur-o-bukun' or e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n 
and i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , beyond a l l 'buruz-o-kumun' or p r o j e c t i o n 
and i n t r o j e c t i o n , beyond a l l *mawsul-o-maf§ul' or r e a l i s a b l e 
and e x p l i c a b l e , beyond a l l 'kashf-o-shuhud' or mystic 
i n t u i t i o n and experience; may even beyond a l l 4mahsus-o-ma 4qui', 
e m p i r i c a l and r a t i o n a l , and beyond a l l 4mawhum-o-mutakhayall'' 
or conceivable and imaginable . . . He the Holy One ~ i s beyond 
the Beyond, again beyond the Beyond, again beyond the Beyond."^ 
THE CONCEPTION OP GOD. 
Pe r s o n a l i t y : For I q b a l the u l t i m a t e groundj.all experience 
i s a r a t i o n a l l y d i r e c t e d w i l l or an ego. He p o i n t s out t h a t 
& ___™____™____™___ 
1. Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of I q b a l , pp 85-86. _ 
2. L e t t e r to Nadvi, S. S. quoted i n A]}mad_, M. M. "'Allama 
I q b a l and Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-SanT" I q b a l Review January 
196U. pp 112-113. 
3. Paruql, B. A. The Mu.jaddid's Conception of TawhTd. p. 118. 
U. i b i d , pp 119-120. 
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i n order t o emphasise the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of the U l t i m a t e Ego, 
v. _ _ 1 
the Qor'an gives Him the proper name of A l l a h . As Bergson 
has s t a t e d i n Creative E v o l u t i o n i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s a matter 
of degrees and i s not f u l l y r e a l i s e d even i n the case of a 
2 
human being. " I n p a r t i c u l a r , i t may be said of 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y , " says Bergson, " t h a t , while the tendency t o 
i n d i v i d u a t e i n everywhere opposed by the tendency towards 
reproduction. For the i n d i v i d u a l i t y t o be p e r f e c t , i t would 
be necessary t h a t no detached p a r t of the organism could 
l i v e separately. But then reproduction would be impossible. 
For what i s repr o d u c t i o n , but the b u i l d i n g up of a new 
organism w i t h a detached fragment of the old? I n d i v i d u a l i t y 
3 _ 
th e r e f o r e harbours i t s enemy at home." According t o I q b a l , 
the p e r f e c t i n d i v i d u a l - God, cannot be conceived as 
harbouring i t s own enemy at home, and must t h e r e f o r e be 
regarded as a superior t o the a n t a g o n i s t i c tendency of 
reproduction. "This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the p e r f e c t ego i s 
one of the most e s s e n t i a l elements i n the Quranic conception of 
God; and the Quran mentions i t over and over again, not so 
much w i t h a view t o a t t a c k the current C h r i s t i a n conception as 
5 
t o accentuate i t s own view of a p e r f e c t i n d i v i d u a l . " 
I q b a l r e f e r s t o the Qor'anic verse which i d e n t i f i e s God 
w i t h l i g h t : "God i s the l i g h t of heaven and e a r t h : the 
1. The Reconstruction of Religi o u s Thought i n Islam, p.62. 
2. I b i d . 
3. Bergson, H. Creative E v o l u t i o n , p. 11+. 
k» The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 62-63. 
5. I b i d . p.63» 
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s i m i l i t u d e of h i s l i g h t i s as a niche i n a w a l l , wherein a 
lamp i s placed, and the lamp enclosed m a case of g l a s s , the 
glass appears as i t were a sh i n i n g star."( 2 k : 3 5 ) 1 We have 
already noted t h a t I q b a l denies the p a n t h e i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of t h i s verse. He uses t h i s verse t o suppart h i s own 
p e r s o n a l i s t i c conception of God as the Absolute. "No doubt," 
says I q b a l , "the opening sentence of the verse gives the 
impression of an escape from an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c conception o f 
God. But when we f o l l o w the metaphor of l i g h t i n the r e s t of 
the verse, i t gives j u s t the opposite impression. The development 
of the metaphor i s meant r a t h e r t o exclude the suggestion of 
a formless cosmic element by c e n t r a l i z i n g the l i g h t m a flame 
which i s f u r t h e r i n d i v i d u a l i z e d by i t s encasement i n a glass 
2 
l i k e n e d unto a w e l l - d e f i n e d s t a r . " I n "Gulshan-e-Raz-e-JadTd" 
I q b a l w r i t e s : 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 215) 
Professor Schimmel r e f e r s t o the NaqshbandT mystic Khwana Mir 
Dard o f Delhi (1720-1781+) who reached the conclusion t h a t the 
metaphor of l i g h t f o r God suggests both Absolutism and 
Omnipresence which covers both transcendentalism and a l l -
1. Sale, G. T r a n s l a t i o n of The Koran, p. 267. 
2. The Reconstruction of Religi o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 63. 
1+. Do not seek the Absolute i n the monastery of the world, 
For nothing i s Absolute but the L i g h t of the Heavens. 
3 
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immanency of the Supreme Being. 1 
For I q b a l then, God i s a Person. He i s an ego also 
because He responds t o our r e f l e c t i o n and our prayer; f o r the 
r e a l t e s t of a s e l f i s whether i t responds t o the c a l l of 
2 _ 
another s e l f . I q b a l , however r e f u t e s the charge of 
anthropomorphism: "Ultimate R e a l i t y , " he says, " i s a 
r a t i o n a l l y d i r e c t e d c r e a t i v e l i f e . To i n t e r p r e t t h i s l i f e as 
a p e r s o n a l i t y i s not t o f a s h i o n God a f t e r the image of man. 
I t i s only t o accept the simple f a c t of experience t h a t l i f e 
i s not a formless f l u i d but an organizing p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y -
a s y n t h e t i c a c t i v i t y which holds together and f o c a l i z e s the 
di s p e r s i n g d i s p o s i t i o n s of the l i v i n g organism f o r a c r e a t i v e 
purpose." 
I n f i n i t y . I q b a l , thus, conceives of God as a Person. The 
question then a r i s e s : does not i n d i v i d u a l i t y imply f i n i t u d e ? 
According t o I q b a l , "God cannot be conceived as i n f i n i t e i n 
the sense of s p a t i a l i n f i n i t y . I n matters of s p i r i t u a l 
v a l u a t i o n mere immensity counts f o r nothing."^ True i n f i n i t y 
does not mean i n f i n i t e extension which cannot be conceived 
without embracing a l l a v a i ] a b l e f i n i t e extensions. I t s 
nature consists m i n t e n s i t y and not e x t e n s i t y . "The u l t i m a t e 
l i m i t , " says I q b a l , " i s to sought not i n the d i r e c t i o n s of 
s t a r s , but i n a n i n f i n i t e cosmic life and s p i r i t u a l i t y . " 
T~. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 100. 
2. The Reconstruction of Relig i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 19. 
3. I b i d , pp 60-61. 
i+. I b i d , p. 61+. 
5. I h i d . p. 132. 
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I n c o n t r a s t t o the c l a s s i c a l conception of God, I q b a l 
emphasizes the idea of a changing God."1" For him "the i n f i n i t y 
of the Ultimate Ego con s i s t s m i n f i n i t e inner p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of h i s c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y o f which the universe as known t o us, 
i s only a p a r t i a l expression. I n one word, God's i n f i n i t y 
i s i n t e n s i v e , not extensive. I t involves an i n f i n i t e s e r i e s , 
2 
but i s not t h a t s e r i e s . " I q b a l w r i t e s : 
3 
(Zabur-e-'A^am, p. 216) 
Creativeness. I q b a l ' s universe i s dynamic. The Ul t i m a t e Ego 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y c r e a t i v e . By means of His Creativeness, He 
a f f i r m s His R e a l i t y . God i s not a mere c o n t r i v e r working on 
something given. I q b a l b e l i e v e s t h a t God created the world out 
of Himself. I n orthodox I s l a m i c theology, however, c r e a t i o n 
aways means c r e a t i o n ex n i h i l o . ^ " Professor Whittemore observes 
"On t h i s p o i n t i t may w e l l be t h a t I q b a l has_ reconstructed 
I s l a m i c r e l i g i o u s thought somewhat more e x t e n s i v e l y than the 
o r i g i n a l a r c h i t e c t s would care to acknowledge." 
I q b a l p o i n t s out t h a t we are apt " t o regard the act of 
c r e a t i o n as a s p e c i f i c past event, and the universe appears t o 
1. Bausani, A. "Iqb a l ' s Philosophy of R e l i g i o n , and the West" 
p. 18. 
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 6l|.. 
3. His i n s i d e i s v o i d of Up and Down, 
But His outside i s accepting Space. ( T r a n s l a t i o n by Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 99.} h. Schimmel, A. M. Gabri 's Wing, p. 99-5  Whittemore, R. "Iq al's Pane theism" p. 73. 
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us as a manufactured a r t i c l e Thus regarded the universe 
i s a mere accident i n the l i f e of God and might not have 
"been created ... from the Divine p o i n t of view, there i s no 
c r e a t i o n i n the sense o f a s p e c i f i c event having a 'before' 
and an 'after'"'*" C r e a t i on i s a continuous and c o n t i n u i n g 
( B a l - e - J i b n l , p. 171.) 
Professor Bausani states t h a t i n Muslim thought, utmost 
importance has always been given to c r e a t i o n , even going so 
f a r as t o consider human acts as created i n order t o save the 
idea of the absolute creativeness o f God. The A s h ' a r i t e s , i n 
order to a b o l i s h the A r i s t o t e l i a n "causae secundae" which 
could compromise the fEeedom of the c r e a t i v e act of God, 
elaborated the theory of atomism. According t o the A s h ' a r i t e s , 
the world i s composed of 'jawahir' - i n f i n i t e l y small p a r t s 
or atoms which are i n d i v i s i b l e . The essence of the atom i s 
independent of i t s existence i . e . existence i s a q u a l i t y 
imposed on the atom by God. Before r e c e i v i n g t h i s q u a l i t y , 
the atom l i e s dormant. Since the c r e a t i v e q c t i v i t y of God 
i s ceaseless, f r e s h atoms come t o being every moment and 
1. The Reconstruction o f R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 65. 
2. The caravan of being does not stop, 
For every i n s t a n t _ t h e r e i s a new phase of God's Being. 
3. Bausani, A. " I q b a l ' s Philosophy of R e l i g i o n and the West" 
p r o c e s s i i n time 
U, «8J- OJ 7*> U 
2 
P. 19. 
k. I b i d . 
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t h e r e f o r e the universe i s c o n s t a n t l y growing. 1 I q b a l t o o , 
as we have seen, b e l i e v e s i n a growing universe, but u n l i k e 
the A s h ' a r i t e s , he t h i n k s t h a t the universe changes not " i n 
an a t o m i s t i c development moving from p o i n t t o p o i n t but 
i n a never ceasing organic movement i n the Divine Ego i t s e l f . 
This i s proved, f o r the philosopher poet, by the Qur'anic 
'bob- t / - \ 
a t t e s t a t i o n ] ^ i n c r e a s e s ' (Sura 35:1) which h i n t s a t the ever 
f r e s h p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t may emerge from the fathomless 
depths of the i n t e n s i v e Divine l i f e and be manifested i n the 
2 — 
created s e r i a l time. I n a well-known couplet, I q b a l says 
A i d <^-fli I ' ^ ^ t V ^ 
3 
(Bal-e-JibrTj., p. Uh) 
and i n a l e t t e r t o Professor Nicholson, "the universe i s not 
a completed a c t : i t i s s t i l l i n the course of f o r m a t i o n ^ 
Opposing the A s h ' a r i t e s ' ideas on substance and c r e a t i o n , 
I q b a l p o i n t s out t h a t "they used the word substance or atom 
w i t h a vague i m p l i c a t i o n of e x t e n n a l i t y ; but t h e i r c r i t i c i s m , 
actuated by a pious desire to defend the idea of d i v i n e 
c r e a t i o n , rediiced the Universe t o a mere show of ordered 
~. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 68-70. 
2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 100. 
3. Perhaps t h i s universe i s s t i l l incomplete, 
For each i n s t a n t there can be heard the cry of "Be, and 
_ i t came i n t o being." 
U. I q b a l quoted by Nicholson, R. A. I n t r o d u c t i o n t o The 
Secrets of the S e l f , p. x v i i . 
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s u b j e c t i v i t i e s which, as they maintained l i k e Berkeley, 
found t h e i r u l t i m a t e explanation m the W i l l of God.""^ " 
Knowledge: The Ultimate Ego i s omniscient. I n the case of 
f i n i t e beings, knowledge even i f extended t o the p o i n t of 
omniscience, must always remain r e l a t i v e t o the c o n f r o n t i n g 
'other', and cannot, t h e r e f o r e , be pre d i c a t e d of the Ultimate 
Ego who, being a l l - i n c l u s i v e , cannot be conceived as having 
p 
a perspective l i k e the f i n i t e ego. Discursive knowledge 
cannot be p r e d i c t e d of an ego who knows and who also forms 
the ground of the object known. 
For I q b a l omniscience does n o t , however, mean a s i n g l e 
i n d i v i s i b l e act of perception which makes God immediately 
aware of the e n t i r e sweep of h i s t o r y , regarded as an order 
of s p e c i f i c events, i n an e t e r n a l 'now1. DawanT, ' I r a q i 
•7. _ 
and Royce conceive of God's knowledge i n t h i s way. I q b a l 
observes, "there i s an element of t r u t h i n t h i s conception. 
But i t suggests a closed universe, a f i x e d f u t u r i t y , a 
pre-determined,_unalterable order- of- s p e c i f i c "events "which, ~ 
l i k e a superior f a t e , has once f o r a l l determined the d i r e c t i o n s 
of God's c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y . " ^ " Divine knowledge i s not 
"passive omniscience" but "a l i v i n g c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y t o 
which the objects t h a t appear t o e x i s t i n t h e i r own r i g h t are 
5 
o r g a n i c a l l y r e l a t e d . I f God's knowledge i s conceived as a 
1• The Development of Metaphysics i n Persia, p. 57. ~ 
2. The Reconstruction of Religi o u s Thought i n Islam, r>t> 77. 
3. I b i d , p. 78. 
h. I b i d , p. 78 
5. I b i d , pp 78-79. 
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k i n d of a mirror r e f l e c t i n g preordained events, there i s 
no room l e f t f o r i n i t i a t i v e and f r e e c r e a t i v e n e s s . "We 
must, t h e r e f o r e , conceive of His knowledge as a p e r f e c t l y 
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s , l i v i n g , c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y - an a c t i v i t y i n 
which knowing and c r e a t i n g are one.""'' 
Omnipotence I q b a l p o i n t s out that omnipotence, a b s t r a c t l y 
conceived, i s merely a b l i n d , c a p r i c i o u s power without l i m i t s . 
The Qor'an f i n d s D ivine omnipotence c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to 
Divine wisdom, and f i n d s God's power r e v e a l e d , not i n the 
a r b i t r a r y and the c a r p r i c i o u s , but i n the r e c u r r e n t , the 
r e g u l a r and the o r d e r l y . Simultaneously, the Qor'an conceives 
2 
of God as holding a l l goodness i n His Hands. " I f , then, the 
r a t i o n a l l y d i r e c t e d Divine w i l l i s good," then, asks I q b a l , 
"how i s i t ... p o s s i b l e to r e c o n c i l e the goodness' and 
omnipotence of God with the immense volume of e v i l i n His 
c r e a t i o n . The p a i n f u l problem i s r e a l l y the crux of Theism."' 
I q b a l wonders i f , with Browning, one i s to regard God as a l l -
goodr, or, with Schopenhauer ~as a i r e v i l . ^ " - According to 
I q b a l s i n or e v i l i s not something which hangs over mankind 
as a c u r s e . I t i s looked upon as a challenge. I t i s the 
presence of e v i l which makes ns recognise good, and a c t s as a 
whetstone f o r the development of p e r s o n a l i t y . I q b a l ' s point 
resembles that of William James (as indeed he intends that 
T. S h a r i f , M. M. About I q b a l and His Thought. p~._22. 
2. The Rec o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 80. 
3. I b i d , pp 80-81. 
U. S h a r i f , M. M. About I q b a l and His Thought, p. 21. 
5. James, W. Pragmatism, London, 1910 - e s p e c i a l l y pp 165-19U* 
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i t should s i n c e he adapts James's language to h i s purposes). 
"The teaching of the Quran, which b e l i e v e s i n the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of improvement i n the behaviour of man and h i s c o n t r o l over 
n a t u r a l f o r c e s , i s n e i t h e r optimism nor pessimism;, I t i s 
meliorism, which recognises a growing uni v e r s e and i s 
aiumated by the hope of man's eventual v i c t o r y over e v i l . " 
P r o f e s s o r Bausani p o i n t s out t h a t i n I q b a l ' s conception of a 
continuously c r e a t i v e God there " l i e s a l s o hidden a new 
s o l u t i o n of the o l d problem, the crux of theism, i . e . the 
problem of E v i l . Nature i s n e i t h e r bad nor good i n i t s e l f , 
3 — 
i t i s one of the f i r s t e x e r c i s e s of God." As the Qor'an says 
"Say, Go through the e a r t h , and see how he o r i g i n a l l y 
produceth'creatures-.afterwards w i l l God reproduce another 
production" £9: 19)^ 
E t e r n i t y . God i s e t e r n a l but not so i n the sense m which 
a thing i s supposed to l a s t f o r a l l time. T h i s i m p l i e s a 
wrong view of time making i t e x t e r n a l to Him. I q b a l ' s God 
i s a changing God but change does not mean s e r i a l change. God 
l i v e s both i n e t e r n i t y and i n s e r i a l time. To I q b a l the 
former means non-successional change, while the l a t t e r i s 
o r g a n i c a l l y r e l a t e d to e t e r n i t y i n so f a r as i t i s a measure 
of non-successional change. " I n t h i s sense alone i t i s 
T~. Whittemore, R. " I q b a l ' s Panentheism" p. 76. 
2. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 81. 
3. Bausani, A. " I o b a l ' s Philosophy of R e l i g i o n , and the West 
p. 18. 
h. S a l e , G. T r a n s l a t i o n of The Koran, p. 298. 
5. S h a r i f , M. M. About I q b l l and His Thought, p. 23. 
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p o s s i b l e , " says I q b a l "to understand the Quranic v e r s e : 'To 
God belongs the a l t e r n a t i o n of day and n i g h t . ' ( 2 3 : 8 2 ) . " 1 
THE UNIVERSE AND TELEOLOGY 
According to I q b a l , the movement of the un i v e r s e has a 
purpose. He disagrees with Nietzsche who "recognises no 
s p i r i t u a l purpose i n the u n i v e r s e . To him there i s no e t h i c a l 
purpose r e s i d e n t i n the f o r c e s of h i s t o r y . V i r t u e , J u s t i c e , 
Duty, Love a l l are meaningless terms to him. The process of 
h i s t o r y i s determined p u r e l y by economical f o r c e s and the 
? 
only p r i n c i p l e t h at governs i s 'Might i s Right." 
I q b a l c o n s i d e r s R e a l i t y to be an ego-determined, ego-
i n s p i r e d f l u x w i t h i n which purposes are a t work. There are 
f i n i t e purposes when the determining egos are f i n i t e , but 
there i s a l s o a supreme purpose of which the Arch-Ego i s the 
author - t h i s Purpose i s the development and p e r f e c t i o n of 
ego, t i l l they, on t h e i r f i n i t e s c a l e , approximate to D e i t y . ' 
As I q b a l says: 
B a l - e - J i b r l L , p. 79) 
1• The Reco n s t r u c t i o n of ReligiousJThought i n I s l a m . 
2. Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l , p. 21+2. 
3. HamTd, K. A. " I q b a l ' s Philosophy of the Human Ego". The 
V i s v a b h a r a t i Q u a r t e r l y (New S e r i e s ) F e b r u a r y - A p r i l lWT 
Volume 9 P a r t I . pp 30^-303. 
h. Godhead l i e s i n the b u i l d i n g up of Selfhood. 
i i U &- or is**/? 
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The Universe i s i n i t s nature, t e l e o l o g i c a l , not i n the 
sense of mechanism which repudiates the idea of f r e e a c t i v i t y 
but i n the sense that the world has "been c r e a t e d f o r a 
purpose.^ As the Qor'an says: "We have not c r e a t e d the heavens 
and the e a r t h , and whatever i s between them, "by way of s p e r t : 
— 2 
We have c r e a t e d them no otherwise than i n t r u t h " (Sura 1+U:38) 
According to I q b a l , the movement of the Universe i s a 
genuinely c r e a t i v e movement which i s not to be understood as 
being c y c l i c i n which the end s h a l l n e c e s s a r i l y r e t u r n to i t s 
s t a r t i n g point as m Greek philosophy. Whatever be the 
c r i t e r i o n by which to jiidge the forward steps of a c r e a t i v e 
movement, i f i t i s conceived as c y c l i c , i t ceases to be 
3 
c r e a t i v e . 
I n b a l does not b e l i e v e that the u n i v e r s e i s moving towards 
a f i x e d destiny. "To endow the world process with purpose i n 
t h i s sense i s to bob i t of i t s o r i g i n a l i t y and i t s c r e a t i v e 
c h a r a c t e r . I t s ends are termination of a c a r e e r ; they are ends 
to come and not n e c e s s a r i l y p r e m e d i t a t e d . I q b a l b e l i e v e s 
m 'immanent' te l e o l o g y which may "be s a i d to be a t work i n 
the c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y of an a r t i s t . A w r i t e r ' s a c t u a l work i s 
not to be taken as a mere t r a n s c r i b i n g of a p r e - e x i s t e n t v i s i o n 
i n t o words. The v i s i o n does not " p r e - e x i s t " save i n a very 
vague sense, b\it comes i n t o e x i s t e n c e while the t e c h n i c a l and 
p h y s i c a l work of p a i n t i n g or w r i t i n g goes on. The a r t i s t s t a r t s 
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabrifel's Wing p. 3U~ 
2. S a l e , G. ( t r a n s l a t i o n o f ) The Koran, p. 368. 
3. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the R e l i g i o u s 
Philosophy of Muhammad I q b a l " p. 167. _ 
k. The R e construction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 55. 
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with a t e n t a t i v e p l a n i n mind but as the work develops i t 
begins to have a l i f e of i t s own and often the a r t i s t f i n d s 
h i m s e l f d e v i a t i n g from h i s o r i g i n a l plan. The a r t i s t does 
have a purpose i n t h a t he wishes to c r e a t e something, but 
the a c t u a l c r e a t i o n i s not a pre-determined product.''" The 
Un i v e r s e , or the analogy of our S e l f , i s of a f r e e , c r e a t i v e 
c h a r a c t e r . I t i s an organic u n i t y of thought, l i f e and 
2 
purpose. I t i s " g r a d u a l l y t r a v e l l i n g from chaos to cosmos," 
and i s not " c h a o t i c , f a l s e , c r u e l , c o n t r a d i c t o r y and 
s e d u c t i v e " ^ as Nietzsche thought. I t has both a reason and 
a p l a n but the end l i k e an ever-receding shore w i l l f o rever 
remain i n the f u t u r e . "There i s , t h e r e f o r e , no f i n a l s t a t e 
to the u n i v e r s e . I t i s a c o n s t a n t l y progressing, s e l f -
generating and s e l f - e v o l v i n g u n i v e r s e , whose inne r p o s s i b i l -
i t i e s of growth and e v o l u t i o n w i l l never know any l i m i t s . " 
1. par, B. A. Post-Kantian Voluntarism, p. 217. 
2. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 55. 
3. I q b a l quoted by Nicholson, R. A. i n I n t r o d u c t i o n to The 
S e c r e t s of the S e l f , p. x v i i . 
ft. Nietzsche quoted by Enver, I . H. m Metaphysics of I q b a l , 
P. 75. 
5. Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of I q b a l , p. 75. 
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CHAPTER V. 
THE SELF IN IQBAVS THOUGHT 
THE SELF; ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION 
Since times immemorial philosophers have asked questions 
regarding the o r i g i n of Man. Sometimes he i s looked upon 
as a being cre a t e d by God who f e l l from a s t a t e of b l i s s due 
1 
to an act of disobedience, sometimes, as Darwin p o s t u l a t e d , 
as a c r e a t u r e who developed l i k e a l l l i v i n g organisms over 
the course of aeons, from a common p r i m i t i v e germ. 
C r e a t i o n . I q b a l r e f e r s to the Qor'anic d e s c r i p t i o n of 
2 
t h e , b i r t h of Man. The process may be s t a t e d thus: man 
i s created f o r a c e r t a i n appointed period of time (Sura 
6:2), growing g r a d u a l l y from the e a r t h (Sura 32 : 7, 55 : 
from an e x t r a c t of c e r t a i n elements of the e a r t h (Sura 6:2, 
22:5), then by r e c e i v i n g nourishment (Sura 17:70), being 
endowed with l i f e and made up of water (Sura 21 : 30) and 
black mud ( s u r a 15: 26) or pla_s_tic_.clay-(Sura-37- : ~ l l ) , ~ 
moulded i n t o shape i n due proportions (Sura 15 : 26) as a 
life - g e r m , a c l o t of congealed blood (Sura 96 : 2) growing 
i n t o a lump of f l e s h , and f u r t h e r developing i n t o bones 
clothed with f l e s h and f i n a l l y emerging as a new c r e a t i o n 
1. McKenzie, A.E.E. The Major Achievements of Sc i e n c e , 
Cambridge, 196I. Volume I , p. 200. 
2. S h a r i f , M. M. "The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Teaching of the Quran" 
i n A H i s t o r y of Muslim Philosophy ( E d i t e d by S h a r i f , M.M.) 
Wiesbaden, 1963, Volume I , p. 1U5. 
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(Sura- 23:1U) 
Thus we f i n d i n the Qor'an e x p l i c i t statements t o the 
e f f e c t t h a t man owes h i s existence t o God. He i s created 
by God from matter and moulded by Him as cl a y i s moulded 
by the p o t t e r . 1 He i s created from blood and t h e r e f o r e i s 
a l i v i n g c r e a t u r e , since i n a l l Semitic thought, blood 
2 
represents the p r i n c i p l e of l i f e . I f man has been created 
by God, then some questions a r i s e , namely, regarding h i s 
appearance on e a r t h , and how the theory of e v o l u t i o n a p p l i e s 
t o h i s emergence. 
The F a l l of Man. I q b a l p o i n t s out t h a t according t o the 
Qor'an, the e a r t h i s the 'dwelling-place* of man and a 
'source of p r o f i t t o him* and t h a t he i s not a stranger t o 
i t . ^ Man's f i r s t appearance on ear t h i s not as the r e s u l t 
of the F a l l . * * I q b a l does not t h i n k t h a t having been 
created by God, Man was placed i n a supersensual paradise 
from whence he f e l l on e a r t h . The 'Jannat' (Garden) from 
-which-Man was expeired~Ts no~t "regarded by I q b a l as the 
Heaven which i s the e t e r n a l abode of the r i g h t e o u s , "the 
reward of those who keep t h e i r duty" (Sura • 13:35)^ since 
the very f i r s t event which took place there was an act of 
1. Smith, H.B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" The Muslim World 
July-October 195U> volume XLIV, numbers 3 and 1+. , 
2. Smith, H.B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" p. 203. 
3» The Reconstruction of Re l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 82+« 
l+. I b i d , p. "53^ 
5. P l e k t h a l l , H. M. The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, New York 
1960, p. 85. 
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disobediences I q b a l regards the 'Jannat' associated w i t h 
the P a l l of Man as "a p r i m i t i v e s t a t e i n which Man i s 
p r a c t i c a l l y u n r e l a t e d to h i s environments and consequently 
does not f e e l the s t i n g of human wants." I t i s a s t a t e 
of e f f o r t l e s s b l i s s , which a Promethean l i k e I q b a l could 
r e l i s h no more than M i l t o n could. 
According t o I q b a l , the purpose of the Qor'anic 
<\©fc 
n a r r a t i o n i s ^ h i s t o n c a l , i . e . , i t does not r e f e r t o a 
p a r t i c u l a r event which took place at a p a r t i c u l a r time. 
The 'Adam* of the legend i s a concept r a t h e r than an 
i n d i v i d u a l . 2 ( I q b a l p o i n t s out t h a t the Qor'an uses the 
word 'Bashar' or 'Insan' f o r Man, and uses 'Adam' only t o 
designate Man i n hi s capacity as God's vicegerent on ea r t h ^ ) 
Thus by 'Adam' i s meant Man "who has become self-consaoas, 
c i v i l i z e d and able t o bear the burden of moral and s p i r i t u a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which has been l a i d upon him from the very 
beginning of his existence, but the a b i l i t y t o bear which 
became-manifest-only when'Insan' reached the stage of 'Adam'." 
Adam's s t o r y , i s t h e r e f o r e , not the h i s t o r y o f the f i r s t man, 
5 
but the e t h i c a l experience, i n symbolic form, of every man. 
Emergence. For I q b a l e v o l u t i o n i s a f a c t . He says: 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 81+. 
2. I b i d , p. 5!H 
3- I b i d . 
1+. Khatoon, J . The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of IobaT. p. 118~I 
5. par, B. A. Quranic E t h i c s , Lahore, 1960, p. 38. 
6. Raf l u d d l n , M. "Iqbal»s Idea of the S e l f " I q b a l Review 
October 1963, volume IV, No. 3. p. 7. 
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(Payam-e-Mashriq p. 88) 
He seeks support f o r the e v o l u t i o n a r y theory not only i n 
the Qor'an but a l s o m the h i s t o r y of Muslim philosophy. 
J a h i z had hinted at the e v o l u t i o n a r y process, and the 
Brethren of P u r i t y (lkhwan-al-Safa) had b e l i e v e d that the 
process of e v o l u t i o n advanced from the m i n e r a l to the 
human stage being d i r e c t e d or prompted by the i n n e r 
p — 
s p i r i t u a l yearning for a r e t u r n to God. I q b a l has 
devoted considerable a t t e n t i o n to the theory of e v o l u t i o n 
as s t a t e d by Ibn-e-M&skawaih.^ Miskawaih's theory i s 
b a s i c a l l y the same as t h a t of the Brethren of Purity.* 4 -
According to Miskawaih e v o l u t i o n c o n s i s t s of four s t a g e s : 
the m i n e r a l , the vegetable, the animal and the human. 
C o r a l , date-palm and ape, mark the t r a n s i t i o n from the 
mineral to the vegetable, from the vegetable t o the 
animal, and from the animal to the human kingdom respec-
5 
t i v e l y . 
I q b a l ' s view of evolution has been g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d 
1. When Nature carves a f i g u r e , 
I t takes a period of time to complete i t . 
2. R a s a ' i l Ikhwan-al-Safa. Egypt. 1928, Volume IV, pp 31I+-319. 
3» The Development of Metaphysics m P e r s i a , p. 29; a l s o The 
Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought m Islam, p. 121, 
PP 133-13^. 
2+. Badaw, A. "Miskawaih 1 1 i n A H i s t o r y of Muslim Philosophy, 
Volume I , p. U72. 
5. I b i d , p. U72. , - . 
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by RumT whose ideas on the subject were a message of hope 
and joy and d i d not b r i n g the gloom and despair which 
1 _ _ 
came m the wake of Darwin's theory. For Rumi the lowest 
form of l i f e i s matter but matter i s not dead or i n e r t : 
According t o RumT, the s e l f o r i g i n a t e d i n the form of 
matter c o n s i s t i n g of dimly-conscious monads. RumT's 
theory i s s t a t e d thus: 
y A » , l & 6>\fyl» U U 
3 (.continued on p 1.^1) 
lT~The Reconstruct i o n of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 121-122. 
2. Ruml, J. Magnawl-e-Ma'nawl ( e d i t e d by Furuzanfar, B. and 
DarvTsh, M.; Tehran, 1963. Book I , p. 53. 
A i r and Earth'and F i r e are slaves, 
For you and I they are dead, but not f o r God. 
3. F i r s t man appeared i n the class of inorg a n i c things 
Next he passed therefrom i n t o t h a t of p l a n t s . 
For years he l i v e d on as one of the p l a n t s , 
Remembering nought of hi s inorganic s t a t e so d i f f e r e n t ; 
And when he passed from the vegetive t o the animal s t a t e , 
He had no remembrance of hi s st a t e as a p l a n t , 
Except the i n c l i n a t i o n he f e l t t o the world of p l a n t s , 
E s p e c i a l l y at the time of spring and sweet f l o w e r s ; 
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CMa-tnaioT _ e . Ma'nau>7 8c*k. "EC pf 1 7 3 - 1 7 1 , ) 
For I q b a l , as f o r Ibn Miskawaih and RuraT, God i s the 
u l t i m a t e source and ground of e v o l u t i o n - 1 We have seen 
t h a t f o r I q b a l matter i s not something dead because from 
the Ultimate Ego only egos proceed: 
2 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 22I+) 
Man i s a s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y . I n a sense he e x i s t s e t e r -
n a l l y as a p o s s i b i l i t y of God's c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y . I n 
"Lala^-e-Tur" I q b a l w r i t e s 
Like^ the i n c l i n a t i o n of. i n f a n t s towards-thei-r mothers r " "~ 
Which knew not the cause of t h e i r i n c l i n a t i o n t o the breast. 
Again the great Creator, as you know, 
Drew men out of the animal s t a t e i n t o the human s t a t e . 
Thus man passed from one order of nature t o another, 
T i l l he became wise and knowing and strong as he i s now. 
Of h i s f i r s t souls he has now no remembrance, 
And he w i l l be again changed from h i s present s o u l . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by_ I q b a l , The Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought i n Islam, pp 121-122;. 
1. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of I q b a l , :ty« "121." "* 
2. From i t s ray nothing comes i n t o being save egos, 
From i t s sea, nothing appears save p e a r l s . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by par, B.A. Iqbal's Gulshan-i Raz-i Jadfd 
and Bandagl Namah, p. 36). 
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(Payam-e->Mashriq p. 614.) 
/ 
1 
But although, as we have pointed out, m one sense the 
ego i s e t e r n a l , i t emerges w i t h i n the spatio-temporal 
order due t o the r e a l i z a t i o n of the Divine p o s s i b i l i t y 
2 
through the e v o l u t i o n a r y process. The Ultimate Ego 
i s immanent i n matter and makes the emergent emerge out 
of i t . There are various l e v e l s of being or grades of 
consciousness. The r i s i n g note of egohood culminates 
3 
m man.-' 
According t o the Qor'an, i n one sense, Man i s of 
the e a r t h , yet he i s also d i v i n e i n t h a t God has breathed 
His own s p i r i t i n t o him (Sura 32:9). Fo l l o w i n g t h i s , 
I q b a l belches jOn the one hand/athe d i v i n e c r e a t i o n of Man andj 
on -the-otheryvtfre~pr i h c i p l e t h a t Man has evolved from 
matter. I t i s possible t o do t h i s because i n his thought 
there i s no impassable g u l f between matter and s p i r i t . 
For him matter i s "endowed w i t h such i n t r i n s i c powers t h a t 
1. The o r i g i n s of Selfhood no man knows, 
To dawn and eve no f e l l o w s h i p i t owes. 
I heard t h i s wisdom from the Heavenly Guide: 
"Not older than i t s wave the ocean fl o w s . " 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A.J. The T u l i p of S i n a i , p. 22) 
2. J^atoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of I a b a l . pp llh.-115. ' 
3» The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp 71-72. 
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we should see ' s p i r i t * s l e e p i n g i n matter, awakening i n 
• i 
p l a n t s , awake i n animals, self-conscious i n man." 
I q b a l w r i t e s : 
(Bang-e-Dara p. I/4.3) 
R e j e c t i o n of Mechanistic I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of E v o l u t i o n . 
I q b a l r e j e c t s , as Bergson d i d , the mechanistic views of 
b i o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n which began w i t h Charles Darwin.' 
Darwin had explained e v o l u t i o n as the mechanical operation 
of n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n on v a r i a t i o n s a r i s i n g a p p a r e n t l y , by 
chance.*4" A w r i t e r p o i n t s out t h a t n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n can-
not account f o r a l l organic e v o l u t i o n . " ' Natural 
s e l e c t i o n * i s an unfo r t u n a t e and most misleading word, and 
sounds as i f Nature d i d t h i s or t h a t by a d e l i b e r a t e act 
of c h o i c e . — N a t u r a l selection'dbes n o t h i n g , produces 
not h i n g . I t s e f f e c t i s purely negative. A l l i t means 
i s t h a t m the s t r u g g l e f o r existence the weak go t o the 
w a l l and do not s u r v i v e . . . 'Natural S e l e c t i o n * can be 
c a l l e d the 'occasion* or ' c o n d i t i o n * of organic e v o l u t i o n , 
1. Cohu, J. R. V i t a l Problems of R e l i g i o n . Edinburgh, 191Ui P»i+1< 
2. That which i s conscious i n Man, sleeps a deep sleep 
I n t r e e s , f l o w e r s , animals, stones and s t a r s . 
3. Ahmad, A. "Sources of Iqbal's P e r f e c t Man" I q b a l , J u l y 1958, 
Volume V I I , No.l, p. 9. 
1+. McKenzie, A.E.E. The Major Achievements of Science, 
Volume I , p. 216. 
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but c e r t a i n l y not i t s cause. A l l p l a n t and animal 
v a r i a t i o n s are due t o inherent energy i n the organisms 
A _ 
themselves. I q b a l does not b e l i e v e i n "the b l i n d and 
p 
dreary mechanism of s t r u g g l e and d e s t r u c t i o n " described 
by Darwin and Spencer. 
I q b a l considers the concepts employed by mechanists 
t o be inadequate f o r the an a l y s i s of l i f e . For instance 
mechanical c a u s a l i t y cannot e x p l a i n self-maintenance and 
r e p r o d u c t i o n ^ nor can i t explain the emergence of the 
i n t e l l e c t from matter - a view necessitated by the a p p l i -
c a t i o n of p h y s i c a l concepts t o l i f e . ^ " The word "epiphenomenon" 
was coined by T. H Huxley t o express his idea t h a t con-
sciousness i s a one-sided phenomenon, a by-product or 
concomitant of o r g a n i z a t i o n , an e f f e c t possessing i n i t s e l f 
no e f f i c i e n c y . ^ According t o I q b a l , t o describe l i f e as 
"an e£i-phenomenofr of the processes of matten i s t o deny i t 
as an independent a c t i v i t y , and t o deny i t as an independent 
- a c t i v i t y i s to deny t h e ^ v a l i d i t y of a l l knowledge which i s 
only a systematized expression of consciousness." 
I q b a l , then, r e j e c t s Darwinism which forces i n t o the 
s t r a i t jacket of p h y s i c a l concepts the dynamic processes of 
1. Cohu, J. E. V i t a l Problems of R e l i g i o n , pp 52-53. 
2. Durant, W. The Story of Philosophy. New York, 1933, P.3U3. 
3. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp U3-14+. 
k. I b i d , pp kk-k5> 
5. Carr, H. W. The Unique Status of Man, London, 1928, p. 13?+. 
6. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp UO-hl. 
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l i f e and by s t r e s s i n g t h a t the f u t u r e i s determined 
completely by the past, repudiates the d u r a t i o n , freedom 
•j 
and c r e a t i o n which are found i n r e a l l i f e . Furthermore 
2 
i t throws no l i g h t on the u l t i m a t e nature of r e a l i t y and 
does not admit the existence of a goal towards which 
e v o l u t i o n i s progressing. 
I q b a l believes m the " f a c t u a l wholeness" of l i f e 
described by the German b i o l o g i s t D r i e s c h ^ who maintains 
t h a t there i s an i n t e r n a l r e g u l a t i n g p r i n c i p l e w i t h i n tne 
organism which shapes i t i n the i n t e r e s t of the whole, 
g u i d i n g and moulding i t s purpose.** This p r i n c i p l e i s 
i n t e r e s t e d not only i n the development of the i n d i v i d u a l 
organism but i n the development and e v o l u t i o n of l i f e as 
a whole. Consciousness i n a l l i t s phases of development 
and adaptation "possesses a career which i s unthinkable 
i n the case of a machine.11-> To say t h a t i t possesses a 
career means t h a t the sources of i t s a c t i v i t y cannot be 
understood save with~ r e f erence t o i t s remote past the 
o r i g i n of which l i e s i n t h a t s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y which r a t a l s 
i t s e l f i n s p a t i a l experience but cannot be discovered by an 
analysis of i t . I n other words, i t would seem t h a t " l i f e 
1. M a g i l l , F. li, ( E d i t o r ) The Masterpieces of World Philosophy 
P-_769_. 
2. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of I q b a l , p. 122. 
3» The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. hh» 
k> RefTuddin, M. " I q b a l ' s Idea of the S e l f " , p. 11. 
5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. kk' 
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i s f o u n d a t i o n a l and a n t e r i o r t o the r o u t i n e of p h y s i c a l and 
chemical processes which must be regarded as a kind of f i x e d 
behaviour formed during a long course of e v o l u t i o n . " 
Emergent E v o l u t i o n . I q b a l r e f e r s w i t h approval to the theory 
p 
of emergent e v o l u t i o n put forward by C. L l o y d Morgan. 
"Emergent e v o l u t i o n works upwards from matter, through l i f e , 
t o consciousness which a t t a i n s i n man i t s highest or supra-
r e f l e c t i v e levelo"^ I t regards the emergence of the higher 
from the lower as being due t o a d r i v i n g f o r c e w e l l i n g up 
from below and drawing upwards through a c t i v i t y . ^ " The 
emergent i s an unforeseeable and novel f a c t i n i t s own plane 
of being which cannot be explained m e c h a n i s t i c a l l y or 
resolved i n t o t h a t which has conditioned i t s b i r t h and 
5 
growth* According t o the theory of emergent e v o l u t i o n 
even i f s o u l - l i f e emerges from a p h y s i c a l l e v e l i t does not 
f o l l o w t h a t the new emergent can be adequately explained i n 
terms of the p h y s i c a l only. 
Berg"son and I q b a l : c r e a t i v e e v o l u t i o n . L i k e Bergson, I q b a l 
believes t h a t " i t i s consciousness or r a t h e r supra-con-
sciousness t h a t i s at the o r i g i n of l i f e . " This con-
sciousness i s the need of c r e a t i o n . ^ Bergson be l i e v e s i n a 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought m Islam , p. kh* 
2. I b i d , pp 106-107. 
3. Morgan, G. L. Emergent E v o l u t i o n , London, 1923, p. 297. 
k.. S i d d l q i , M. " I q b a l "s Concept of E v o l u t i o n " I q b a l , January 
195U, Volume I I , No.3, p. 22. 
5« The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp I4.J4.-L1.5. 
6. Bergson, H. Creative E v o l u t i o n , p. 275» 
7- I b i d . 
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s o r t of cosmic v i t a l i s m i n which the v i t a l p r i n c i p l e or 
elan v i t a l , as he c a l l s i t , i s l i f e i t s e l f as i t has endured 
through the ages and e v o l u t i o n i s the h i s t o r y of the e f f o r t 
of l i f e t o f r e e i t s e l f from the domination of matter and t o 
•l 
achieve self-consciousness. I n other words, e v o l u t i o n i s 
the outcome of an impulse of l i f e m a n i f e s t i n g i t s e l f i n 
p 
innumerable forms. The v i t a l impulse determines the 
d i r e c t i o n of e v o l u t i o n as w e l l as e v o l u t i o n i t s e l f . Tnis 
ever-changing a c t i v i t y i s i n f a c t l i f e . L i f e i s t h a t which 
makes e f f o r t s , irahich pushes upwards and outwards and on. 
A l l the s t r i v i n g i s due t o the elan v i t a l i n us, " t h a t v i t a l 
urge which makes us grow, and transforms t h i s wandering 
planet i n t o a theatre of unending creation.'^ I n Bergson's 
view "the whole of nature i s said t o be the outcome of a 
f o r c e which t h r u s t s i t s e l f forward i n t o new and unforeseen 
forms of organised s t r u c t u r e . These stor e and u t i l i z e 
energy, maintaining t h e i r power of growth and adaptive 
n o v e l t y up t o a p o i n t and then relapse i n t o r e p e t i t i v e 
r o u t i n e and u l t i m a t e l y i n t o the degradation of energy. 
According t o Bergson, the universe shows two tendencies. 
There i s a r e a l i t y which i s making i t s e l f m a r e a l i t y which 
1. M a g i l l , P. N. ( E d i t o r ) Masterpieces of World Philosophy, 
P. 769. 
2. Urmson, J. 0. ( E d i t o r ) Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy 
and Philosophers, p. 63. 
3. Durant, W. The Story of Philosophy, pp 3k5-3k6* 
k» Urmson, J. Ol ( E d i t o r ) Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy 
and Philosophers, p. 63. 
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i s unmaking i t s e l f . The laws of the tendency t o r e p e t i t i o n 
and the d i s s i p a t i o n of energy are the laws of matter; the 
counter tendency i s the t h r u s t of l i f e . For I q b a l , the 
f u n c t i o n of consciousness i s " t o provide a luminous p o i n t 
i n order to e n l i g h t e n the forward rush of l i f e * I t i s a 
case of tension, a s t a t e of s e l f - c o n c e n t r a t i o n , by means of 
which l i f e manages t o shut out a l l memories and associations 
p 
which have no bearing on present a c t i o n - " L i k e Bergson, 
I q b a l believes i n the dynamic p r i n c i p l e (whether i t i s 
c a l l e d *soul', ' l i f e ' , 'personality','consciousness', or 
whatever else) w i t h i n organisms. I t i s t o t h i s p r i n c i p l e 
" t h a t we owe our eyes, ears, hands, f e e t , nerves, b r a i n , our 
p h y s i c a l e v e r y t h i n g . I t simply c a l l e d a l l our organs i n t o 
being i n response t o stimuli or prompting from the R e a l i t y 
outside i t s e l f , i . e . Nature, which i t wanted t o i n t e r p r e t . " ^ 
I q b a l expresses t h i s idea thus: 
1. Urmson, J. 0. ( E d i t o r ) Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy 
and Philosophers, p. 63» 
2. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. U0. 
3« Cohu, J. R. V i t a l Problems of R e l i g i o n , p. 5h» 
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1 (Asrar-e-Khudi p. 17) 
I q b a l ' s well-known poem "SaqT Nama" eontains most of 
his ideas on e v o l u t i o n : 
1. The p a r t r i d g e ' s l e g i s derived from the elegance of i t s g a i t , 
The n i g h t i n g a l e ' s beak from i t s endeavour t o s i n g , 
Nose, hand, b r a i n , eye and ear, 
Thought, imagination, f e e l i n g , memory and understanding -
A l l these weapons devised by l i f e f o r s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n 
I n i t s ceaseless s t r u g g l e . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the S e l f , 
pp 25-26. 
2ho 
1 ( B a l - J i b r T l pp 166-170) 
Evolution and teleology. 
Iqbal accepts Bergson's b i o l o g i c a l approach to the 
2 
problem of evolution but unlike Bergson he takes a 
t e l e o l o g i c a l view of the evolutionary process. Bergson 
r e j e c t s teleology which he c a l l s "inverted mechanism" 
since i t pertains to development tied to the r e a l i z a t i o n 
of pre-determined ends.^ Therefore, according to Bergson, 
the v i t a l urge to which emergence i s due i s both non-
mechanical and non-teleological. 
1. Down from the heights that r i l l comes leaping, 
Slipping, spurting, r e c o i l i n g , creeping, 
Stumbling, recovering, while i t winds 
Through a hundred turnings u n t i l i t findB 
I t s way. (Translation by Kiernan, V.G. Poems from Iqbal, p.46] 
Perpetual r o l l s l i f e ' s ocean: a l l 
That i t shows l i f e ephemeral. 
Prom i t , l i k e smoke c u r l s _ 
I n _ f i r e , the_bodyemerges T blent Of earth and moisture, irksome, yet 
In t h e i r leading l i f e delights: l i f e , set 
In the labyrinth, chafing, of the gross 
Elements; undying, transient; close 
Captive, thus i n d i v i s i b l e , 
I n d i v e r s i t y , yet in a l l things s t i l l 
Unparagoned, single. This immense 
Idol-temple, the world of sense, 
This world the three-dimension fence 
Was reared by L i f e . 
(Translation by Kiernan, V.G. quoted by Ahmad, A. 
"Sources of Iqbal's Perfect Man" p. 1U). 
2. Lindsay, A. D. The Philosophy of Bergson. London, 1911, p.28. 
3. Urmson, J . 0. (Editor) Concise Encyclopaedia of Western 
Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 0.3. 
2kl 
Lamarck's explanation of evolution i s t e l e o l o g i c a l 
•j 
postulating i n organisms a s t r i v i n g or w i l l to evolve. 
McDougall b u i l t up a whole system of animal and s o c i a l 
psychology on the basis of t e l e o l o g i c a l causation as 
opposed to mechanistic causation, explaining animal and 
human actions i n terms of inner drives tending towards 
some goal which s a t i s f i e s the innermost being of the 
2 _ 
organism. Iqbal looks upon the creative urge not as 
mere blind w i l l but e s s e n t i a l l y of the nature of thought 
and in t e l l i g e n c e . Purpose holds a fundamental position 
in Iqbal's concept of the evolution of l i f e . 
3(Asrar-e-Khuar p. 16) \ ' 
Purpose i s born of desire or the w i l l - t o - l i v e . For Iqbal 
the driving force of evolution l i e s i n the conative 
1. McKenzie, A.E.E. The Major Achievements of Science. Volume 
I , p. 202. 
2. Siddlql, M. "Iqbal's Concept of Evolution" p. 25. 
3» L i f e i s preserved by purpose, 
Because of the goal i t s caravan-bell t i n k l e s . 
L i f e i s latent in seeking, 
I t s origin i s hidden in desire. 
Desire keeps the s e l f in perpetual uproar 
I t i s a r e s t l e s s wave of the s e l f ' s sea. 
(Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the S e l f pp 23-21+). 
2k2 
tendency of things. This tendency may be c a l l e d love. 
For Iqbal a l l the processes of assimilation, growth and 
reproduction are manifestations of Love. I t i s i n t e r e s -
ting to note that in Les Deux Sources de l a Morale et de 
l a Religion (1932) Bergson too i s prepared to c a l l 'elan 
2 
v i t a l * 'love' which i s either God or from God. I t has 
been observed that Iqbal's theory of Love i s l i t t l e else 
than a theory of i n t r i n s i c teleology operating from within 
the mind and s p i r i t of man in the shape of i n s t i n c t i v e 
d e s i r e s . ^ This type of causation does not dispense with 
the idea of God, but God as conceived by the i n t r i n s i c 
t e l e o l o g i s t i s the cr e a t i v e principle of l i f e , the guide 
who makes every organism conscious of i t s goal, implants 
U 
in i t the desire for the attainment of that goal. 
Man i s not a mere episode or accident i n the huge 
evolutionary process. On the contrary, the whole cosmos 
i s there to serve as the basis and ground for the emergence 
and perfection of the Ego.^ The purpose of evolution i s 
Man in whom L i f e gained freedoms 
1. Siddlql", M. "Iqbal's Concept of Evolution" p. 27-
2. Unnson, J . 0. (Editor) Concise Encyclopaedia of Western 
Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 63. 
3« SiddlqT, M. "Iqbal's Concept of Evolution" p. 33. 
U. I b i d . 
5» Khatoon, J . The Place of God, Man and Universe in the 
Philosophic System of Iqbal, pp 113-lllu 
2k3 
1(Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 97) 
L i f e finds i t s perfection in Man in whom i t becomes s e l f -
consciousness for the f i r s t time since the beginning of 
creation. / / 
\ / t 
2 ( B a l - e - J i b r I l , p. 173) 
The universe has waited for man for a long times 
" ^ B a l - e - J i b r l l , p. 153) 
The universe has been created so that Man's Selfhood may be 
revealed to hims # „ _ 
^ ( B a l - e - J i b r n , p. 17U) 
1. L i f e said, " I writhed i n dust aeon a f t e r aeon, 
Now at l a s t a door opens out of t h i s old prison. 
2. Since eternity i t i s involved in s t r i v i n g , 
I t appeared i n the form of man's clay. 
3. You are the late-discovered meaning of the universe, 
The world of hue and scent have been searching for you. 
i4-« Time's revolutions have one goal, 
To show you what i s your own soul. 
(Translation by Kiernan, V. G. Poems from Iqbal, p. k$) 
2kh 
Evolution; Iqbal's interpretation and attitude. 
As we have seen, l i k e Leibniz Iqbal believed in grades 
of consciousness. Evolution i s the t r a n s i t i o n from near-
consciousness to consciousness and from consciousness to 
self-consciousness. In a very early poem^ Iqbal makes 
l i f e describe the process of evolution thuss 
r> 
Consciousness, in creating anew the universe from moment 
to moment for the sake of i t s sslf-expression, i s continually 
breaking through i t s own resistance and outgrowing i t s e l f , 
and thereby gradually advancing towards i t s goal. For 
Iqbal, evolution i s the passage of l i f e and consciousness 
from the death l i k e stupor of things almost unconscious to 
the f i r s t glimpse of *I-am-ness' i n Man. The tr a n s i t i o n 
from one plane of existence to another takes place not by 
means of t o t a l extinction but by the transformation of the 
lower into the higher self.** 
1. Cited i n BadvT, L. "A forgotten Composition of Iqbal" 
Iqbal Review, January 1965. PP 77-78. 
2. With what great ef f o r t have I made 
Rank by rank, part by part, 
Inorganic into organic, organic into animal, 
Animal into brute, brute into man. 
3. RafluddTn, M. "Iqbal's Idea of the S e l f " p. 7. 
1+. Bar, B. A. A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy, Lahore, 191+1+, p.5*+. 
2h5 
I t i s apparent from Iqbal's poetry that Iqbal regards 
the advent of Man on earth as a great and glorious event, 
not as an event signifying Man's sinfulness and degradation. 
For Iqbal, the F a l l symbolizes a t r a n s i t i o n from "a primi-
ti v e state of i n s t i n c t i v e appetite to the conscious 
possession of a free s e l f , capable of doubt and disobedience 
... man's t r a n s i t i o n from simple consciousness to the f i r s t 
f l a s h of self-consciousness, a kind of wakings from the 
dream of nature with a throb of caus a l i t y in one's own 
being." Adam's emergence marks that stage i n evolution 
when simple and conative tendencies, native impulse, 
i n s t i n c t s and propensities are transformed into s e l f -
2 
conscious behaviour, purposive w i l l and creative f a c u l t i e s . 
Greeting Adam, the Earth sayss 
^ ( B a l - e - J i b r T l , p. 179) 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 85. 
2. Khatoon, J . The Place of God, Man and Universe in the 
Philosophic System of Iqbal. p. 118. 
3. The l i g h t of the world-Illuminating sun i s in your spark, 
A new world l i v e s i n your talents. 
Unacceptable i s a Paradise which i s given, 
Your Paradise l i e s hidden in your blood, 
0 form of clay see the reward of constant endeavour. 
t J 
'or*y ^ r X ^ - J > ^ 4^-
JP **-y -s- U^. 7 y y y 
2k6 
I n ''TaskhXr-e-Fitrat" 1 Iqbal points out that Adam 
though created out of matter r i s e s to eminence and glory. 
He possesses immense powers by means of which he can invade 
both the v i s i b l e and the non-visible. He has much to do 
on earth and i s in no hurry to return to his c e l e s t i a l 
abode. The daring poet says to God: 
2 ( B a l = e w j i b r I l , p.9) 
Such i s Man's evolution that even the heavenly bodies 
are beginning to fear his ascent: 
3 ( B a l - e - J i b r T l p. Ik) " 
Man's evolution has, by no means, come to an end. His 
destiny l i e s f a r beyond t h i s world. He has to conquer 
worlds yet uncreated. 
1. Payam-e-Mashr1q, pp 97-101. 
2. Why did you ask me to leave the Garden of Eden? 
There i s much to do i n the world. Now you must wait for me! 
3. Seeing man's ascent, the stars grow f e a r f u l , 
Lest this f a l l e n s t a r become the f u l l moon. 
/ 
2k7 
1 ( B a l - e - J i b r n p. 171+) 
Concerned as he i s about the question of h i s o r i g i n , 
I q b a l i s more anxious t o know about the f u t u r e of man: 
1. This i s the Se l f ' s f i r s t h a l t i n g - p l a c e , 
Wayfarer, not your home. I t s base 
Cinder-heap was not your flame's source: 
Not you by ea r t h ' s , earth by your f o r c e 
E x i s t s . -Pierce i t s huge rocks, and c l i m b l 
Burst the dark s p e l l s of space and timel 
The S e l f , t r u e l i o n of God, i s given 
E S r ^ a r r y ^ t h ^ w p ^ a l l e a r t h , a l l heaven, 
As y e t : cr e a t i o n ' s heart beats s t i l l . 
A l l things await your onset and 
Your r e s t l e s s urge of b r a i n and hand. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Kiernan, V. G. Poems from I q b a l , p. 1+9) 
2b& 
J „ / y 
1 ( B S l - e - J i b r l l p. 81) " The man of courage does not put a l i m i t t o h i s e v o l u t i o n : 
2 
(Payam-e-Mashriq p.198) 
Opposition an impetus t o e v o l u t i o n * According t o I q b a l , the 
greatest obstacle i n the way of l i f e i s matter or Nature, and 
yet "Nature i s not e v i l , since i t enables the inner powers of 
3 
l i f e t o u n f o l d themselves." L i f e , i n f a c t , as I q b a l conceives 
i t , advances through o p p o s i t i o n . Like Hegel, I q b a l t h i n k s 
t h a t l i f e creates i t s own opp o s i t i o n s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n 
order t o r e a l i z e i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . ^ 
There can be no e v o l u t i o n without c o n f l i c t . "According 
t o my b e l i e f r e a l i t y i s a c o l l e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l i t i e s tending 
to become a harmonious whole through c o n f l i c t which must 
i n e v i t a b l y lead t o mutual adjustment. This c o n f l i c t i s a 
nec e s s i t y i n the i n t e r e s t s of the e v o l u t i o n of higher forms 
5 
o f l i f e and of personal i m m o r t a l i t y . " 1. Why should I ask of wise men what my o r i g i n i s ? I am anxious t o f i n d out what my d e s t i n y i s . 
2. I n the wilderness of my madness G a b r i e l i s a poor prey, 
0 courage of manhood cast your noose and capture God. 
3. I q b a l quoted by Nicholson, R. A. i n The I n t r o d u c t i o n t o The 
Secrets of the S e l f , p. x i x . 
k* Asrar-e-Khudi. p.12. 
5. Iqb a l ' s l e t t e r t o R.A. Nicholson. "Asrar-e-Khudi - The 
Secrets of the S e l f " The Quest, London, J u l y t o October, 
1920. Volume X I I p. i+87. 
2k9 
Theory of Evolution; application to p o l i t i c s and eth i c s . 
Like Nietzsche, Iqbal applies the theory of evolution both 
to p o l i t i c s and ethics though, i n Iqbal's own words, his 
inte r e s t i n c o n f l i c t - which i s the agent of evolution -
i s "mainly e t h i c a l and not p o l i t i c a l . " 2 Iqbal points out 
that "modern physical science has taught us that the atom 
of material energy has achieved i t s present form through 
many thousands of years of evolution yet i t i s unstable and 
can be made to disappear. The same i s the case with the 
atom of mind - energy, i . e . the human person. I t has 
achieved i t s present form through aeons of incessant effort 
and c o n f l i c t ; yet in spite of a l l t h i s i t s i n s t a b i l i t y i s 
c l e a r from the various phenomena of mental pathology. I f 
i t i s to continue intact i t cannot ignore the lessons learnt 
from i t s past career, and w i l l require the same (or s i m i l a r ) 
forces to maintain i t s s t a b i l i t y which i t has availed i t s e l f 
of before."3 A s Iqbal puts i n the language of poetry: 
(Payam-e-Mashrlq, p.5) 
1. Kashyap^ S. " S i r Mohammad Iqbal and P r i e d r i c h Nietzsche." 
The Islamic Quarterly. London, 1955, Volume 2, No.2, p.191. 
2. Iqbal's l e t t e r to R.A. Nicholson "Asrar-e-Khudl - The 
Secrets of the S e l f " p. U88. 
3. I b i d . 
/+. L i f e i s exertion, i t i s not a right, 
I t i s meant only for acquiring knowledge of Self and the 
Universe. 
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REALITY OF THE SELF. 
Iqbal's philosophy i s the philosophy of the S e l f . 
"The S e l f i s at once the s t a r t i n g , and the basic point of 
his thought. I t i s the S e l f which affords him a high road 
to metaphysics, because i t i s the int u i t i o n of the S e l f which 
makes metaphysics possible for him." According to Iqbal, 
the S e l f i s a r e a l i t y . As Descartes's h i s t o r i c a l utterance 
"Oogito ergo sum" i . e . " I think, therefore I am" stated, a l l 
thinking presupposes a subject who thinks. Iqbal puts i t 
thus: . . • 
(Payam-e-Mashriq p a 38) 
Iqbal refers to F. H. Bradley who he considers of a l l 
modern thinkers to furnish "the best evidence for the 
_ "5 
- impossibility of denying r e a l i t y to the ego." I n his f i r s t 
book E t h i c a l Studies, Bradley assumes the r e a l i t y of the 
s e l f ; i n his Pri n c i p l e s of Logic he takes i t only as a 
working hypothesis; in his greatest work Appearance and 
1. Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of Iqbal, p. 37. 
2. Whether I am, or not, I hold my peace -
To say " I am" were s e l f - i d o l a t r y : 
Who i s the singer, then, and whose the song 
That c r i e s " I am" within the heart of me? 
(Translation by Arberry, A.J. The Tulip of S i n a i , p. 11) 
3« The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 97-98. 
(x7A 
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R e a l i t y he subjects the concept of the s e l f to a searching 
examination. According to Bradley, quality and r e l a t i o n , 
substance and cause, space and time, s e l f and object, are 
a l l of them, i f taken as r e a l , beset by insoluble contra-
dictions and must therefore be dismissed as "appearance1.! 
The absolute r e a l i t y must have a nature which transcends 
a l l these categories. Relations are grounded i n the 
nature of thei r terms, and no term can be understood apart 
from i t s relations. 5* Whatever may be our view of the S e l f 
i t can only be examined by the canons of thought, which, i n 
i t s nature, i s r e l a t i o n a l , and a l l r e l a t i o n s involve contra-
dictions yet though his "ruthless logic"-' has shown the 
Sel f to be "a mass of confusion,"*4" yet, as Iqbal points out, 
"Bradley has to admit that the Self must be 'in some sense 
r e a l , ' 'in some sense an indisputable f a c t i " 5 
For I q b a l , there i s no doubt whatever about the r e a l i t y 
of the S e l f . I n f a c t , he sayss 
•* -> y 
(Javld Nama, p. 239) 
1« The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, ~j)."98V. 
2. Urmson, J.0. (E d i t o r ) The Concise Enc.vclopaedia"of Western 
Philosophy and Philosophers, pp 72-73. 
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 98. 
k» Bradley, F. H. Appearance and R e a l i t y . London, 1908, p. 316. 
5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 98. 
6. He who denies God i s an i n f i d e l for the mulla, 
He who denies the Se l f i s a greater i n f i d e l to me. 
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He points out that "our f e e l i n g of egohood i s ultimate and 
i s powerful enough to extract from Professor Bradley the 
reluctant admission of i t s r e a l i t y . " ^ The S e l f i s undoub-
tedly r e a l , though " i t s r e a l i t y i s too profound to be 
i n t e l l e c t u a l i s e d . " In "Gulslian-e-Raz-e-Jadrd," Iqbal 
puts forward his ideas on the r e a l i t y of the S e l f : 
<> ^ Jo & ^ <-> ^ J4r s ^ — ^ o S * b A J 
3, (Zabur-e-'A^am, p. 237) 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 98. 
2. I b i d . 
3« I f you say that the " I " 
I s a l l pure fantasy, 
Nothing but an i l l u s o r y 
Thing seen by the mind's eye,_ -
Then t e l l me whoseT experience 
I s t h i s delusion of the inner sense? 
Who i s the subject of t h i s fantasy? 
Look inward at yourself: are you not he? 
Apparent though the world i s , yet 
You have to prove that i t e x i s t s ; 
But doing so r e s i s t s 
A Gabriel's ethereal wit. 
The S e l f , i s on the other hand, 
Concealed from view, and yet 
I t i s self-evident, 
Beyond a l l argument. 
Reflect a l i t t l e on t h i s and 
Endeavour to find out 
The meaning of t h i s mystery. 
The S e l f i s not I l l u s i o n but R e a l i t y . 
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, 
p. 18). 
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ASPECTS OF THE SELF. 
E f f i c i e n t and Appreciative Self. 
We have already referred to the d i s t i n c t i o n Iqbal 
draws between the aspects of the Self. The Self has, 
Iqbal says, "two sides which may be described as apprecia-
t i v e and e f f i c i e n t . " The e f f i c i e n t s e l f i s what assoeia-
t i o n i s t psychology concerns i t s e l f w i t h - "the p r a c t i c a l 
s e l f of d a i l y l i f e in i t s dealing with the external order 
of things which determine our passing states of conscious-
ness and stamp on these states t h e i r own s p a t i a l feature 
2 
of mutual i s o l a t i o n . " Thus the e f f i c i e n t s e l f i s that 
which is concerned with, and i s i t s e l f p a r t i a l l y formed by, 
3 
the physical world.-' I t apprehends the succession of 
impressions, l i v i n g as i t were, "outside i t s e l f . . . and, 
while r e t a i n i n g i t s unity as t o t a l i t y , ( i t ) discloses 
i t s e l f as nothing more than a series of s p e c i f i c and 
consequently numerable states."^ Iqbal likens the 
e f f i c i e n t s e l f to Kant's transcendental u n i t y of apper-
5 
ception^ which "according to the determinations of our 
state, i s , with a l l our i n t e r n a l perceptions, empirical 
only." 6 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 1+7. 
2. I b i d . 
3. Harre, R. " I q b a l : A Reformer of Islamic Philosophy" p. 335-
!+• The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 1|7« 5» Harre, R. "I q b a l : A Reformer of Islamic Philosophy" p. 335. 6. Kant, I . C ritique of Pure Reason (translated by MSller, P.M.) 
p. 88. 
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The Self has also an appreciative aspect which l i v e s 
not i n ©patialised time but i n pure duration. Iqbal i s 
supported i n his viewpoint that consciousness has a deeper 
aspect, by a notable s c i e n t i s t : "Feelings, purpose, values, 
make up our consciousness as much as sense-impressions. 
We follow up the sense-perceptions and f i n d that they lead 
i n t o an external world discussed by science; we follow up 
the other elements of our being and f i n d that they lead -
not i n t o the world of space and time, but surely somewhereo. 
consciousness as a whole i s greater than those quasi-
metrical aspects of i t which are abstracted to compose the 
physical brain." 
According to Iqbal the tragedy of the modern man i s 
that he has become alienated from his deeper s e l f . He i s 
so caught up i n the material world that "his hidden sources 
of s p i r i t u a l energy" have become impoverished. 2 To such 
a man Iqbal sayss 
& iy>y»): crro*^) 
3 ( B a l - e - J i b r T l p. 2+8) 
1. Eddington, A.S. The Nature of the Physical World. Cambridge, 
1929, p. 323. 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 188-189. 3. Look i n , and i n yourself, l i f e ' s secret see, 
To your own s e l f be true, i f not to me. 
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One becomes aware of the appreciative s e l f "only i n 
the moments of profound meditation, when the e f f i c i e n t 
s e l f i s i n abeyance," and sinking i n t o our deeper s e l f we 
A 
"reach the inner centre of experience." The uni t y of 
the appreciative ego i s such that i n i t each experience 
permeates the whole. The m u l t i p l i c i t y of i t s elements i s , 
unlike that of the e f f i c i e n t s e l f wholly q u a l i t a t i v e . 
"There i s change and movement, but t h i s change and movement 
are i n d i v i s i b l e ; t h e i r elements inter-penetrate and are 
p 
wholly non-serial i n character." The movement of the 
appreciative ego i s not a movement i n space and time since 
3 
the time of the appreciative ego i s a single *now.' 
The appreciative s e l f i s creative. I t does not f i n d 
things, i t makes them. "Not only do we make things, but 
i n p o l i t i c a l and et h i c a l action among things, Iqbal believes 
that we also make our ends. He regards t h i s as a conse-
quence of the two kinds of experience, the inner and the 
outer. The r e s u l t of our inner experience i s the grasping 
of a continual succession of goals and purposes which give 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp \\£>-k9» 
2. I b i d , p. "W. 
3« Ahmad, M. M. "Iqbal's Appreciative Self" Iqbal Review, 
October, 1961, p. 17. 
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A 
significance to everything that happens."' Thus, f o r 
I q b a l , the l i f e of the Self consists i n i t s movement from 
appreciation to e f f i c i e n c y , from i n t u i t i o n t o i n t e l l e c t , 
from pure duration to s e r i a l time which i s born of t h i s 
movement.2 
Body and Soul* For Descartes, there i s one absolute 
substance, God, and two r e l a t i v e substances, mind and body, 
ex i s t i n g independently of each other but both depending 
on God.^ Iqbal rejects the Cartesian b i f u r c a t i o n between 
mind and matter which cannot account f o r the i n t e r a c t i o n of 
the s p i r i t u a l w i t h material being.*4- I f body and mind are 
fundamentally d i f f e r e n t , as Descartes assumed, then "the 
changes of both run on exactly p a r a l l e l l i n e s , owing to 
some kind of pre-established harmony, as Leibniz thought. 
This reduces the soul to a merely passive spectator of the 
happenings of the body."^ Thus Iqbal r e j e c t s parallelism. 
I f the mind and body are regarded as a f f e c t i n g each 
other, "then we cannot f i n d any observable facts to show 
1. Harre, R. " I q b a l : A Reformer of Islamic Philosophy" 
PP 335-356. 
2 . The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 76. 
3 . T h i l l y , P. A History of Philosophy, pp 279-280. 
k» Whittaker, E. Space and S p i r i t , p. 72. 
5« The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 105* 
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how and where exactly t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n takes place, and 
which of the two takes the i n i t i a t i v e . The soul i s an 
organ of the body which exploits i t f o r physiological 
purposes, or the body is an instrument of the soul, are 
A 
equally true propositions on the theory of i n t e r a c t i o n . " 
Iqbal refers to Lange's theory of emotion "which tends to 
show that the body takes the i n i t i a t i v e i n the act of 
int e r a c t i o n . There are, however, facts to contradict t h i s 
theory ... even i f the body takes the i n i t i a t i v e , the mind 
does enter as a consenting factor at a d e f i n i t e stage i n the 
development of emotion, and t h i s i s equally true of the 
p 
external s t i m u l i which are constantly working on the mind." 
Thus in t e r a c t i o n i s also unsatisfactory. Iqbal does not 
believe i n the d u a l i t y of body and s p i r i t . They are one 
as becomes v i s i b l e i n action. "When I take up a book from 
my table, my act i s single and i n d i v i s i b l e . I t i s impossible 
to draw a l i n e of cleavage between the share of the body and 
that of the mind i n t h i s act." 3 According to Iqb a l , "the 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 105. 
2 . I b i d . 
3. Ibid". 
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body i s not a thing situated i n an absolute void; i t i s a 
system of events or acts. The system of experiences we 
c a l l soul or ego i s also a system of acts. This does not 
obli t e r a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n of soul and body; i t only brings 
them closer together. The characteristic of the ego i s 
spontaneity; the acts composing the body repeat themselves. 
The body i s accumulated action or habit of the soul; and as 
such undetachable from i t . I t i s a permanent element of 
consciousness which, i n view of t h i s permanent element, 
1 
appears from the outside as something stable." 
For Iqbal then, body and mind are not two a n t i t h e t i c a l 
e n t i t i e s . His viewpoint i s supported by many Vedantic 
systems.-* We have seen that Iqbal regards matter not as 
something dead but as a sub-ego. Hence matter^ i s i t s e l f ^ 
resolved to s p i r i t and w i l l . " * "When seen i n t h i s l i g h t , 
i t becomes f u l l y evident that the determining force of the 
body i s w i l l and not matter. W i l l , or s p i r i t , assumes the 
form of body i n order to f u l f i l i t s purpose i n the present 
1» The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 105. 
2. Raju, P. T. "The Idealism of Si r Mohammad Iq b a l " p. 108. 
3« KHatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
in the Philosophic System of God, p. 1214-1 
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environment."^ As is clear from Iqbal's views on evolution, 
i t i s the creative w i l l which evolves the various physical 
organs to aid i t i n i t s unceasing struggle f o r the r e a l i s a t i o n 
of i t s evergrowing ideals. 
The body and soul are not two independent substances. 
The body i s "the a t t r i b u t e of the same r e a l i t y whose mani-
f e s t a t i o n i s the soul." I n JavTd Nama Iqbal says: 
u 
^(javTd Naraa, p. 20) 
1. KHfitoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of Iqbal, p. 12U. 
2. Asrar-e-Khudr, pp 16-17. 
3* You who say that the soul i s the soul's vehicle, 
consider the soul's secret; tangle not with the body. 
I t i s not a vehicle; i t is a state of the soul; 
to c a l l i t i t s vehicle i s a confusion of terms. 
What is the soul? Rapture, joy, burning and anguish, 
delight i n mastering the revolving sphere. 
What i s the body? Habit of colour and scent, 
habit of dwelling i n the world's dimensions. 
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. JavTd Nama, p. 33) 
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Iqbal regards the b i f u r c a t i o n of the essential unity 
of Man's l i f e i n t o the physical and the s p i r i t u a l spheres 
of being s i n f u l : , . 
1(Zabur-e-*Ajam, p. 216) 
The soul i s "the pure act, the body i s only the act become 
v i s i b l e and hence measurable." 2 In Iqbal's thought there 
is great emphasis placed on the idea that "Man i s not the 
c i t i z e n of a profane world to be renounced i n the in t e r e s t s 
of a world of s p i r i t situated elsewhere. To Islam matter 
is s p i r i t r e a l i s i n g i t s e l f i n space and time."^ I t is the, 
vit>l&fcwfrdF- the essential u n i t y of human l i f e that has ted 
to the cleavage between the temporal and the s p i r i t u a l l i f e 
of Man i n the West: 
\zabur-e-*Ajam, pp 217) 
1. To t a l k of body and soul as two separate e n t i t i e s i s wrong, 
To see them as two is s i n f u l . 
(Translation by par, B.A. Iqbal's Gulshan-i Raz-i Jadld and 
Bandagf Namah, p. 24) 
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 71. 
3« Thoughts and Reflections of I q b a l , p. 163. 
1+. The West thinks Soul and Body to be separate; 
Hence the dichotomy between Religion and the State. 
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of 
Mystery, p. 7)« 
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The r e l a t i o n between the body and soul i s the same as the 
re l a t i o n between the Universe and God, The Universe i s 
the obRectification of God, and the body i s the obRectifi-
cation of the soul. The body i s necessary f o r the expression 
1 
and manifestation of the soul. Both have t h e i r l i f e and 
significance when they are related to each other. 
2(Zabur-e-4ARam, p. 117) 
However, f o r I q b a l , the soul i s more fundamental than the 
body since the l a t t e r owes i t s existence to the former 
which has i t s source i n God.^ (Sura 15:29, 3 2 : 9 , 38:72) 
THE NATURE OF THE SELF. 
The Self as a soul-substance: Iqbal refers to the school of 
thought represented by GazzalT who considers the ego to be 
a simple, i n d i v i s i b l e and immutable soul-substance, e n t i r e l y 
d i f f e r e n t Trom the" group of our mental states and unaffected 
by the passage of time. Our conscious experience i s a unity 
because our mental states are related as so many qua l i t i e s 
to t h i s simple substance which persists unchanged during 
the f l u x of i t s qualities.** Iqbal does not regard the soul 
1 . Khatoon. J. The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of Iqbal, pp 13U-135. 
2 . Body l i v e s and s p i r i t l i v e s 
By the l i f e t h e i r union gives. 
(Translation by Arberry, G. J. Persian Psalms, p. 75) 
3 . Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of Iqb a l , p. 135. 
U. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 100. 
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as a substratum i n which, mental states inhere and agrees 
with Kant's objections to the conception of soul as a 
•J 
metaphysical e n t i t y . According to Kant, the ' I t h i n k ' 
which accompanies every thought is a purely formal condition 
of thought, and the t r a n s i t i o n from a purely formal condi-
t i o n of thought to ontological substance i s l o g i c a l l y 
2 
unwarranted. Furthermore, the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y of a 
substance does not prove i t s i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y , since, as 
Kant points out, the i n d i v i s i b l e substance may disappear 
into nothingness l i k e an intensive quality.- 7 
This theory f a i l s to s a t i s f y both from-a metaphysical 
and a psychological point of view.*4, Iqbal points out that 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to regard the elements of our conscious 
experience as qual i t i e s of a soul-substance i n the sense i n 
which, f o r example, the weight of a body i s a q u a l i t y of the 
body."* "Observation reveals experience to be p a r t i c u l a r 
acts of reference, and as such they possess a specific being 
of t h e i r own. They constitute, as Laird acutely remarks, 
c 
'a new world' and not merely new features i n an old world." 
Moreover, even i f we regard experiences as q u a l i t i e s , we 
cannot know how they inhere in the soul-substance. "Thus 
1. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe i n the 
Philosophic System of Iqbal, p. 125. 
2 . Kant, I . Critique of Pure Reason, pp 295-296. 3« The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 101. k. I b i d : 
5. I b i d . 
6. I b i d . 
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we see that dmr eansxiouB experience can give us no clue to 
the ego regarded as soul-substance, f o r by hypothesis the 
soul-substance does not reveal i t s e l f i n experience." 
Iqbal also points out that i n view of the improbability of 
the d i f f e r e n t soul-substances c o n t r o l l i n g the same body at 
d i f f e r e n t times, the theory can o f f e r no adequate explana-
t i o n of psychological aberrations such as the schizophrenic 
2 
personality. 
The Self as a stream of consciousness. According to William 
James, the essence of the mental l i f e i s experienced as a 
"flow" i n which each succeeding moment grasps back upon and 
"owns" i t s predecessor.^ According to James, there i s "a 
kind of gregarious p r i n c i p l e working i n our experiences which 
have, as i t were, 'hooks' on them, and thereby catch up one 
another i n the flow of mental l i f e . The ego consists of the 
feelings of personal l i f e , and i s , as such, part of the 
system of thought. Every pulse of thought, present or 
perishing i s an i n d i v i s i b l e u n i t y which knows and r e c o l l e c t s . 
The appropriation of the present pulse of thought, and that 
of the present by i t s successor, is the ego."** Iqbal 
admits that James's description of mental l i f e i s "extremely 
ingenious" but i t is not true to consciousness as we f i n d i t 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p.101. 
2. i b i d : 
3. Urmson, J. 0. (Editor) The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western 
Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 195. 
U» The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 102. 
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i n ourselves, as "consciousness is something single, pre-
supposed i n a l l mental l i f e , and not b i t s of consciousness 
• i 
mutually reporting to one another." The fact i s that 
f o r a l l his demands that Hume's "bricks" of experience are 
not the entire p i c t u r e , that the "mortar" which holds the 
bricks together i s equally a part of experience. William 
James does accept Hume's bricks and must therefore deny 
that the s e l f exists over and apart from the mental states 
which constitute experience. 2 Iqbal rejects his view-point 
which " e n t i r e l y ignores the r e l a t i v e l y permanent element i n 
experience" and cannot explain how one passing thought which 
i s irrevocably l o s t can be known and appreciated by the 
present thought i f there i s no con t i n u i t y of being between 
the passing thoughts.^ Iqbal does not suggest that the 
ego i s something outside the mutually penetrating m u l t i p l i -
c i t y called experience but wishes to stress the u n i t y and 
con t i n u i t y of the ego which i s appreciated i n the act of 
perceiving,~~ judging and'willing.^ 
The Characteristics of the Self. 
(a) The ego i s unique. According to Iq b a l , the ego reveals 
i t s e l f as a uni t y of what we c a l l mental states. Mental 
states do not exist i n mutual i s o l a t i o n but exist as phases 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 102. 
2. I b i d . 
3. Urmson, J. 0. (Editor) The Concise Engyclopaedia of Western 
Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 196. 
k» The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 102. 
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of a complex whole, ca l l e d mind. The u n i t y which these 
i n t e r - r e l a t e d states possess is organic u n i t y . Fundamen-
t a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the un i t y of the parts of a material 
thing. Mental u n i t y i s absolutely unique. 
(b) The ego i s not space-bound* Iqbal points out that 
the ego i s not space-bound i n the sense i n which the body 
is space-bound. HWe cannot say that one of my b e l i e f s i s 
situated on the r i g h t or l e f t of my other b e l i e f . Nor i s 
i t possible t o say that my appreciation of the beauty of 
the Taj varies with my distance from Agra. My thought of 
space i s not s p a t i a l l y related to space. Indeed the ego 
can think of more than one space-order. The space of 
waking consciousness and dream-space have no mutual r e l a t i o n . " 
(c) The ego alone possesses time-duration. Iqbal states that 
mental and physical events are both i n time but the time-
span of the ego i s fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from the time-
span of the physical event. "The duration of the physical 
event i s stretched out i n space as a present f a c t , the ego's 
duration i s concentrated w i t h i n i t and linked with i t s present 
and future i n a unique manner. The formation of a physical 
event discloses certain present marks which show that i t has 
passed through a time-duration, but these marks are merely 
emblematic of i t s time-duration, not time-duration i t s e l f . 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 98-99* 
2 . I b i d , p. 99. 
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True time-duration belongs to the ego alone." 
(d) The ego possesses that privacy which reveals i t s 
uniqueness. Iqbal points out that private nature of inner 
experience. " I n order to reach a certain conclusion a l l the 
premises of a syllogism must be believed i n by one and the 
same mind... Again, my desire f o r a certain thing i s essen-
t i a l l y mine... My pleasures, pains and desires are exclu-
sively mine, forming a part and parcel of my ego alone. My 
feelings, hates and loves, judgments and resolutions are 
exclusively mine... My recognition of a place or person 
means reference to my past experience, and not the past 
2 
experience of another ego." 
(3 ) The ego i s spontaneous. The ego i s a system of acts 
which possesses spontaneity as distinguished from the body 
which i s "accumulated action."^ 
( f ) The ego i s d i r e c t i v e . Iqbal points out that according 
to the Q6r ,an, the essential nature of the soul i s d i r e c t i v e , 
as i t proceeds fronTthe d i r e c t i v e energy of God (Sura 1 7 : 8 7 ) « ^ 
He draws att e n t i o n to the d i s t i n c t i o n made by the Qor'an 
between 'Khalq' and *Amr.' ""Khalq* i s creation; 'Amr* i s 
direction."-* The Qor'an uses 'Khalq* to indicate the 
r e l a t i o n of the Universe of matter to God, and 'Amr' to 
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 99-100. 
2 . I b i d , pp 99-100. 
3 . I b i d , p. 100. 
U. I b i d , p. 103. 
5. I b i d . 
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indicate the r e l a t i o n of the human s e l f t o the Divine Self. 
"'Arar'," says Iqbal " i s not related to God i n the same way 
as 'Khalq' i s . The 4Amr» is d i s t i n c t but not isolated 
from God."2 He, however, admits that we cannot " i n t e l l e c -
t u a l l y apprehend this r e l a t i o n s h i p any more than Rumi" whose 
couplet he quotes:^ w „ 
c r U fr? «L 
I t has been observed that "the world of 'amr' ... i s 
the world of significance, of meaning; and represents from 
man's point of view the inward movement of God's creative 
power. What issues f o r t h as a r e s u l t of God's command *Be' 
i s both 'creation' and 'significance'."^ T n e s e l f , then, 
belonging to the world of 'amr', consists of, and i s known 
through, i t s d i r e c t i v e a t t i t u d e . Iqbal says, "you cannot 
perceive me l i k e a thing i n space, or a set of experiences 
i n temporal order; you must i n t e r p r e t , understand and 
appreciate me i n my judgments, i n my w i l l - a t t i t u d e s , aims 
and aspirations." 
1« Thoughts apd R e f l e c t i o n ^ ojf_j;,g£j[l, P« H 3 -
2 . I b i d . 
3« I b i d . 
J+. A contact beyond i n t u i t i o n and beyond imagination 
Exists between the God of man and the soul of man. 
5. Brohr, A. K. "Iqbal as a Philosopher-Poet" Iqbal Review A p r i l , 1961, p. 5. 
6. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 103. 
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FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND MAN'S DESTINY. 
Arguments from Psychology* According to Iqbal, the Self 
possesses freedom of the w i l l and i s not a r i g i d l y determined 
r e a l i t y . Freedom i s not a mere hypothesis. As the 
psychological argument i n favour of the freedom of the w i l l 
states, we i n t u i t i v e l y perceive that we are free to choose 
•j 
and act. Iqbal has pointed out that the operation of 
thought i s essentially not mechanical. The thinking s e l f 
i s f r e e . This is the basic assumption of a l l knowledge. 
One thought may lead t o , and a f f e c t , another thought, but 
the r e l a t i o n between these two i s not that of mechanical 
necessity. Furthermore, i n every act of judgment, there 
2 
i s a judging s e l f , and this s e l f i s f e l t t o be f r e e . 
Freedom is not a postulate which we assume i n order to make 
morality possible, as Kant imagined, but a fa c t of the human 
consciousness i t s e l f , as our i n t u i t i v e experience reveals.^ 
Iqbal's viewpoint i s reminiscent of Nietzsche who said, "He 
who feels that his w i l l i s not free i s insane, lie who denies 
i t i s f o o l i s h . " 1 * 
The associationists, t o whom Iqbal r e f e r s , regard the 
human act of deliberation as "a c o n f l i c t of motives which are 
conceived, not as the ego's own present or inherited 
1 . Haq, I . "Freedom of W i l l and Determinism" Al-HLkmat, Lahore, 
1967. P. 83. ' 
2 . Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of I q b a l , pp 14.8-14.9. 
3. I b i d , p. 50. 
ko Nietzsche, F. quoted i n The Encyclopaedia of Religious 
Quotations (Edited by Mead, F.S.; London, 1965, P» 15k» 
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tendencies of a c t i o n or i n a c t i o n , but as so many e x t e r n a l 
f o r c e s f i g h t i n g one another, g l a d i a t o r - l i k e , on the arena 
of the mind... The f i n a l c hoice i s ... determined by the 
s t r o n g e s t f o r c e . " According to I q b a l , the controversy 
between the advocates of Mechanism and Freedom a r i s e s from 
a wrong view of i n t e l l i g e n t a c t i o n , namely, that ego-
a c t i v i t y i s a s u c c e s s i o n of thoughts and i d e a s , u l t i m a t e l y 
p 
r e s o l v a b l e to u n i t s of s e n s a t i o n s . As the German 
Confi g u r a t i o n Psychology points out, "a c a r e f u l study of 
i n t e l l i g e n t behaviour d i s c l o s e s the f a c t of ' i n s i g h t * over 
and above the mere su c c e s s i o n of s e n s a t i o n s . T h i s ' i n s i g h t 
i s the ego's a p p r e c i a t i o n of temporal, s p a t i a l , and c a u s a l 
r e l a t i o n of t h i n g s - the c h o i c e , that i s to say, of data, 
i n a complex whole, i n view of the goal or purpose which 
the ego has s e t before i t s e l f f o r the time being."^ Thus 
by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s based on C o n f i g u r a t i o n Psychology, I q b a l 
r e f u t e s the arguments of those who c l a i m that the d e t e r -
minism of the ego and that of Nature are not mutually 
e x c l u s i v e , and that the s c i e n t i f i c method i s e q u a l l y 
a p p l i c a b l e to human action.** 
As a s c i e n t i s t p o i nts out, the p r i n c i p l e of determi-
nism, of s t r i c t c a u s a l i t y , has been discarded even by 
5 
p h y s i c s . I n 1927> Heisenberg d i s c o v e r e d the P r i n c i p l e 
j.The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 107« 
2 . I b i d . 
3. I b i d . 
iugiddrql, R. " I q b a l and Free W i l l " The P a k i s t a n Q u a r t e r l y . 
. .August, ±S5h, Volume IV No.3, pp 20-21. 
5 . I b i d . p. 22. 
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of Indeterminacy i n Quantum Mechanics which demolished 
Newton's mechanical determinism. Heisenberg showed t h a t 
the behaviour of even a s i n g l e atomic p a r t i c l e i s (evob 
determined; there are an i n f i n i t e number of p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of which any one might happen. Thus I q b a l ' s viewpoint 
i s supported, r a t h e r than c o n t r a d i c t e d by s c i e n c e , even 
though he thought that the dynamic movement of l i f e could 
not be f u l l y understood by means of the concepts and 
2 
c a t e g o r i e s of s c i e n c e . 
P e r s o n a l c a u s a l i t y known through purposive a c t i o n : 
I t i s man's fundamental experience of purposive 
a c t i o n s , of s t r i v i n g towards and reaching ends which 
convinces I q b a l of the i n d i v i d u a l ego's e f f i c i e n c y as a 
3 
personal cause. The ego stands outside the c a u s a l c h a i n 
i n which the advocates of determinism t r y to f i n d a place 
f o r i t . I q b a l points out that the c a u s a l chain " i s i t s e l f 
an a r t i f i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of the ego f o r i t s purposes."* 4 -
The ego i n order to deal with the m a t e r i a l world, reduces 
the r i c h m u l t i p l i c i t y of l i f e to some kind of a system. 
"The view of environment as a system of cause and e f f e c t 
i s thus an indispensable instrument of the ego, and not a 
f i n a l e x pression of the nature of R e a l i t y . Indeed i n 
1. Siddrql", R. " I q b a l and Free W i l l " , The P a k i s t a n Q u a r t e r l y , 
August 195U, volume IV, No.3, P« 22. 
2. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 50. 
3» Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man", p. 207. 
k» The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 108. 
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i n t e r p r e t i n g Nature i n t h i s way the ego understands and 
masters i t s environment, and thereby a c q u i r e s and a m p l i f i e s 
•1 
i t s freedom." 
Can both God and Man be f r e e ? 
The element of guidance and d i r e c t i v e c o n t r o l i n the 
a c t i v i t y of the ego shows that the ego i s a f r e e p e r s o n a l 
c a u s a l i t y a k i n to the Ultimate Ego. God permitted, even 
purposed, the emergence of a f i n i t e ego, capable of p r i v a t e 
i n i t i a t i v e and i n so doing He l i m i t e d the freedom of His 
2 
own f r e e w i l l . The question a r i s e s : how can God and man 
both be f r e e ? I q b a l answers as f o l l o w s : "The t r u t h i s 
that the whole t h e o l o g i c a l controversy r e l a t i n g t o p r e -
d e s t i n a t i o n i s due to pure s p e c u l a t i o n w i t h no eye on the 
spontaneity of l i f e , which i s a f a c t of a c t u a l experience. 
No doubt the emergence of egos endowed with the power of 
spontaneous and hence unforeseeable a c t i o n i s , i n a sense, 
a l i m i t a t i o n of the freedom of the a l l - i n c l u s i v e Ego. But 
t h i s _ l i m i t a t i o n i s -not externally""imposed." _ I t i s born out 
of God's c r e a t i v e freedom, whereby he has chosen f i n i t e egos 
to be p a r t i c i p a n t s of h i s l i f e , power and freedom."^ 
C r e a t i o n i m p l i e s freedom: 
The a p p r e c i a t i v e s e l f l i v e s i n pure duration which 
means t h a t i t i s not bound by the f e t t e r s of s e r i a l time 
1. The Re c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 108. 
2. Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man", p. 207-
3» The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, pp 79-80. 
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but c r e a t e s i t from moment to moment and i s a b s o l u t e l y 
f r e e and o r i g i n a l i n c r e a t i o n . I q b a l points out th a t 
the very conception of l i f e as a c r e a t i v e movement i n v o l v e s 
the i d e a of freedom. " I n f a c t a l l c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y i s 
f r e e a c t i v i t y . C r e a t i o n i s opposed to r e p e t i t i o n which 
2 
i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of mechanical a c t i o n . " P r o f e s s o r 
Bausani observes that "Man i s a Creat o r " could be given as 
3 
the essence of I q b a l ' s philosophy of r e l i g i o n . The 
Qor'an too, says I q b a l , admits the p o s s i b i l i t y of c r e a t o r s 
other than God when i t d e s c r i b e s God as the best of 
c r e a t o r s (Sura 23:114.).** 
The Qor'an- and freedom of the wd.ll. 
I q b a l i s c o n s t a n t l y t u r n i n g to the Qor'an to j u s t i f y 
h i s b e l i e f i n human freedom. As H. B. Smith w r i t e s , 
"There are a u t h o r i t a t i v e passages i n the QiSr'ah to j u s t i f y 
both p o s i t i o n s ( i . e . freedom and p r e d e s t i n a t i o n ) . Many 
passages s t a t e e x p l i c i t l y or imply a do c t r i n e of complete 
p r e d e s t i n a t i o n . A survey of the divergent passages w i l l 
r e v e a l the f a c t that wherever a t t e n t i o n i s c e n t r e d on God, 
s t r e s s i s l a i d on His absolute and ultimate sovereignty. 
I t i s i n t h i s connection that men's a c t i o n s , good and e v i l 
a l i k e , are thought of as d i r e c t l y caused by the Divine W i l l , 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a i f l , p. 50. 
2. I b i d . 
3. Bansani, A. " I q b a l ' s Philosophy of R e l i g i o n , and the West." 
P. 5h» 
k» I q b a l ' s quoted by Nicholson, R.A. I n t r o d u c t i o n to The 
S e c r e t s of the S e l f , p. X V I I I . 
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s i n c e nothing happens u n l e s s God w i l l s i t or permits i t . . . 
when the focus of a t t e n t i o n i s turned on man, however, i t 
i s evident t h a t man i s endowed by God with freedom and 
moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Each man i s a f r e e moral u n i t , held 
r e s p o n s i b l e by God f o r h i s thoughts, d e c i s i o n s , and a c t i o n s . " 
I q b a l points out that I s l a m recognises man to be a 
centre of l a t e n t power i n that he i s capable of responding 
to or of r e j e c t i n g God's guidance. "The t r u t h i s from your 
Lord; wherefore l e t him who w i l l , b e l i e v e , and l e t him who 
w i l l , be i n c r e d u l o u s . " (Sura 18:28). Man i s f r e e to 
choose between good and e v i l , and as he chooses so w i l l he 
be r e q u i t e d . " I f ye do w e l l , yet w i l l ye do w e l l to your 
own s o u l s ; and i f ye do e v i l , ye w i l l do i t unto the same" 
(Sura 17:7). I q b a l would have agreed with Dante when he 
s a i d : "The g r e a t e s t g i f t which God i n His bounty bestowed 
i n c r e a t i n g , and the most conformed to His own goodness, 
and t h a t which He p r i z e s the most, was the freedom of the 
w-i-11* with which the c r e a t u r e s that have i n t e l l i g e n c e , they 
a l l and they alone, were and are endowed."** 
The power to act f r e e l y i s not uniform. I q b a l points 
out t h a t I s l a m takes cognisance of t h i s important f a c t of 
human psychology - the r i s e and f a l l of the power to e x e r c i s e 
1. Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" pp 203-20k. 
2. S a l e , G. ( t r a n s l a t i o n of) The Koran, p. 220. 
3. I b i d . p. 207. 
i+. Dante, A. quoted i n The Encyclopaedia of R e l i g i o u s 
Quotations ( E d i t e d by Mead, P.S.) London, 1965, p. 151» 
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the freedom of the w i l l , and that i t " i s anxious to r e t a i n 
the power to a c t f r e e l y as a constant and undiminished 
f a c t o r i n the l i f e of the ego." 
The r e j e c t i o n of the idea of redemption. I q b a l points out 
that "the Qor'an i n i t s simple, f o r c e f u l manner emphasizes 
2 
the i n d i v i d u a l i t y and uniqueness of man." I t i s i n 
consequence of t h i s view that I s l a m r e j e c t s the i d e a of 
redemption according to which one i n d i v i d u a l can bear the 
s i n s and burdens of others. -' I q b a l f i n d s the independent 
moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of each human being "expressed c l e a r l y 
i n the Q5r*an when i t s t a t e s that each i n d i v i d u a l ' s h a l l 
come to Him (the d i v i n e judge) on that Day (the day of 
judgment) s i n g l y * (Sura 19:25)° 'No s o u l s h a l l labour 
but f o r i t s e l f , and no one s h a l l bear another's burden* 
(Sura 6:16/+). 'For i t s own works l i e t h every s o u l i n 
pledge* ( S u r a - Jkikl)*"^ Thus the burdens, joys and pains 
of each man a r e e x c l u s i v e l y h i s own. He i s a centre of 
moral autonomy and " b i s s a l v a t i o n i s h i s own b u s i n e s s . 
There i s no mediator between God and man. u > 
Freedom i m p l i e s r i s k and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . L i k e the e x i s t e n -
t i a l i s t s I q b a l r e a l i z e s that freedom i n v o l v e s a great r i s k 
c 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Man i s "the t r u s t e e of a f r e e 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 109. 
2. I b i d , p. 95. 
3. I b i d . 
U- Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" p. 207. 
5* Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l , p. 38. 
6. 'Erf an, N. "What i s Common Between the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s and 
I q b a l " p. 56. 
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p e r s o n a l i t y which he accepted at h i s p e r i l . " Freedom i s 
a condition of goodness but "to permit the emergence of a 
f i n i t e ego who has the power to choose... i s r e a l l y to take 
a great r i s k ; f o r the freedom to choose good i n v o l v e s a l s o 
the freedom to choose what i s the opposite of good. That 
God has taken t h i s r i s k shows His immense f a i t h i n manj i t 
i s f o r man now to j u s t i f y t h i s f a i t h . " I q b a l points out 
that according to the Qor'anic n a r r a t i o n , Adam's f i r s t 
t r a n s g r e s s i o n was forgiven because h i s f i r s t a c t of d i s -
obedience was a l s o h i s f i r s t a c t of f r e e c h o i c e . ^ 
I t i s the r i s k i nvolved i n freedom of choice which 
makes i t p o s s i b l e to t e s t and develop the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s 
of man. As the Qor'an s a y s : "And we w i l l prove you with 
e v i l , and with good, f o r a t r i a l of you" (Sura 21:33).^ 
"Good and e v i l , " says I q b a l , "though opposites must f a l l 
5 
w i t h i n the same whole." The consequences of the freedom 
of w i l l are t r a g i c f o r "the mutual c o n f l i c t of opposing 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s the world-pain which both i l l u m i n a t e s and 
darkens the temporal c a r e e r of l i f e . I n the case of man 
i n whom i n d i v i d u a l i t y deepens with p e r s o n a l i t y , opening up 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of wrong-doing, the sense of the tragedy of 
l i f e becomes much more acute. But the acceptance of 
1. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 95. 
2. I b i d p. 85l 
3. I b i d . 
k» S a l e , G. ( t r a n s l a t i o n of ) The Koran, p. 2l\h» 
5. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 85. 
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selfhood as a form of l i f e i nvolves the acceptance of a l l 
the imperfections t h a t f l o w from the f i n i t u d e of selfhood." 
According t o I q b a l , God took the r i s k of c r e a t i n g a 
creature capable of both good and e v i l , because 
I f man had not the choice of r e j e c t i n g e v i l , he could not 
prove himself t o be good. As I q b a l p o i n t s out, "goodness 
i s not a matter of compulsion; i t i s the s e l f ' s f r e e 
surrender t o the moral i d e a l . . . A being whose movements are 
3 
wholly determined l i k e a machine cannot produce goodness." 
I q b a l has r e f e r r e d a number of times i n h i s w r i t i n g s 
t o Sura 33:72. "We proposed the f a i t h unto the heavens, 
and the e a r t h , and the mountains: and they refused t o under-
take the same, and were a f r a i d t h e r e o f ; but man undertook i t : 
v e r i l y he was u n j u s t t o h i m s e l f , and f o o l i s h . " * 4 " Even though 
man has not kept h i s f a i t h or managed the world w o r t h i l y 
having become unju s t and senseless, yet he alone had the 
d a r i n g t o undertake such a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I n man's freedom 
of w i l l l i e s "both the measure of h i s greatness and of h i s s i n . 
Had he not been f r e e , he could not have sinned, yet at the 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 8S. 
2. Godhead l i e s i n c r e a t i n g Selfhood. 
3« The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 85. 
k» Sale, G. ( t r a n s l a t i o n o f ) The Koran, p. 321. 
2 ( B a l - e - J i b r i l p. 79) 
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same time the burden of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y could not have been 
placed upon him." Whenever I q b a l speaks of the " t r u s t " 
man undertook i t i s i n a tone r e f l e c t i n g both p r i d e and 
h u m i l i t y : 4 
2 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam p. 225) 
I q b a l ' s r e j e c t i o n of the d o c t r i n e of 'Qismet' 
I q b a l i s vehemently opposed to the d o c t r i n e of 'Qismat' 
which embodies "a most degrading type of f a t a l i s m . " ^ He 
a s c r i b e s the f a t a l i s t i c element i n I s l a m to the i n f l u e n c e of 
Greek thought. Reaching back through a ch a i n of cause and 
1o Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctri n e of Man" p. 20k. 
2. What can I say,—what-ean—I s a y " 
About the " I " , i t s splendour and i t s might? 
I t was the " I " t h a t answered the C r e a t o r ' s c a l l 
To take up H i s vicegerency, 
Which caused the heavens to q u a i l 
And draw back i n sheer f r i g h t . 
The heavens s t i l l tremble a t i t s majesty. 
I t holds i n i t s embrace 
Both Time and Space. 
I t has s e l e c t e d man's heart f o r i t s d w e l l i n g - p l a c e 
A hut of mud to house a King. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, 
p. 12.) 
3« The Reco n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 110. 
278 
e f f e c t to a f i r s t cause i n the c l a s s i c a l t r a d i t i o n the 
Muslim philosophers tended to regard the u l t i m a t e F i r s t 
Cause as the only cause and t h e r e f o r e denied the e x i s t e n c e 
of intermediary secondary c a u s e s , thus making God the only 
author of whatever happened. Two other f a c t o r s added to 
the growth of f a t a l i s m . One was p o l i t i c a l expediency 
seeking to j u s t i f y p o l i t i c a l a t r o c i t i e s by a t t r i b u t i n g 
them to the decrees of God. The second was the d i m i n i s h i n g 
f o r c e of the l i f e - impulse of o r i g i n a l I s l a m which 
1 
produced apathy favourable to a f a t a l i s t i c outlook, and 
made the Muslims f o r g e t that " I s l a m i s i t s e l f D e s t i n y and 
2 
w i l l not s u f f e r a d e s t i n y . " 
L e i b n i z had held that "the n a t u r a l changes of the 
come from an i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e . ^ Whatever happens to a 
monad has i t s o r i g i n w i t h i n i t and i s the unfolding or 
working out of that which has been present i n i t from the 
beginning so that the present i s pregnant with the f u t u r e 
k -
which i t holds p o t e n t i a l l y w i t h i n i t s e l f . I q b a l conceives 
of consciousness as unfolding i t s " i n t e r n a l i n f i n i t u d e i n 
time l i k e the seed which from the ve r y beginning, c a r r i e s 
w i t h i n i t the organic u n i t y of the t r e e as a present f a c t . " - * 
1. The Reco n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 110-111. 
2. Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l . p. 165. 
3. L e i b n i z , G. W. P h i l o s o p h i c a l W r i t i n g s ( t r a n s l a t e d by 
Morris, M.) London, 19t>5, p. b. 
J+. Rashld, A. " G o t t f r i e d Wilhelm L e i b n i z : His L i f e and Work" 
P. 37. 
5« The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 6. 
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But although i n one sense the f u t u r e p r e - e x i s t s i n the 
present, I q b a l does not b e l i e v e that l i f e i s moving towards 
a f i x e d d e s t i n y . We have seen that I q b a l conceives of 
C r e a t i o n as the continuous unfolding and f u l f i l m e n t by God 
i n time of the u n l i m i t e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s open f o r His 
r e a l i s a t i o n , r a t h e r than, as orthodoxy has i t , the making 
of a f i n i s h e d product o u t s t r e t c h e d i n space, c o n f r o n t i n g 
God as His "other." T h i s being so, I q b a l sees Destiny 
not as "an u n r e l e n t i n g f a t e working from without l i k e a 
taskmaster; i t i s the inward reach of a t h i n g , i t s r e a l i z a b l e 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s which l i e w i t h i n the depths of i t s nature, 
and s e r i a l l y a c t u a l i z e themselves without any f e e l i n g of 
2 
e x t e r n a l compulsion." The Qor'anic verse " A l l things have 
We created bound by a f i x e d decree" (Sura 54:50)"^ would 
then mean th a t each c r e a t u r e i s endowed wi t h a f i x e d poten-
t i a l which i t i s f r e e to r e a l i z e or not. P r o f e s s o r Bausani 
observes, " I f the c e n t r e of the s p i r i t u a l i t y of the Qor'ah 
i s - and i t i s - the p e r s o n a l i t y of God, then, however 
p a r a d o x i c a l i t may seem, I q b a l ' s judgment i s t r u e that there 
i s nothing f u r t h e r from the Qor'an than the f e e l i n g of a 
pre-determined universe."-' A l s o , the very essence of 
1. Whittemore, R. " I q b a l ' s Panentheism" p. 75. 
2. The R econstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 50. 
3« S a l e , G. ( t r a n s l a t i o n of) The Koran, p. 393. 
l+« Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" p. 207. 
5» Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the R e l i g i o u s Philosophy 
of Muhammad I q b a l , p. 172. 
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r e l i g i o u s experience - prayer and repentance - does not 
p o s t u l a t e a c l o s e d u n i v e r s e i n which God i s f e t t e r e d or 
1 man predetermined e i t h e r by omnipotence or omniscience, 
Man as the maker of h i s own d e s t i n y . 
I q b a l p l a c e s great emphasis on human freedom. L i k e 
Berdyaev he too b e l i e v e s t h a t "God has l a i d upon Man the 
duty of being f r e e , of safeguarding freedom of s p i r i t , no 
matter how d i f f i c u l t that may be, or how much s a c r i f i c e 
2 
and s u f f e r i n g i t may r e q u i r e . " Of a l l God's c r e a t i o n s , 
Man alone i s "capable of c o n s c i o u s l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the 
c r e a t i v e l i f e of h i s maker" and of moulding "what i s i n t o 
what ought to be."^ I n 1910, I q b a l wrote i n h i s d i a r y , 
"Given c h a r a c t e r and healthy imagination, i t i s p o s s i b l e 
to r e c o n s t r u c t t h i s world of s i n and misery i n t o a v e r i -
t a b l e p a r a d i s e . " Throughout h i s works, runs the note -
f o r c e f u l and c l e a r - t h a t "the powerful man c r e a t e s e n v i r o n -
5 
ment, the f e e b l e have to a d j u s t themselves to i t . " 
I q b a l i s a passionate b e l i e v e r i n the pe r s o n a l c r e a t i o n 
of d e s t i n y , f o r him "man... i s maker of h i s own d e s t i n y . " 
"Both God and the D e v i l " he observed t r e n c h a n t l y i n h i s d i a r y , 
1. Djir, B.A. Qur'anic E t h i c s , p. 31. 
2. Berdyaev, N. quoted i n The Encyclopaedia of R e l i g i o u s 
Quotations ( e d i t e d by Mead, F.S.) p. 150. 
3» The Reco n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 72. 
k» S t r a y R e f l e c t i o n s , p. 102. 
5. I b i d , p. §T. 
6. Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l , p. 38. 
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"give man o p p o r t u n i t i e s only, l e a v i n g him to make use of 
them i n the way he t h i n k s f i t . " 1 T h i s thought f i n d s 
u t t e r a n c e i n memorable l i n e s : 
2 
(Bang-e-Dara p. g07) 
L i k e Browning, I q b a l does not seek omniscience because 
"complete knowledge w i l l destroy the l i b e r t y of human c h o i c e . " ^ 
He does not b e l i e v e i n " s t a r - g a z i n g , " and says with profound 
contempt: , / / 
H ( B a l - e - J i b r n p. 1+3) 
The key to one's d e s t i n y l i e s i n one's c h a r a c t e r . 
"Character," says I q b a l , " i s the u l t i m a t e equipment of man, 
5 
s i n c e i t i s from c h a r a c t e r t h a t a l l a c t i o n s flow." I n a 
poem w r i t t e n on a v i s i t to Napoleon - whom I q b a l admired f o r 1. S t r a y R e f l e c t i o n s , p. 13U« 
2. Through a c t i o n l i f e i s made heaven or h e l l , 
T h i s man of c l a y , by o r i g i n i s n e i t h e r heavenly ( l i g h t ) nor 
h e l l i s h ( f i r e ) . 
3» S t r a y R e f l e c t i o n s 
k' How w i l l the s t a r inform one of my f a t e ? 
I t i s i t s e l f so wretched and h e l p l e s s i n the wideness of 
the s k i e s . 
5» Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l , p. 38. 
282 
being a man of a c t i o n - he s a y s : 
' -7 
( B a l - e - J i b r T l p. t»%) 
By doing nothing and j u s t w a i t i n g e x p e c t a n t l y f o r the 
manna to drop from heaven, one cannot hope to achieve the 
de s t i n y which man could make f o r himself were he to s t r i v e , 
o 
" f o r man i s man and master of h i s f a t e . " 
1. Strange, strange the f a t e s that govern 
T h i s world of s t r e s s and s t r a i n , 
But i n the f i r e s of a c t i o n 
F a t e ' s m y s t e r i e s are made p l a i n . 
The prayers of God's f o l k t r e a d i n g 
The b a t t l e f i e l d ' s red sod, 
Forged i n the flame of a c t i o n 
Become the v o i c e of God. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Kiernan, V.G. Poems from I q b a l . p. 55) 
2. Tennyson, A. quoted i n The Encyclopaedia of R e l i g i o u s 
Quotations ( e d i t e d by Mead, F.S.) p. Ik3» 
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1 o>/^ ' u ^ ^ / ^ 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam pp 138-139) 
I t i s up to man to make himself a h e l p l e s s p r i s o n e r of Pate 
or to r i s e up and carve h i s d e s t i n y . Should he make the 
e f f o r t , I q b a l b e l i e v e s that the way w i l l open before h i s 
advancing s t e p s . 
(Payam-e-Mashriq p. i+9) 
1. Although the s o u l , I know, 
One day un v e i l e d s h a l l be, 
Think not i t s h a l l be so 
By w r i t h i n g e n d l e s s l y . 
I t needs a blow, to s t i r 
T h e ^ l e e p i n g soul-from e a r t h ; 
Unswept, the harp can ne'er 
B r i n g melody to b i r t h . 
Transcend the dust, nor take 
T h y s e l f but dust to be; 
I f thou thy b r e a s t w i l l break, 
The moon s h a l l shine from thee. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J . P e r s i a n Psalms, p. 89) 
2. Set not the chain of Pate upon thy f o o t ; 
There i s a Way beyond t h i s r o l l i n g sphere; 
I f thou b e l i e v e s t not, r i s e up, and f i n d 
Thy foot u p l i f t e d l e a p e t h i n the a i r . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J . The T u l i p of S i n a i , p. 16) 
I > 
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I f man does not f i n d h i s envirnment c o n g e n i a l to 
him s e l f , there i s no reason why he should not - i n the 
words of '0mar Khayyam - " s h a t t e r i t to b i t s , and remould 
i t n earer to the heart's d e s i r e , " I n JavTd Nama the 
Voice of Beauty s a y s : 
1 ( J a v T d Nama p. 225) 
1. Are you a l i v e ? Be vehement, be c r e a t i v e ; 
L i k e Us, embrace a l l horizons;-
BreaXwhatsoever i s uncongenial, 
Out of your h e a r t ' s heart produce a new world -
I t i s irksome to the f r e e s e r v i t o r 
To l i v e i n a world belonging to ot h e r s . 
Whoever possesses not the power to c r e a t e 
I n Our s i g h t i s naught but an i n f i d e l , a heathen; 
Such a one has not taken h i s share of Our Beauty, 
Has not t a s t e d the f r u i t of the Tree of L i f e . 
Man of God, be trenchant as a sword, 
Be y o u r s e l f your own world's d e s t i n y . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J . J a v l d Nama, p. 138) 
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I n I qbal's eyes, the c r e a t i o n of something new, even i f i t 
i s s i n f u l , i s an accomplishment: 
1 jX W JC^J' JS 
(Payam-e-Mashriq p. 62) 
The sinner he depicts i s proud of h i s deed and does not wish 
t o be r e l i e v e d of i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : 
(Zabur-e-*Ajam p. V\h) 
I f a man or a n a t i o n does not s t r i v e , then i t i s worthy 
of a g l o r i o u s f u t u r e . To such a man or such a n a t i o n I q b a l 
extends n e i t h e r hope nor sympathy. 
- / 
3(zarb-e-KalIm p. 11+3) 
1. I f by t h y labour something r a r e i s wrought, 
Though i t be s i n , i t hath i t s own reward. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A.J. The T u l i p of S i n a i , p. 21) 
2. A sinner proud am I ; no meed 
I take, except I work f o r i t ; 
I rage, because men say He w r i t 
Predestinate my w i l f u l deed. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A.J. Persian Psalms, p. 92) 
3. That n a t i o n does not deserve the renaissance of To-morrow 
Which has not i n i t s d e s t i n y a Today. 
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I q b a l c o n s t a n t l y r e f e r s t o the Qor'anic verse, " V e r i l y 
God w i l l not change the c o n d i t i o n of men, t i l l they change 
A 
what i s i n themselves" (Sura 13:12) . I f Man "does not 
take the i n i t i a t i v e , i f he does not evolve the i n n e r 
richness of h i s being, i f he ceases t o f e e l the inward push 
of advancing l i f e , then the s p i r i t w i t h i n him hardens i n t o 
p 
stone and he i s reduced t o the l e v e l of dead matter." 
But i f he does t r a n s f o r m himself, God w i l l ask him t o chosse 
h i s own d e s t i n y : 
-"\ / , J / 
\ & U U J i j / U l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
• ^ B a l - e - J i b r n p. 81) 
Or man can p e t i t i o n God f o r a new d e s t i n y i f he be not 
s a t i s f i e d w i t h his present one: 
4 # . j* ' ? 
-i 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 12. 
2. I b i d : 
3. Elevate your Selfhood so, t h a t before each Judgment 
God Himself should ask of Man "What i s i t you wish?" 
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/ 
1 (JavTd Nama p. 123) 
I n "Jawab-e-Shikwa" God promises t h a t i f Man be indeed 
f a i t h f u l , then h i s d e s t i n y i s whatever he desires i t t o be-
2 
(Baig-e-Dara p. 226) 
1. I f your heart bleeds on account of one d e s t i n y , 
P e t i t i o n God t o decree another d e s t i n y ; 
I f you pray f o r a new d e s t i n y , t h a t i s l a w f u l , 
Seeing t h a t God's d e s t i n i e s are i n f i n i t e . 
E a r t h l i n g s have gambled away the coin of selfhood, 
Not comprehending the s u b t l e meaning of de s t i n y ; 
I t s s u b t l e t y i s contained i n a s i n g l e phrase-
* I f you t r a n s f o r m ^ o u r s e l f , i t too w i l l - b e transformed.' 
Be dust, and f a t e w i l l give you the winds; 
Be stone, and i t w i l l h u r l you against glass. 
Are you a dew-drop? your d e s t i n y i s t o p e r i s h ; 
Are you an ocean? your d e s t i n y i s t o endure. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J. JavTd Nama, p. 85). 
2. This world i s nothing, the Tablet and Pen are yours. 
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Submission t o the W i l l of God. 
One important question a r i s e s from I q b a l ' s view of 
freedom of the w i l l and d e s t i n y : how i s man's freedom of 
choice compatible w i t h the idea of submission t o God's 
w i l l which plays such an important p a r t i n Islamic b e l i e f ? 
For I q b a l , t o submit t o the w i l l of God, t o say "Thy W i l l 
be done," i s not t o c o n t r a d i c t or c u r t a i l our own freedom, 
i t i s " t o obey the prompting of my own p e r s o n a l i t y , t o give 
f r e e scope and f u l l expression t o my t r u e s e l f , i«e. t o be 
p e r f e c t l y f r e e . " I n a poem e n t i t l e d "TaslIin-o-Raza," he 
explains the meaning of submissions 
) 
J ik u > 0 - 1 ^ ^ A w 
Loo 
y 
y y 
1. Cohu, J. R. V i t a l Problems of R e l i g i o n • p. I83. 
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t<£_L^ < j t u * L i J - l - ^ 
1 ( j a r b - e - K a l I m p. hS) 
Resignation t o God's w i l l - *tawwakul' - i s not mere 
acceptance of t h a t which i s i n e v i t a b l e . 'Tawwakul' i s born 
not out of an awareness of one's helplessness, but i s the 
_ 2 r e s u l t of Tmah', the v i t a l way of making the world our own. 
"linan," says I q b a l , " i s not,merely a passive b e l i e f i n one 
or more p r o p o s i t i o n s of a c e r t a i n k i n d ; i t i s a l i v i n g 
assurance begotten of a r a r e experience." This experience 
became embodied i n c l a s s i c utterances such as " I am the 
c r e a t i v e T r u t h " ( H a l l a j ) , " I am d e s t i n y " (Mu'awiya), and " I 
am the speaking Qor'an" ( ' A l l ) . * 4 " Only "s t r o n g p e r s o n a l i t i e s 
are capable of r i s i n g t o t h i s experience and the/higher 
f a t a l i s m ' i m p l i e d i n i t . " ^ This 'higher f a t a l i s m ' does not 
1. I n every branch t h i s s u b t l e t r u t h i s manifest 
T h a t even plants d e s i r e t h e wide space." 
The seed i s not content t o remain i n the dark s o i l , 
I t longs t o shoot up and grow t o f u l l bloom. 
Do not suppress the f u n c t i o n s of your nature -
This i s not what i s meant by submission. 
I f you have the courage t o advance, then space i s unbounded, 
0 man of God, God's e a r t h i s not so narrow. 
2. The Reconstruction of Religi o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 109. 
3. I b i d . 
U. I b i d , p. 110. 
5. I b i d , pp 109-110. 
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look upon the a f f a i r s of the world as a f o r t u i t o u s conco-
m i t a t i o n of atoms, but recognises the all-embracing a c t i v i t y 
of the wise and l o v i n g Creator. I n a remarkable passage i n 
Javrd Nama, H a l l a j explains the t r u e meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of p r e d e s t i n a t i o n : 
2(JavTd Nama pp 1U1-1U2) . _ - - - - - - -
1. Arnold, T. W. The Islamic F a i t h , London, 1928, p. 2U« 
2. Whoever possesses the apparatus of de s t i n y , 
l b U s and death tremble before his might. 
P r e d e s t i n a t i o n i s the r e l i g i o n of man of z e a l , 
P r e d e s t i n a t i o n f o r heroes i s the p e r f e c t i o n of power. 
Ripe souls become yet r i p e r through c o n t r a i n t 
Which f o r raw man i s the embrace of the tomb. 
The business of t r u e men i s r e s i g n a t i o n and submission; 
This garment does not s u i t the weaklings. 
You who say, "This was t o be, and so happened, 
A l l t h i n g s were tethered t o a d i v i n e decree, and so happened," 
You have l i t t l e understood the meaning of d e s t i n y ; 
You have seen n e i t h e r selfhood nor God: 
The b e l i e v e r t r u e thus p e t i t i o n s God: 
'We accord w i t h you, so accord w i t h us.' 
His r e s o l u t i o n i s the c r e a t o r of God's determination 
And on the day of b a t t l e h i s arrow i s God's arrow. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J. Javld Nama, pp 91+-95) 
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The higher f a t a l i s m described thus by Tennyson: 
"Our w i l l s are ours, we know not how, 
Our w i l l s are ours to make them Thine." 
"which the great re l ig ious heroes of a l l times and re l ig ions 
have described as the highest and most paradoxical experience" 
i s , for I q b a l , generative of " l i f e and boundless power which 
recognises no obstruction, and can make a man calmly o f fer 
3 
h i s prayers when bu l l e t s are showering around him." The 
man of God whose w i l l i s per fec t ly attuned to the W i l l of 
God, becomes the maker of h i s tory and dest iny: 
(Bang-e-Dara p. 303) 
1. Tennyson, A. "In Memoriam A.H.H." The Poe t i ca l Works. 
London, 1959, P.239. 
2. Schimmel, A. M. G a b r i e l ' s Wing, p. 312. 
3. The Reconstruction of Rel igious Thought in I s l a m , p. 110. 
1+. In servitude, both swords and schemes are u s e l e s s , 
When f a i t h i s born, the chains are broken loose . 
Who can imagine what the strength of his arm would be? 
The gaze of a man of God can a l t e r f a t e . 
>; ^  > -> J 
\ 
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With h i s hand he can work m i r a c l e s , f o r 
1 ( B a l - e - J i b r i l p. 132) 
I q b a l believes t h a t "man i s r e a l l y f r e e only i n God, the 
source of h i s freedom." 2 U n t i l such time as man f i n d s his 
f a i t h and can see the source of d i v i n e law w i t h i n the depths 
of h i s being, he i s t r o u b l e d by doubt: 
(Pas (5i Bayad Kard A i Aqwam-e-Sharq? p.1+0) 
But having grasped the " v i t a l way" of l i f e , he acquires 
u n l i m i t e d power: 
(Pas <5i Bayad Kard A i Aqwam-e-Sharq? p. 11+) 
1. The hand of a f a i t h f u l i s the Hand of God. 
2. Eddy, s. quoted i n The Encyclopaedia of R e l i g i o u s 
Quotations ( e d i t e d by Mead, F.S.) P» 151• 
3» As long as man does not behold God, 
He does not emerge from p r e d e s t i n a t i o n and f r e e - c h o i c e . 
k» When he loses himself i n the s a t i s f a c t i o n of God 
The f a i t h f u l becomes God's instrument of d e s t i n y . 
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C o n f l i c t between Necessity and Freedom 
One w r i t e r has contended t h a t I q b a l , despite h i s 
i n s i s t e n c e on human freedom, i s a b e l i e v e r i n determinism, 
since he has admitted on several occasions t h a t when there 
i s a c o n f l i c t between ' t a q d l r ' ( D i v i n e decree) and ' t a d b l r ' 
A 
(human des i g n ) , the l a t t e r i s unable t o do anything. For 
instance, I q b a l says, w 
(Bang-e-Dara p. 2^6) 
3(Bang-e-Dara p. 297) . S 
4 ( B a l - e - J i b r T l p. 11*7) 
1. Rahman, M.W. " I q b a l ' s Doctrine of Destiny" The I s l a m i c 
C u l t u r e 1939, Volume 13, pp 159-160. 
2. Every p a r t i c l e of the Universe i s a captive of Destiny, 
Human e f f o r t i s mere helplessness and f u t i l i t y . 
3. Heaven has another w e l l - t r i e d a f f l i c t i o n -
See the h u m i l i a t i o n of man's e f f o r t s before Destiny. 
1+. There are some signs t o say t h a t u l t i m a t e l y 
The chess-expert of Destiny defeated human endeavour. 
29U 
V / >^  ^  y'jtJ^O^'f - A" 
1 ( j a v T d Nama p. 122.) 
These verses do not c o n t r a d i c t or repudiate I q b a l ' s 
b e l i e f i n human freedom. They merely i n d i c a t e t h a t I q b a l 
recognises an o v e r - r u l i n g Power which disposes w h i l e Man 
proposes. I q b a l has nowhere asserted t h a t Man i s completely 
f r e e . Only God - the most P e r f e c t I n d i v i d u a l - possesses 
p e r f e c t freedom. But t h i s does not mean t h a t Man i s 
completely determined. His w i l l i s l i m i t e d o n l y by the 
W i l l of God: 
-(-Zarb-e-Kallm p. 62) 
and the more p e r f e c t h i s Selfhood becomes, the more w i l l i n g l y 
he surrenders his w i l l t o the W i l l o f God. 
I n h i s l e t t e r t o Professor Nicholson, I q b a l p o i n t s out 
1. None but God i s the c r e a t o r of d e s t i n y 
And against d e s t i n y human design i s powerless. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arb e r r y , A. J. Jav l d Nama, p. 85) 
2, Plants and animals are bound by the decree of Pate, 
But the Man of God i s only subject to the Laws of God. 
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t h a t the ego i s " p a r t l y f r e e , p a r t l y determined, and reaches 
f u l l e r freedom by approaching the I n d i v i d u a l Who i s most f r e e • 
1 
God, I n one word, l i f e i s an endeavour f o r freedom." 
This view i s based on the hadls,: " F a i t h l i e s between Necessity 
and Freedom." Man i s subject t o God's W i l l but since "God i s 
the u l t i m a t e s p i r i t u a l basis of a l l l i f e , l o y a l t y t o God 
o 
v i r t u a l l y amounts t o Man's l o y a l t y t o hi s own i d e a l nature." 
I n Zabur-e-'Ajam, I q b a l says 
J"-
- / 
u V ' 1 A^ A SAJ J 
S 
4 
(p£><t-> o ^ f A ( A 
JA>JAA j\Zg>j^? u 5 y 
/ 
1. I q b a l quoted by Nicholson, R.A. i n the I n t r o d u c t i o n t o The 
Secrets of the S e l f pp XX-XXl. 
2. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 11+7. 
29 6 
y / • -
For i t ( t h e S e l f ) has been a l l o t e d the supreme 
C o n t r o l of the realm of existence so 
That i t may manifest i t s e l f i n f i n i t e l y . 
I t s d e s t i n y i s immanent 
I n i t s own nature and, though outwardly 
Dependent on pure accident, 
I t i s completely f r e e . 
What more can I t e l l you about 
What i t i s l i k e , what not? 
The Holy Prophet s a i d t h a t F a i t h 
Resides between Necessity and Freedom. You 
Think a l l created things are subject t o 
A foreordained Necessity. 
But 0 the Soul i s God's own b r e a t h , 
Enshrined,- f o r a i r i t s " s e l f - d i s p l a y , 
I n i t s i n v i o l a b l e r e t r e a t , 
From Nature's h u r l y - b u r l y f a r away. 
There i s no question of Necessity -
Ordaining i t ; 
For Soul cannot be Soul, unless completely f r e e . 
Created by Necessity, i t h u r l e d 
I t s e l f a t t h i s m a t e r i a l world 
And, conquering i t , gained 
A freedom u n r e s t r a i n e d . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Husain H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, 
p. 13). 
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L i k e RumT, I q b a l does not consider the freedom of 
choice as an end i n i t s e l f ; the end of freedom i s t h a t 
man may decide f r e e l y t o l i v e according t o h i s higher 
s e l f . The end of freedom i s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n at a 
higher plane. At the end freedom and determination 
(which i s not the same as coercion or c o n s t r a i n t ) become 
one, " L i f e s t a r t s w i t h determinism at the lower plane, 
develops t o the capacity o f Free Choice i n man, i n order 
t o r i s e t o a Higher Determinism again, where man makes a 
1 
f r e e o f f e r of h i s freedom." Kant had held t h a t the 
source of the moral law i s i n the innermost s e l f of man, 
and t h a t man's autonomy consists i n imposing t h i s law 
upon hi m s e l f . For Iqbal»s viewpoint also "the i n d i v i d u a l 
achieves a f r e e p e r s o n a l i t y , not by r e l e a s i n g h i m s e l f from 
the f e t t e r s of the law, but by discove r i n g the u l t i m a t e 
2 
source of the law w i t h i n the depths of h i s own consciousness." 
I q b a l ' s r e j e c t i o n of the idea of 'fana* 
~ " T t has been argued" says Professor Nicholson, " t h a t 
§ufism reaches i t s l o g i c a l conclusion i n the s t a t e of 'fana'... 
x 
when the s e l f 'passes away' from i t s e l f . " This idea i s 
completely unacceptable t o I q b a l . According t o him, the 
i d e a l of p e r f e c t manhood i n Islam i s t h a t f u l l - g r o w n ego 
1. I q b a l , A. "Rum! as a Thinker" p. 17. 
2. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. 181. 
3» Nicholson, R.A. The Idea of P e r s o n a l i t y i n gufism. 
Cambridge, 1923, PP 1U-18. 
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which can r e t a i n i t s self-possession even i n the case of a 
d i r e c t contact w i t h the all-embracing Ego. He r e f e r s 
t o the Prophet's v i s i o n of the U l t i m a t e Ego, quoting the 
Qor'anic verse: " h i s eyesight turned not aside, n e i t h e r 
_ 3 
d i d i t wander" (Sura 53:17) and the verse: 
t o show tha t the P e r f e c t Man can stand before God without 
being a n n i h i l a t e d . 
L i k e T i l l i c h , I q b a l believes t h a t "the centre of a 
completely i n d i v i d u a l i z e d being cannot be entered by any 
other i n d i v i d u a l i z e d being, and i t cannot be made i n t o a 
5 _ mere p a r t of higher u n i t y . " I n "Gulshan-e-Raz-e-Jadid," 
I q b a l says: ^ 
6(Zabur-e-*Ajam p. 222) 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p.118. 
2. i D i d : 
3. Sale, G. ( t r a n s l a t i o n o f ) The Koran, p. 390. 
1+. Moses f a i n t e d having seen only the A t t r i b u t s , 
You see the Essence w i t h a s m i l e . 
5. T i l l i c h , P. Love, Power, and J u s t i c e , London, 1959» P» 26. 
6. To be l o s t i n His sea i s not our d e s t i n y ; 
And i f you span i t , you can never cease t o be. 
That S e l f should be submerged i n S e l f i s an i m p o s s i b i l i t y : 
To be the essence of Selfhood i s the S e l f ' s apogee. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, 
p. 10). 
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Rather than l o s i n g oneself i n God as a drop loses 
i t s e l f i n the ocean, "the t r u e person <>.. absorbs God i n t o 
h i s ego,"^ i . e . , "we do not enter God's u n i t y , but r a t h e r 
make him enter the u n i t y of our s e l v e s . " 2 "The moral and 
r e l i g i o n s i d e a l of man," says I q b a l , " i s not s e l f - n e g a t i o n 
but s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n , and he a t t a i n s t o t h i s i d e a l by 
becoming more and more i n d i v i d u a l , more and more unique. 
The Prophet s a i d , *create i n yourselves the a t t r i b u t e s of 
Al l a h ? and thus man becomes unique by becoming more and 
more l i k e the most unique I n d i v i d u a l . " - ' 
I q b a l p o i n t s out t h a t Islam does not contemplate 
complete l i b e r a t i o n from f i n i t u d e as the highest s t a t e of 
human b l i s s . He sees no c o n t r a d i c t i o n between r e a l i s i n g 
the I n f i n i t e and r e t a i n i n g one's i n d i v i d u a l i t y . ^ "True 
i n f i n i t y , " he says, "does not mean i n f i n i t e extension which 
cannot be achieved w i t h o u t embracing a l l a v a i l a b l e f i n i t e 
extensions. I t s nature c o n s i s t s i n i n t e n s i t y , and not 
e x t e n s i t y . And the moment we f i x our gaze upon i n t e n s i t y , 
we begin t o see t h a t the f i n i t e ego must be d i s t i n c t though 
5 
not i s o l a t e d from the I n f i n i t e . " 
"Iqbal»s mysticism," says E. M. Porster, "does not 
seek union w i t h God. We s h a l l see God perhaps. We s h a l l 
1. I q b a l quoted by Nicholson, R.A. i n I n t r o d u c t i o n t o The 
Secrets of the S e l f , p. x i x . 
2. Raju, P.T. "The Ideali s m of S i r Mohammad I q b a l J' p. 113. 
3.Iqbal quoted by Nicholson, R.A. i n I n t r o d u c t i o n t o The 
Secrets of the S e l f , p. x v i i i . 
k* Naravane, V.S. Modern Ind i a n Thought, London, 196U, p. 290. 
5» The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p. 118. 
300 
never be God."'' Iqbal's I d e a l Man i s not w i l l i n g t o p a r t 
w i t h h i s Selfhood e i t h e r f o r i m m o r t a l i t y 
2 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam p. 77) 
or f o r a v i s i o n of God 
<3>)2 o^Su-^ J U i > y - i / l t r y 
^(Zabur-e-'Adam p. 60) 
I q b a l p o i n t s out t h a t "the 'fana' i n the I s l a m i c 
mysticism means not extinction but complete surrender of 
the human ego t o the Divine Ego. The i d e a l o f Isl a m i c 
mysticism i s a stage beyond the stage of *fana' i . e . 
;*baqa' which from my point of view i s the highest stage 
of s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n . " 
1. P o r s t e r . E.M. "Mohammad I q b a l " p. 297. 
2. I f but^atom must I giv e 
Of t h i s f a b r i c t h a t I l i v e , 
Too great a p r i c e were t h a t , f o r me 
To purchase i m m o r t a l i t y . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by A r b e r r y , A.J. Persian Psalms, p. k5) 
3« I f v i s i o n self-effacement b r i n g , 
The v e i l i s a f a r b e t t e r t h i n g ; 
Thy trade hath l i t t l e t o enti c e 
That doth r e q u i r e so great a p r i c e . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arb e r r y , A.J. Persian Psalms, p. 35) 
k» Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l , p. 2hk. 
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F o l l o w i n g the t r a d i t i o n "Heaven and e a r t h do not 
contain Me, but the heart of my f a i t h f u l servant contains 
1 _ 
Me," I q b a l describes u n i t i v e experience not as "the f i n i t e 
ego e f f a c i n g i t s own i d e n t i t y by some s o r t of absorption 
i n t o the I n f i n i t e Ego," but r a t h e r as "the I n f i n i t e passing 
2 
i n t o the l o v i n g embrace of the f i n i t e . " For I q b a l "the 
end of the ego's quest i s not emancipation from the l i m i -
t a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l i t y ; i t i s , on the other hand, a more 
precise d e f i n i t i o n of i t . " ^ Man can discover God only by 
r e t a i n i n g h i s Selfhood not by r e s i g n i n g i t , as the great 
lover of God, H a l l a j says: 
^JavTd Nama p. 15k) 
IMMORTALITY OF THE SELF. 
Metaphysical and e t h i c a l arguments f o r I m m o r t a l i t y . 
I q b a l p o i n t s out t h a t "purely metaphysical arguments 
5 
cannot give us a p o s i t i v e b e l i e f i n personal i m m o r t a l i t y . " 
He r e f e r s t o Ibn-e-Rushd who d i s t i n g u i s h e d between sense 
and i n t e l l i g e n c e probably because of the expressions 'nafs' 
1. Schimmel, A.M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 121. 
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p.110. 
3. I b i d , p. TW. 
U. You who seek your goal i n a n n i h i l a t i o n , 
Non-existence can never discover existence. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A.J. J a v l d Nama, p. 101. 
5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p.111. 
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and 'rub/ used i n the Qor'an 1 (although according to I q b a l , 
"the word 'nafs* does not seem to have been used i n the 
Quran i n any t e c h n i c a l sense of the kind imagined by Muslim 
t h e o l o g i a n s " 2 ) . According to I b n - e - R u s h d i n t e l l i g e n c e i s 
not a form of the body but belongs to a d i f f e r e n t order of 
being. I t transcends i n d i v i d u a l i t y and i s one, u n i v e r s a l , 
and e t e r n a l , " T h i s obviously means t h a t , s i n c e u n i t a r y 
i n t e l l e c t transcends i n d i v i d u a l i t y , i t s appearance as so 
many u n i t i e s i n the muijOjiplicity of human persons i s a mere 
i l l u s i o n . . The e t e r n a l u n i t y of i n t e l l e c t may mean, as 
JEsnan t h i n k s , the e v e r l a s t i n g n e s s of humanity and c i v i l i -
z a t i o n ; i t does not s u r e l y mean per s o n a l i m m o r t a l i t y . " ^ 
I q b a l , t h e r e f o r e , r e j e c t s Ibn-e-Rushd»s metaphysical 
viewpoint. 
I q b a l next views e t h i c a l arguments, such as t h a t of 
Kant and modern v e r s i o n s of the Kantian p o s i t i o n . Such 
arguments, says I q b a l , "depend on a kind of f a i t h i n the 
f u l f i l m e n t of the claims of j u s t i c e , or i n the i r r e p l a c e a b l e 
and unique work of man as an i n d i v i d u a l pursuer of i n f i n i t e 
Ideals."* 4" Kant co n s i d e r s immortality to be beyond the 
scope of s p e c u l a t i v e reason. For him i t i s a p o s t u l a t e of 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p.111. 
2. i b i d , P. 112: 
3. I b i d . 
i+. I b i d . 
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p r a c t i c a l reason which i s derived from "the p r a c t i c a l l y -
n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of a duration adequate to the p e r f e c t 
1 
f u l f i l m e n t of t|ie moral law." According to Kant "the 
highest good i s p r a c t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e only on the suppo-
s i t i o n of the immortality of the s o u l , " 2 but I q b a l remarks, 
" i t i s not c l e a r . . . why the consummation of v i r t u e and 
happiness should take i n f i n i t e time."^ Hence the soul, 
need not be immortal* 
M a t e r i a l i s m and immortality. 
I q b a l r e f e r s to "modern m a t e r i a l i s m which r e j e c t s 
immortality, holding that consciousness i s merely a f u n c t i o n 
of the b r a i n , and th e r e f o r e ceases with the c e s s a t i o n of 
k 
the b r a i n - p r o c e s s . " W i l l i a m James t h i n k s t h i s argument 
i s v a l i d only i f the f u n c t i o n i n question i s taken to be 
productive. The mere f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n mental and b o d i l y 
changes c o i n c i d e does not mean th a t mental changes are 
ceased b o d i l y changes. The fu n c t i o n may not be n e c e s s a r i l y 
productive, but only p e r m i s s i v e or t r a n s m i s s i v e l i k e the 
f u n c t i o n of the t r i g g e r of a cross-bow or that of a r e f l e c t i n g 
l e n s . 5 i q b a l says, "This view which suggests that our in n e r 
l i f e i s due to the operation i n us of a kind of t r a n s c e n -
d e n t a l mechanism of consciousness, somehow choosing a 
1. Kant, I . C r i t i q u e of P r a c t i c a l Reason ( t r a n s l a t e d by Beck, 
L.W.) Chicago ( I l l i n o i s ; 191+9, p. 23$. 
2. I b i d , p. 226. 3« The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Isl a m , p. 113» 
U.. i b i d : 
5. I b i d . 
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p h y s i c a l medium f o r a short period of sp o r t , does not give 
us any assurance of the continuance of the content of our 
1 
a c t u a l experience." The proper way of meeting m a t e r i a l i s m , 
says I q b a l , i s to confine s c i e n c e to c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c 
aspects of r e a l i t y f o r although "man has a s p a t i a l aspect... 
t h i s i s not the only aspect of man. There are other 
aspects ... which s c i e n c e must n e c e s s a r i l y exclude from i t s 
study, and the understanding of which r e q u i r e s c a t e g o r i e s 
2 
other than those employed by s c i e n c e . " To the m a t e r i a l i s t 
philosopher, a l l that I q b a l can say i s : 
3 ( 2 a r b - e - K a l I m p. 3) 
Nietzsche's E t e r n a l Recurrence. 
We have a l r e a d y r e f e r r e d to I q b a l ' s r e j e c t i o n _ o f 
N i e t z s c h e ' s d o c t r i n e of E t e r n a l Recurrence which I q b a l 
c o n s i d e r s the "one p o s i t i v e view of immo r t a l i t y . " ^ Nietzsche 
b e l i e v e s i n a temporal i n f i n i t y behind us and ahead of u s . 
The number of p o s s i b l e forms i n which our ever-changing 
r e a l i t y appears i s , however, not i n f i n i t e . Therefore a l l 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p.113. 
2. I b i d , pp 113-HU. 
3. You cannot be f r e e from the f e a r of death 
For you consider the S e l f merely to be a body of c l a y . 
1+. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Islam, p. I l k . 
305 
events must r e c u r an i n f i n i t e number of times. Nietzsche's 
mistake, according to I q b a l , i s to consider time as an 
i n f i n i t e s e r i e s of events moving i n a c i r c l e - i n t h i s case 
2 
immortality does e x i s t but becomes " a b s o l u t e l y i n t o l e r a b l e . " 
" I t i s energy and the process of i t s e t e r n a l recurrence 
i n f i n i t e c e n t r e s that i s to be regarded as immortal, and 
not ' I * and 'you!."^ I q b a l points out th a t according to 
Nietzsche what makes t h i s k i nd of immortality bearable i s 
"the expectation t h a t a recurrence of the combination of 
energy-centres which c o n s t i t u t e s my personal e x i s t e n c e i s 
a necessary f a c t o r i n the b i r t h of th a t i d e a l combination 
which he c a l l s 'superman.' But the superman has been an 
i n f i n i t e number of times before. His b i r t h i s i n e v i t a b l e ; 
Ji _ 
how can the prospect give me any a s p i r a t i o n ? " I q b a l 
c o n s i d e r s N i e t z s c h e ' s view as " a f a t a l i s m worse than the 
one summed up i n the word 'qismat.' Such a d o c t r i n e , f a r 
from keeping up the human organism f o r the f i g h t of l i f e , 
tends to destroy i t s a c t i o n - t e n d e n c i e s and r e l a x e s the 
5 
t e n s i o n of the ego." 
The Qor'an and immortality. 
I q b a l p o i n t s out that the Qor'an upholds the b e l i e f i n 
1. H-alingdale, R. J . Nietzsche, pp 200-201. 
2. The Re c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Is l a m , p.115-
3» Enver, I . H. Metaphysics of I q b a l . p. 53. 
k* The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 115-116. 
5. I b i d , p. l i s : 
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r e s u r r e c t i o n and immor t a l i t y ( S u r a . 22:5; 75s36 f f ) , the 
"Quranic d o c t r i n e of personal immortality being based on 
three p r o p o s i t i o n s : 
( 1 ) That the ego has a beginning i n time and did not 
p r e - e x i s t i t s emergence i n the spatio-temporal 
order. 
( 3 ) That there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of r e t u r n to t h i s 
e a r t h (Sura 23:101 f ; 8U:19; 56:59 f f ) . 
1 
( 3 ) That f i n i t u d e i s not a misfortune (Sura, 19:95 f ) . 
I q b a l ' s views on death and immortality. I q b a l b e l i e v e s i n 
immortality, but i t i s not everybody's l o t by r i g h t , as i f 
the s o u l qua- s o u l , were immortal. "Personal immortality," 
he s a y s , " i s not ours as of r i g h t ; i t i s to be achieved by 
personal e f f o r t . Man i s only a candidate f o r i t . . . The ego 
must continue t o str u g g l e u n t i l he i s able to gather himself 
2 
up, and win h i s r e s u r r e c t i o n . " Thus I q b a l does not regard 
immortality as man's i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t guaranteed by h i s 
3 
f a i t h . He i s supported i n h i s viewpoint by P r o f e s s o r 
P r i n g l e - P a t t i s o n : "People t a l k as i f the being of a s o u l were 
something which almost d e f i e d a n n i h i l a t i o n , which a t any r a t e 
could be brought to an end only by s p e c i a l f i a t of the D e i t y . 
But s u r e l y i t i s quite the other way. I t i s but a r e l a x i n g of 
1. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , pp 116-119. 
2 . I b i d , pp 119-120. 
3 . Whittemore, R. " I q b a l ' s Panentheism" p . 7 5 « 
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c o n t r o l , and a process of d i s s o c i a t i o n a t once begins. 
Nothing seems more f a t a l l y easy than the d i s s o l u t i o n i n t h i s 
f a s h i o n of the coherent u n i t y which we c a l l a mind, i f the 
process i s allowed to continue and to spread. We can 
observe the phenomenon f r e q u e n t l y i n c a s e s of d i s e a s e , when 
i t a f f e c t s the p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of l i f e ; but the mere 
r e l a x a t i o n of moral e f f o r t may i n i t i a t e the same process in 
the s p i r i t u a l sphere. And without the u n i t y i m p l i e d i n 
some continuous purpose, what prospect can th e r e be of 
1 
e t e r n a l l i f e , or what meaning can i t have?" 
I q b a l regards personal i m m o r t a l i t y as an a s p i r a t i o n 
"you can have i t i f you make an e f f o r t to achieve i t . I t 
depends on our adopting i n t h i s l i f e modes of thought and 
a c t i v i t y which tend to maintain the s t a t e of t e n s i o n . . . i f 
our a c t i v i t y i s d i r e c t e d towards the maintenance of a s&ate 
2 
of t e n s i o n , the shock of death i s not l i k e l y t o a f f e c t i t . " 
The "weak, c r e a t e d and dependent Ego ... can be made per-
manent by adopting a c e r t a i n mode of l i f e and thereby 
b r i n g i n g i t i n t o contact with the ul t i m a t e source of l i f e . " 3 
Thus, f o r I q b a l i t i s "the deed that prepares the ego f o r 
d i s s o l u t i o n , or d i s c i p l i n e s him f o r a fu t u r e career."** 
1. P r i n g l e - P a t t i s o n , A.S. The I d e a of Immortality, Oxford, 1922 
P. 197. 
2. I q b a l quoted by Nicholson, R.A. I n t r o d u c t i o n to The S e c r e t s 
of the S e l f , p x x i v . 
3» Thoughts and R e f l e c t i o n s of I q b a l , p. 239. _ 
!+• The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n I s l a m , p. 119. 
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I n h i s e a r l y poetry, I q b a l seems to think of a l l human 
l i f e as being immortal. I n "Kinar-e-RavT," f o r i n s t a n c e , 
he s a y s : 
1 s t > (Bang-e-Dara p.95) -
Again, 
2 
(Bang-e-Dara p. 161+) 
Sometimes he speaks i n words reminiscent of S h e l l e y ' s "Adonais" 
1. S w i f t l y a c r o s s the r i v e r ' s bosom g l i d e s 
A boat, the oarsman w r e s t l i n g w i t h the waves, 
A s k i f f l i g h t - motioned as a d a r t i n g glance, 
Soon f a r beyond the eye's curved boundary. So g l i d e s the bark of mortal l i f e , i n the ocean Of e t e r n i t y so born, so v a n i s h i n g , Yet never knowing what i s death; f o r i t May disappear from s i g h t , but cannot p e r i s h . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Kiernan, V.G. Poems from I q b a l , p. 9) 
2. Those who d i e , die but are not a n n i h i l a t e d , I n r e a l i t y they do not par t from us. 
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i n which the dead Keats i s u l t i m a t e l y shown as having become 
a s t a r . ^ 
J "3 
1(Bahg-e-Dara p.165) 
I n h i s very moving elegy on h i s mother's death, I q b a l 
t r e a t s the question of death and immortality as i f t o 
suggest that human l i f e cannot p e r i s h : 
* -
a<Z^y J f a 
2. The forehead of our dead one s h i n e s i n t h i s darkness 
As s t a r s gleam i n a dark n i g h t . 
yy y / 
4 
(Bang-e-Dara pp 253-25U) 
1. L i f e ' s flame i s not destined to end i n ashes, 
T h i s p e a r l i s not de s t i n e d to be s h a t t e r e d , 
L i f e i s so precious i n the eyes of Nature, 
I n e v erything there i s the d e s i r e _ t o _ p r e s e r v e i t . - -
If-'death could^have - ^ erased <• the mark of l i f e , 
The u n i v e r s a l order would not have made i t so common. 
I f i t i s common and cheap, think t h a t death i s nothing, 
J u s t as to the l i v i n g s l e e p i s nothing. 
Unknowing One death's s e c r e t i s something e l s e , 
The impermanence of l i f e shows something e l s e . 
The a i r above the waves i s d e l i g h t f u l to see 
I t breaks up the r e s t l e s s wave to make a bubble. 
Then hides i t i n the bosom of the wave -
Now h e a r t l e s s l y i t wipes out i t s own m a n i f e s t a t i o n . 
I f the a i r could not again c r e a t e i t s own bubble 
Then i t would not have destroyed i t so c a r e l e s s l y . 
The nature of Being i s the prey of yearning, 
I t seeks to create 4more f l a w l e s s form. 
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The emphasis here i s on the evolution of l i f e towards 
g r e a t e r p e r f e c t i o n r a t h e r than on the e f f o r t involved on 
the part of the i n d i v i d u a l ego to win i t s r e s u r r e c t i o n . 
However, we know that already i n 1910, I q b a l was beginning 
to think of immortality not as "a s t a t e " but as "a process." 
L i f e o f f e r s man "a scope f o r e g o - a c t i v i t y , and death i s the 
2 
f i r s t t e s t of the s y n t h e t i c a c t i v i t y of the ego." T h i s 
id e a i s repeated throughout I q b a l ' s mature w r i t i n g s : 
s 
3 (Armagan-e-Hi j a z p. 2k5) 
or 
^(Payam-e-Mashriq p. 36) 
1. S t r a y R e f l e c t i o n s , p. 17« 
2. The Reconstruction of R e l i g i o u s Thought i n Is l a m , p. 119. 
3« I f Selfhood i s a l i v e then death i s but a stage i n l i f e , 
For love t e s t s i m m u t a b i l i t y by means of death, 
k. F e a r not; take thou a Selfhood more mature, 
Which grasping, a f t e r death thou s h a l t not d i e . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A.J. The T u l i p of S i n a i , p.10). 
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The problem of death and e v e r l a s t i n g l i f e i s envisaged 
i n a poem e n t i t l e d " E t e r n a l L i f e " 
(Payam-e-Mashriq p.108) 
Immortality i s not "a s t a t i c c o n d i t i o n to be achieved 
2 
and enjoyed i n an e t e r n i t y of r e s t f u l g l o r y . " I q b a l s a y s : 
^(Payam-e-Mashriq p. h i ) 
1. Think ye not that the Magi have f i n i s h e d t h e i r work: 
A thousand wines y e t undrunk are f r o t h i n g i n the vine's 
own heart. 
A meadow i s b e a u t i f u l , but thou cans t not l i v e as a bud _ 
f o r e v e r : 
D ivine breezes do t e a r the garment of l i f e from thee. 
I f thou h a s t w e l l comprehended the s e c r e t mystery of l i f e 
T r u s t not a heart that i s f r e e from the twinging thorn of 
d e s i r e . 
L i v e drawn w i t h i n t h y s e l f , mighty as a mountain 
Not l i k e a f l u t t e r i n g straw: beware, quick i s the 
wind and brave and burning the flame. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the 
R e l i g i o u s Philosophy of Muhammad I q b a l " p.177. 
2. Whittemore, R. "Iqbal»s Panentheism" P»75» 
3. Take not thy banquet on the shore, f o r there 
Too g e n t l y flows the melody of l i f e : 
Plunge i n the sea, do b a t t l e with the waves, 
For immortality i s won i n s t r i f e . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A. J . The T u l i p of S i n a i , p.12) 
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As the parable of the t h i r s t y b i r d i n Asrar-e-KhudT 
i l l u s t r a t e s , i f one i s a dew-drop one i s bound to be 
swalloi*ied by the b i r d , but i f one i s a diamond then one 
can withstand a l l f o r c e s of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n and d i s s o l u t i o n . 
I q b a l ' s b e l i e f i n c o n d i t i o n a l immortality i s regarded 
by one w r i t e r as "a s e r i o u s d e v i a t i o n from the orthodox 
teaching t h a t i s based on the Quranic v i s i o n of the l i f e 
beyond. I s l a m and C h r i s t i a n i t y c o n s i d e r the ego immortal 
as such and make i t s s t a t e i n the H e r e a f t e r depend on what 
2 
i t does here and now." Another w r i t e r , however, points 
out the emphasis placed by the Qor'an on the importance of 
man's e f f o r t s i n the d i r e c t i o n of immortality. "Those 
who do wish f o r the h e r e a f t e r , and s t r i v e t h e r e f o r with 
a l l due s t r i v i n g , and have f a i t h - they are the ones whose 
3 
s t r i v i n g i s acceptable" (Sura 17:19). I t has been 
observed by P r o f e s s o r Schimmel that Iqbal»s ideas on 
immortality f i n d support a l s o i n the works of many Western 
philosophers. 1* Pannwitz, f o r i n s t a n c e w r i t e s , " i f immor-
t a l i t y i s equal to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of what i s e t e r n a l i n 
man, then i t i s unthinkable t h a t men should be immortal 
i n the same manner. I n many of them there may be nothing 
e t e r n a l which would be worthy of i m m o r t a l i t y . "-* 
1. Asrar-e-KhudT pp 60-62. 
2. Vahlduddin, S. "The Philosophy of S i r Muhammad I q b a l " 
The Aryan P a t h ^ Bombay, December 1957. Volume X X V I I I , P.5U8. 
3. Var, B.A. Qur'anic E t h i c s , p.51. 
k» Schimmel, A. M. G a b r i e l ' s Wing, p.283. 
5. Pannwitz, R. quoted by Schimmel, A.M. Gabriel'sWirjg„ p.28J+. 
31U 
I q b a l , then, regards death, as the end of the weak but 
not of the s e l f - f o r t i f i e d ego which r e a l i s e s t h a t "we are 
t i m e l e s s , and i t i s p o s s i b l e to r e a l i s e our t i m e l e s s n e s s 
even i n t h i s l i f e . " I n J a v f d Nama, TTpu S u l t a n , the 
martyr-king, speaks of death as i f i t were a moment of 
triumph r a t h e r than of horror: 
A / // ^ s 
s 
2 ( J a v r d Nama p.217) 
1. I q b a l quoted-by Nicholson R.A. i n I n t r o d u c t i o n to The S e c r e t s of the S e l f , p. xxv. 
2. I f you have a b r e a s t worthy of an arrow, L i v e l i k e a f a l c o n , and l i k e a f a l c o n d i e , Immortality i s i n the breadth of l i f e -
I do not ask of God f o r length of days. The Man of God i s a l i o n , and death a fawn; Death i s but one s t a t i o n f o r him of a hundred. 
The p e r f e c t man swoops upon death Even as a f a l c o n swooping upon a dove. The s l a v e d i e s every moment i n f e a r or death; The f e a r of death makes l i f e f o r him a thing forbidden, The f r e e servant has another d i g n i t y , Death bestows upon him a new l i f e . He i s anxious f o r the s e l f , but not f o r death, 
S i n c e to the f r e e death i s no more than an i n s t a n t . 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A.J. J a v l d Nama, pp 133-13U-« 
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I q b a l has a ha b i t of seeing the f a m i l i a r i n an unfamiliar 
way, and so onee again he makes a r a t h e r s t a r t l i n g comparison 
of man w i t h God: 
1 ( J a v T d Nama p. 39) 
The immortality which Man wins i s b e t t e r than the immortality 
of God: 
2(Zabur-e-'A;jam pj.237) 
The Man of God does not f e a r death, f o r death i s but the 
opening of another door. When death comes, i t f i n d s him 
s m i l i n g . — - - - ^ /j— . ~. ~~ ~~ ~ 
) ~ ' -
^{Armagan-e-Hi j a z p. 165) 
1. Though we are b i r d s without wings or f e a t h e r s , 
We know more of the s c i e n c e of death than God. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Arberry, A.J. JavTd Nama, p.U2) 
2. The Immortality of God I s not His deed's reward: I t i s an elemental a t t r i b u t e , Not a sou g h t - a f t e r f r u i t . Par b e t t e r i s th a t immortality Which i s won by a borrowed s o u l 
fs i t s l o v e ' s need, i t s f r e n z y ' s goal. T r a n s l a t i o n by gusain,H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery.p.19J 
3 . What i s the s i g n of the f a i t h f u l man? 
When death comes, he has a smile on h i s l i p s . 
The death, to be f e a r e d i s not the p h y s i c a l event of 
dying. I n "Gulshan -e-Raz-e-Jadrd," I q b a l speaks of the 
death of the body and of the s o u l : 
. /J . 1/ // . 
S> > ^ J*>^J^* 
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p.230) 
1. Because you cannot see the l i g h t 
Revealed to the S e l f ' s eyes, 
You think i t i s mere mortal dust. 
But a t i t s . p e r f e c t b e s t , 
I t i s immune from death, 
The stoppage of mere breath 
The body's death i s not the death to dread, 
But death of that more s u b t l e kind -
Death of the s o u l , the heart, the mind; 
The death i n which the S e l f l i e s dead; 
I n which love's task i s disavowed; 
I n which you s e l f i s h l y deny 
Your spark to someone e l s e ' s c l a y ; 
I n which you t a i l o r your own shroud 
And witness your own f u n e r a l . 
T h i s i s the death which a l l 
The time i s s t a l k i n g you; 
T h i s i s the death which you have to eschew. 
T h i s death digs your grave i n s i d e you, 
With your Recording Angel a s t r i d e you. 
( T r a n s l a t i o n by Husain, H. The New Sose-G-arden of Mystery, P . 15 ) . 
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Following the t r a d i t i o n so dear to the mystics: *mtltu-
gabla an tamutu' (die before you die) Iqbal believes i n the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of fi n d i n g a p u r i f y i n g death even before the 
time of death. He says: 
1(JavTd Nama p. 18) 
Barzakh. According to I q b a l , the struggle through which 
man wins immortality i s not one which culminates with death* 
Death is the l a s t s e r i a l event. 2 Resurrection and immor-
t a l i t y are not external events, they are accomplished w i t h i n 
the s e l f and are "the consummation of a l i f e process w i t h i n 
3 
the ego." I f present action has s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r t i f i e d 
the ego against the shock that physical dissolution brings, 
then death " i s only a kind of passage to what the Quran 
describes_as -Barzakh V.. a staW of consciousness charac-
terised by a change in the ego's a t t i t u d e towards time and 
space."^ 
1. You who are l i k e a dead man i n the grave's c o f f e r , 
Resurrection i s possible without the sound of the Trumpet. 
(Translation by Arberry, A.J. JavTd Nama, p.32) 
2. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time i n the Religious 
Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal" p.l7U« 
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p.120. 
k> I b i d , pp 119-120. 
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The concept of 'Barzakh' (Sura 25:55; 55:19) has been 
described my Muslim theologians and mystics " p a r t l y as a 
temporary, p a r t l y as a spatial? waiting period or room 
between death and resurrection, and which l a t e r on developed 
i n t o a kind of purgatory." This concept interested Iqbal 
2 
throughout his l i f e . To Professor Nicholson he wrote, 
"After death there may be an i n t e r v a l of r e l a x a t i o n , as the 
Koran speaks of a 'barzakh,' or intermediate state, which 
lasts u n t i l the Day of Resurrection."^ According to I q b a l , 
4Barzakh * "does not seem to be merely a passive state of 
expectation; i t i s a state i n which the ego catches a 
glimpse of fresh aspects of Reality, and prepares himself 
f o r adjustment to these aspects."** The ego, therefore, 
does not relax even i n 'Barzakh.' 
Resurrection of the body. I n passing Iqbal touches the 
question whether the resurrection of the ego i s also accom-
panied by the resurrection of the body. He refers to Shah 
Wair Ullah "the^ l a s t great theologian of Islam," who i s 
inc l i n e d to think that ego's resurrection "does involve at 
least some kind of physical medium suitable to the ego's new 
environment."^ Also, i n his l e t t e r to Professor Nicholson 
he says, "although l i f e abhors r e p e t i t i o n i n i t s evolution, 
1. Schimmel, A.M. Gabriel's Wing, p.277* 
2. I b i d . 
3. Iqbal quoted by Nicholson, R.A. i n Introduction t o The 
Secrets of the Self, p. xxiv . 
i+. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, ppl20. 
5. I b i d . p.l2"2": 
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yet on Bergson's pr i n c i p l e s the resurrection of the body-
too, as Wildon Carr says, i s quite possible. 1 Iqbal 
himself i s rather non-committal and vague on t h i s point. 
He points out that , "the nature of the universe i s such 
that i t i s open to i t to maintain i n some other way the 
kind of i n d i v i d u a l i t y necessary f o r the f i n a l working out 
of human action, even a f t e r the di s i n t e g r a t i o n of what 
appears to specify his i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n his present envi-
ronment. What that other way i s we do not know. Nor do 
we gain any fur t h e r i n s i g h t i n t o the nature of the 'second 
creation* by associating i t with some kind of body, however 
subtle i t may be. The analogies of the Quran only suggest 
i t as a f a c t ; they are not meant to reveal i t s nature and 
character. Philosophically speaking, therefore, we cannot 
go f u r t h e r than t h i s - that i n view of the past history of 
man i t i s highly improbable that his career should come to 
2 
an end with the dissolution of his body." 
Heaven and Hell. Iqbal does not regard Heaven and Hell as 
l o c a l i t i e s , but states of the s p i r i t . H e l l i s the p a i n f u l 
r e a l i s a t i o n of one's f a i l u r e as a man and Heaven the joy of 
triumph over the forces of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . ^ Professor 
Schimmel points out that Iqbal's conception of Heaven and 
Hell i s similar to that of Ibn 'Arab! who considers Hell t o 
1. Iqbal quoted by Nicholson, R.A. Introduction to The Secrets 
of the Self, p. xxiv. 
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, pp 122-123. 
3. I b i d , p.123. 
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be the r e a l i s a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l s e l f as slave, and 
Heaven as the r e a l i s a t i o n of the s e l f i n the state of 
'rubublya?, the Lordship. 
Iqbal conceives of Hell not as "a p i t of everlasting 
tor t u r e i n f l i c t e d by a revengeful God; i t i s a corrective 
experience which may make a hardened ego once more sensitive 
to the l i v i n g breeze of Divine Grace* Nor i s Heaven a 
holiday... the recipient of Divine i l l u m i n a t i o n i s not merely 
a passive r e c i p i e n t . Every act of a free ego creates a new 
s i t u a t i o n , and thus offers f u r t h e r opportunities of creative 
.2 
unfolding." 
The journey of the ego does not end i n Paradise. As 
'AJIjar had stated "When the way towards God i s f i n i s h e d , the 
way i n God begins."^ The Man of God is not enticed by the 
so-called joys of Paradise: 
- i • 
k 
(£arb-e-KalIm p.W) 
In Payam-e-Mashriq he shows Goethe refusing to stay with 
the houri because 
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p.285. 
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam, p.123. 
3» Afcfcar quoted by Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p.286. 
1+. The angels say: "The f a i t h f u l i s gracious," 
The houris complain: "The f a i t h f u l i s aloof1" 
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(Payam-e-Mashriq p. 11+9) 
For Iqbal the idea of a s t a t i c paradise i s quite unbearable 
(Javid Nama p.30) 
Goethe's prayer could also be Iqbal's i n s p i r i t : "L.et us 
continue working u n t i l we are called back by the Divine 
S p i r i t , return i n t o the Ether. May then, the Eternally 
l i v i n g God, not withhold from us new a c t i v i t i e s , analogous 
3 
t o those which we were used to i n t h i s world." 
1. The lover's heart dies from eternal paradise. 
2. I f our salvation amounts to freedom from yearning, 
Then the grage i s better than a paradise of hue and scent. 3» Goethe quoted by Schimmel, A.M. Talk on The Reconstruction 
of Religious Thought i n Islam at Lahore on 13«U<>61. 
bly>^ 
